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ABSTRACT
The legal dispute over the system of deep sea bed exploitation was 
one of the critical and most controversial problems that faced the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. In spite of that, the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea declared the deep sea bed and its 
resources to be the common heritage of mankind and its exploitation 
exclusively for the benefit of mankind under an international regime. 
Some states have enacted unilateral legislation for deep sea bed mining 
providing a legal framework for their nationals to exploit the resources of 
the deep sea bed on the basis of freedom of high seas.
The objective of this thesis is to attempt an examination of one of the 
important current problems of the international law of the sea, that is the 
legal system of deep sea bed resources exploitation.
This study contains four chapters.
Chapter one presents the concept of the deep sea bed as a "common 
heritage of mankind." It provides an historical background beginning 
from Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo's proposal, and through the 
General Assembly resolutions to the United Nations Convention on the 
law of the sea. It will also consider the issue of the legal status of the deep 
sea bed as one of the important questions which had been debated since the 
emergence of the new concept of the common heritage of mankind.
Chapter two analyses the system of exploitation and its essential 
elements such as transfer of technology, production control...etc, 
incorporated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with 
reference to its provisions of Part XI and Annex III.
Chapter three examines the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA). 
This Authority is endowed with a significant role to play in implementing
the system of exploitation embodied in the Convention, through 
managing, organizing and controlling the deep sea bed activities. More 
specifically the chapter discusses the functions and the structure of the 
Authority, and examines the system of deep sea bed disputes settlement.
Chapter four looks at the alternative regime of unilateral legislation. 
It comprises five sections. Section one deals with the common 
characteristics of unilateral legislation. Section two discusses the area of 
application of the unilateral legislation. Section three outlines with the 
liabilities under this regime such as financial terms, transfer of 
technology, diligence requirement...etc. Section four discusses the issue 
of the unilateral legislation and international law. Finally, section five 
focusses on examining the Reciprocating States Agreements (RSA).
The study concludes that only an agreed international legal system 
can secure and protect the benefits of mankind. Thus a compromise to 
resolve the basic difficulties and reconcile the various conflicting interests 
involved should be reached.
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.D.I.
A.F.D.I.
A.J.I.L.
A.S.I.L. Proc.
Am.U.L. Rev. 
Area
Authority
B.L.D.
Boston.U.I.LJ.
B.Y.I.L.
Cal.W.I.L.
Cam L. J.
Can B.R.
Can Y.B.I.L.
Academie de Droit International
A nnuaire F rancais de D ro it 
International
American Journal of International 
Law
Proceedings of the American Society 
of International Law
American University Law Review
Sea bed and Ocean Floor and Subsoil 
Thereof Beyond the Lim its of 
National Jurisdiction
International Sea-Bed Authority
Black's Law Dictionary
Boston University International Law 
Journal
British Yearbook of International Law
California Western of International 
Law
Cambridge Law Journal
Canadian Bar Review
Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law
Convention The 1982 Convention on the Law of the
For.Aff.
Harvard I.L.J. 
I.C.L.Q.
I.L.C. Rep.
I.L.C. Yearbook
I.L.M.
ICJ
ICNT
ILC
Indian J.I.L. 
Int'l.Law.
ISNT
Italian Y.I.L. 
J.Mar.Law & Com.
J.W.T.L.
Ll.M.C.L.Q.
L.Sea.Inst. Proc.
iv
Sea
Foreign Affairs
Harvard International Law Journal
International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly
International Law Commission Reports
In ternational Law Com m ission 
Yearbook
International Legal Materials
International Court of Justice
Inform al Composite N egotiating 
Text
International Law Commission
Indian Journal of International Law
International Lawyer
Informal Single Negotiating Text
Italian Yearbook of International Law
Journal of M aritim e Law and 
Commerce
Journal of World Trade Law
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly
Proceedings of the Annual Conference 
of the Law of the Sea Institute
LOSC
Lou.L.Rev.
N.L.R.
N.R.F.
Netherlands I.L.R.
Netherlands Y.B.I.L.
O.D.I.L.A.
Off. Rec.
Oreg.L.R.
PIP
R.G.D.I.P.
Res.
RSNT
San Diego L. Rev. 
Syracuse J.I.L. & Com.
Texas I.L.F.
Texas I.L.J.
Tulsa L.J.
U.Day.L. Rev.
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Louisiana Law Review 
Natural Resources Lawyer 
Natural Resources Forum 
Netherlands International Law Review
Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law
Ocean Development and International 
Law Journal
Official Records
Oregon Law Review
Preparatory Investments Protection
Revue General de Droit International 
Public
Resolution
Revised Single Negotiating Text
San Diego Law Review
Syracuse Journal of International Law 
and Commerce
Texas International Law Forum 
Texas International Law Journal 
Tulsa Law Journal 
University of Dayton Law Review
1INTRODUCTION
Since Pardo's 1967 question of which principle should govern the 
deep sea bed and who has the right to exploit its resources in 1967, the 
issue has been critical and has long attracted the attention of those 
involved in matters relative to the law of the sea up to the present time. It 
has received considerable attention from international forctm like the 
United Nations and legal writers, and constituted a major concern of the 
land-based producers which fear the adverse effects on their economies 
because of any commercial production of the deep sea bed resources.
Moreover, because of the strategic and economic importance of the 
deep sea bed and its resources, the issue received considerably concern. 
The economic significance of the sea has increased when natural resources 
of different kinds have been found thereto in prodigious quantities. 
Manganese nodules, which contain significantly large amounts of nickel, 
copper, cobalt and manganese, cover around 25 percent of the ocean 
floor, a weight evaluated at about 600 billions tons which is enough for 
approximatively 400 thousand years.1
Modem technology made the exploitation of the deep sea bed 
resources feasible. In fact, advanced ocean mining technology has 
conquered the seas and it has become clear that the resources of the deep 
sea bed can be progressively exploited if not fully recovered for economic 
purposes more especially.
Marine resources had long been regarded as abundant resources and 
therefore, free for all. Thus, the principle of abundance governed the 
exploitation activity in the seas. It was only after world war n, and due to
1 N. Shaw, International Law, 272 (1977).
the advances in marine technology that, it became possible to exploit some 
parts of the ocean. States promulgated different laws to appropriate some 
areas of the sea. In this connection, Truman in 1945 issued a presidential 
proclamation to extend the national jurisdiction on the so-called 
Continental Shelf granting the United States sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploration and exploitation of the living and non-living 
resources. Many countries from Latin America and the Arab Gulf 
followed suit.2
To depress the effects of crawling national jurisdiction, which is due 
to dramatic development of technology, the importance of deep sea bed 
and its resources has come before the United Nations General Assembly 
When Ambassador Arvid Pardo submitted a proposal in 1967 affirming 
the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and its resources being 
the common heritage of mankind. In 1969, the United Nations General 
Assembly intervened with a resolution of 15 December placing a 
moratorium on deep sea bed mining. One year later, 1970, the United 
Nations General Assembly intercedes a Declaration of Principles of 
Which it declared that the deep sea bed and its resources are the common 
heritage of mankind. It further stated that the Area and its resources shall 
not be subject to appropriation and no sovereignty or sovereign rights 
will be claimed by any state or person over any part thereof.
Since the Caracas Session in 1974, participants from different socio­
economic systems have had disputes over the contingent deep sea bed 
access of private entities and the International Sea-Bed Authority. In other 
words, during UNCLOS III, participant states made a stand as to who 
would exploit the deep sea bed resources and under which principle 
should the resources be exploited.
Reaching an agreement between the developed states, which have
2 W. Monton, The Continental Shelf, 9 (1952).
3made efforts to call upon the extension of the freedom of the high seas 
principle to the exploitation of the resources of the Area on the one hand, 
and developing states which have tried to put into effect the common 
heritage of mankind principle in order to protect the interests of mankind 
on the other, was the most difficult task for the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea negotiators and a major point of 
controversy among participants.
From the beginning of the negotiations, delegates to the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea strongly held dissimilar views on the 
international legal regime which govern the deep sea bed mining. The 
outstanding issues of disagreement in particular were centered on the 
system of exploitation, the legal status o$ieep sea bed and the structure of 
the International Sea-Bed Authority.
Developing countries advocated the common heritage of mankind as 
a legal principle and binding upon all states and that exploitation of the 
resources will be carried out on a common basis rather than on individual 
grounds. They strongly supported a powerful Authority as the sole 
representative of mankind. This Authority will exclusively have rights to 
manage and use the resources of the Area.
However, developed countries rejected the common heritage concept 
as being vague, imprecise and having no legal content. Therefore, it is not 
an appropriate principle to be applicable as a legal status of the Area and 
its resources. Further developed states opposed the creation of an 
Authority which enjoys discretionary powers to adopt rules to regulate 
activities in the deep sea bed. Instead, they favoured an Authority which 
only grants licenses to the miners and adopt measures for the protection of 
the marine environment. This impasse constituted a real obstacle for the 
establishment of an agreed international regime between those countries.
4Despite the fact that awkwardness made negotiations circuitous 
because of the divergence in the ideological and economic grounds of the 
states participants, the efforts of the participants were fruitful in reaching 
a compromise between developed and developing countries. The 
compromise was a parallel access to the Area and its resources known as 
the "parallel system" which was to a great extent worked out by the 
developed states. Under this system, the Authority and state parties to the 
Convention and their entities would conduct activities of exploration and 
exploitation side by side in the Area.
However, when the Conference reached a final decision to adopt the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, some developed countries showed 
dissatisfaction with Part XI of the Convention, which envisaged the 
parallel system of deep sea bed exploitation. These countries felt obliged 
to take a different route and got under way with unilateral legislation 
embodying a different system of mining the deep sea bed and its 
resources, in order to provide a legal regime under which their nationals 
explore deep sea bed and exploit its resources.
The question which we are confronted with, here, is, what is the legal 
system of deep sea bed exploitation?. Although such a study is very broad 
for the aim of this dissertation in that every point of it merits a separate 
study, it is the purpose of this work to consider this issue through 
analyzing and examining the legal system of deep sea bed exploitation.
The present study consists of four chapters.
Chapter one deals with the concept of deep sea bed (referred to as the 
"Area" or the "common heritage of mankind"). The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide an historical background on the development of the 
concept which went through many stages until the adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Owing to the relation which
exists between the status of the Area and the system of exploitation 
incorporated in each regime, this chapter will also consider the issue of 
the legal status of the deep sea bed as one of the important questions yet to 
be resolved in international doctrine and legal writings.
Chapter two is concerned with the system of exploitation as laid 
down in the United Nations Convention regime. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to analyses the major elements of the system in order to 
demonstrate how the resources of the Area should be exploited. It deals
-rye
with the core of the system/'parallel system" as the basis on which the 
Authority and private entities carry out activities of exploration and 
exploitation of the deep sea bed and its resources. Financial terms, 
transfer of technology, production limitation control, pioneer investment 
and review conference are discussed in this chapter. Concerning the issue 
of pioneer investment, attention is focussed on the problem of 
overlapping claims for mining sites and the difficulties which faced the 
Preparatory Commission on the International Sea-Bed Authority and the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea to find an acceptable solution 
to this problem.
Chapter three is devoted to discussing the mechanism of the 
International Sea-Bed Authority as the sole representative of mankind in 
carrying out deep sea bed mining activities. It discusses the important 
functions of the International Sea-Bed Authority and its organs, their 
composition and decision-making system. Moreover, and because of the 
indirect relation between the Authority and the Sea-Bed Disputes 
Chamber, it also examines the system of settlement of sea bed disputes.
Chapter four aims to analyse the system incorporated in unilateral 
legislation in order to throw light on how this system differs from the 
system embodied in the Convention. Section one, two and three outline the 
common features of the domestic legislation. In section four, the issue of
unilateral legislation and international law will be examined. The final 
section deals with the reciprocating states agreements under which 
unilateral legislation are co-ordinated and creating the so-called 
"reciprocating states regime."
The literature concerning studies in the deep sea bed mining is 
voluminous. Nevertheless, different sources were used in this work:
(I) Series of Official Records of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea; (II) the United Nations Publications; 
(III) International Legal Materials; (IV) Reports of the International Law 
Commission, (V) Reports of the Preparatory Commission on the 
International Sea-Bed Authority and the International Tribunal on the 
Law of the Sea and (VI) the legal writings of international lawyers.
7CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONCEPT OF THE DEEP SEA BED
The deep sea bed (Area) is defined as the sea bed and ocean floor and 
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (LOSC. art. 1(1). 
It is also referred to as the ’’common heritage of mankind.”
The theory of the "common heritage of mankind" was first 
enunciated by the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson in 
1966. He said:
Under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the 
prospects of rich harvests and mineral wealth to create a new 
form of colonial competition among the maritime nations, we 
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands 
under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and 
oceans bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human 
beings.1
In the following year, on August 17, 1967, the first significant 
recognition of the economic and political importance of the deep sea bed 
was made by the Ambassador of Malta, Dr Arvid Pardo. In a famous 
speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, he initiated the 
discussion on the deep sea bed issue, declaring that the deep sea bed should 
be considered as "common heritage of mankind" and not as "freedom of 
high seas." He also suggested that the deep sea bed should not be subject to 
national appropriation. He urged the establishment of an international 
agency to serve as a trustee for all mankind.
Ever since Ambassador Pardo raised the importance of the deep sea
1 Quoted in L. Brooke, The Current Status of Deep Seabed Mining, (1983-84)
24 Virg.J.LL., p.371.
8bed and its resources and recognized that the common heritage of 
mankind as the only comprehensive principle for the sea bed and ocean 
floor beyond national jurisdiction, the "common heritage of mankind" 
concept has been reflected in numerous resolutions in particular, the 
Declaration of Principles. In 1969, a resolution was passed by the General 
Assembly establishing a moratorium on deep sea bed mining recognizing 
the common interests of mankind. A year later, in 1970, the General 
Assembly adopted a Declaration of Principles announcing the formulation 
of an international regime administered by an international agency.
In spite of support by a great number of states for the Declaration of 
Principles, the members of the United Nations disagreed on the exact 
meaning and the legal content of the "common heritage of mankind." One 
lawyer stated that,
common heritage of mankind, no matter how well motivated, in 
a legally binding document...carries no clear jurid ical 
connotation but belongs to the realm of politics, philosophy or 
morality and not law.2
Developed states viewed that the meaning of the concept is 
ambiguous and subject to legal problems for the future regime of the deep 
sea bed. Mr Oda of Japan believed that the concept of common heritage of 
mankind "might give rise to unnecessary confusion in the establishment of 
a legal regime applicable to the Area, and would therefore be 
undesirable."3
Moreover, developed states maintained that the deep sea bed 
exploitation is a freedom of high seas, which has been incorporated in the
2 S. Grove, The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind a Political, Moral, 
or Legal Innovation, 9 San Diego L.Rev., p.402.
3 UN. Doc. A.AC.138.SC.1.SR. 14 August 1969, p.24.
reciprocating states agreements and unilateral legislation. Developing 
states, especially the Group of 77 rejected both concepts: "freedom of 
high seas" and "res nullius", and endorsed the "common heritage of 
mankind" principle. With respect to the legal status of the deep sea bed, 
the Group of 77 stated that the freedom of high seas does not apply to the 
exploitation of the sea bed areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 
because when the common heritage of mankind principle emerged the 
exploitation of the resources of the deep sea bed was beyond the capacity 
of states. The Group went on to argue that even on the assumption that the 
freedom of high seas principle would be applicable to the exploitation 
activity, "it would certainly have ceased to be applicable in consequence of 
the Declaration of Principles" which is an event "reflecting a conviction 
incompatible with "opinio juris sive necessitatis." The Group added that,
there is an obvious difference in legal status as regards the 
superjacent waters of the area and as regards the sea bed, subsoil 
and resources of the area. Whereas the legal status of the 
superjacent waters is that of res communis, the legal nature of 
the sea bed, subsoil and resources thereof is that of an indivisible 
and inalienable common heritage of mankind.4
The concept of the common heritage of mankind was finally 
confirmed as a legal status for the deep sea bed in the Final Draft of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, the Area 
"common heritage of mankind" shall not be subject either to sovereign 
claims or appropriation. All states, have the right to administer and 
regulate the activities in the Area under the control of an international 
agency, and share the benefits gained from the mining of the resources on 
an equitable basis. The concept of the common heritage of mankind went 
through many developments as a legal principle applicable to the deep sea
4 UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.XI, pp.80-82.
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bed and its resources.
This chapter will examine the historic development of the concept of 
deep sea bed and discuss its legal status according to the principles which 
have been applied to it.
Section 1. History of the Concept of Deep Sea Bed
The concept of the common heritage of mankind was the basis on 
which the future international regime of exploitation of the resources of 
the deep sea bed was to be established.
l.l.The Maltese Proposal
In a verbal note addressed by the Permanent Mission of Malta to the 
United Nations to the Secretaiy General on August 17,1967, Arvid Pardo 
requested the inclusion of an item entitled "Declaration and Treaty 
Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the 
Seabed and of the Ocean Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of 
Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of their Resources in the 
Interests of Mankind"5 in the twenty-second Session of the General 
Assembly. The reasons which explained why Malta proposed that the item 
calling for the establishment of a treaty on the question of the deep sea bed 
should be taken into consideration, are set out in the accompanying 
Memorandum.
5 U.N. Doc. A.6695, 18 August 1967.
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In the Memorandum attached to the verbal note, Malta expressed that 
the sea bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction had not been 
appropriated so far because of their technological unfeasibility to be used 
for economic exploitation of their resources. However, the technological 
progress of new techniques reached by the developed countries might 
change the situation. Gradually, jurisdiction on the sea bed and ocean 
floor could extend beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and be 
subjected to national appropriation which would consequently lead to the 
militarization of the ocean floor and depletion of its resources for the 
national benefit by the developed countries. Therefore, Malta sought 
immediate steps to establish a treaty declaring that the seabed and ocean 
floor is a "common heritage of mankind" and not subject to national 
appropriation; should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes; the 
exploitation of the sea bed should be carried out to safeguard the interests 
of mankind and the benefit derived from such exploitation must be used 
for promoting the development of the poor countries.
Malta felt that the time had come to declare the sea bed and ocean 
floor a "common heritage of mankind" and suggested that, immediate 
steps should be taken to draft a treaty embodying, inter alia, the following 
principles:
1. The sea bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the 
limits of present national jurisdiction, are not subject to national 
appropriation in any manner whatsoever.
2. The exploration of the sea bed and of the ocean floor, underlying 
the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, shall be 
undertaken in a manner consistent with the principles and purposes of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
3. The use of the sea bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas
12
beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and their economic 
exploitation shall be undertaken with the aim of safeguarding the interests 
of mankind. The net financial benefits derived from the use and 
exploitation of the sea bed and of the ocean floor shall be used primarily 
to promote the development of poor countries.
4. The sea bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the 
limits of present national jurisdiction, shall be reserved exclusively for 
peaceful purposes in perpetuity.6
When the request was accepted, Dr Arvid Pardo was invited on 
November 1, 1967, to introduce the item before the First Committee of 
the General Assembly. He made a historic speech of over three hours, 
referring to the rapid progress of technology made by advanced countries 
which had made it possible to exploit the resources of the sea bed. He 
pointed out that the Area was also of vital strategic importance, where an 
effective exploitation for military and economic purposes could be 
feasible because of new technology.
Pardo's concern was to end national claims to appropriate the sea bed 
and to have its resources exploited under the aegis of an effective 
international agency which would not act as a sovereign, but as a trustee 
for the whole of mankind. Pardo stressed in his speech the establishment 
of an effective international regime under which the international 
community would be able to avoid the dangers of national claims to 
appropriate the sea bed and ocean floor. Lastly, he called upon the 
General Assembly to take action to declare the sea bed and ocean floor the 
"common heritage of mankind" to be used and exploited exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind, taking into account the 
interests and needs of developing countries. Ultimately, due to the Maltese
6 Note verbal, dated 17 August 1967 from the Permanent Mission of Malta to 
the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary General. Ibid, pp.2-3.
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initiative, the General Assembly reached a compromise after an extensive 
debate in the First Committee. It adopted the Resolution 2340 (XXIL) of 
18 December 1967,7 and created an Ad-Hoc Committee composed of 
thirty five members to study the peaceful uses of the sea bed and ocean 
floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. At the following session, 
the General Assembly reconstituted the Ad-Hoc Committee into a 
Standing Seabed Committee entitled "The Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction" [hereinafter referred to as "the Sea-Bed Committee"]. The 
Sea-Bed Committee was enlarged from thirty five to fourthy two in 1968, 
in 1970 to around eighty six, and in 1971 it was enlarged to ninthy one 
members. This Committee was charged with making studies and 
recommendations on the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of 
the sea bed and ocean floor as well as for the legal and economic issues 
related to the exploitation of the sea bed.
Clearly, the Maltese proposal was effective and almost universally 
supported because it was concerned with the hopes and interests of the 
international community.
1.2. UN General Assembly Resolutions
1. The Moratorium Resolution
The most controversial endeavour to enforce negotiations on the 
question of the deep sea bed before 1970 was the promulgation of the 
M oratorium  R eso lu tio n .8 It was of particular concern to the
7 G.A. Res. 2340 (XXIL), 18 December 1967.
8 G.A. Res. 2574 (XXIV), 15 December 1969, in (1970) 9 I.L.M., pp.422-
23.
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international community to establish a moratorium on any commercial 
activity of deep sea bed resources until the establishment of an 
international regime. Because of the belie f  that the advanced technology 
realized by developed countries might enable those countries to exploit 
the resources of the common heritage of mankind before an agreed 
international regime is established, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a resolution on December 15, 1969 by a vote of sixty two in 
favour to twenty eight against, with twenty eight abstention. This 
resolution declared that, pending the establishment of an international 
regime:
1. States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from 
all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea bed and 
ocean floor, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
2. No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be 
recognized.
The Moratorium Resolution was faced by a vigorous opposition 
from a number of technologically advanced countries. For instance, the 
United States did not want the freedom to explore and exploit the 
resources of the sea bed to be restricted by recommendations which have 
no legal binding. This position was confirmed by the statement by Mr 
Stenvenson, the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of States:
The resolution is recommendatory and not obligatory. The 
United States is, therefore, not legally bound by it. The United 
States is, however required to give good faith consideration to 
the resolution in determining its policies.
He added that,
the United States considers the recommendations contained in
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the Moratorium Resolution an important statement to be given 
weight in the determination of United States policy. The United 
States is not, however, obligated to implement the 
recommendations and has made clear its opposition to the 
concept.9
The United Kingdom viewed that they do not believe that the General 
Assembly by virtue of its recommendations purports to modify existing 
international law.10
This resolution was passed in the First Committee by fifty two votes 
to twenty seven, with thirty five abstention. The aim of the resolution was 
to endorse the principle of the common heritage of mankind by halting 
any attempt to exploit the resources of the sea bed and ocean floor until an 
international regime is established. In other words, the Moratorium 
Resolution sought from the developed countries to stop enhancing their 
deep sea bed technology and techniques until the international community 
established a treaty on the regime of the sea bed and ocean floor.
The developing countries have therefore, attached a great aspiration 
and importance to this resolution. They reiterated that the sea bed and 
ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction should be regarded as a 
"common heritage of mankind" and its resources should be exploited for 
the benefit of the whole mankind. In expressing the views of the countries 
which supported the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" and 
which voted in favour of the Moratorium Resolution, Mr W. Pinto, the 
representative of Sri Lanka stated that,
In our view, it was a solemn expression of the opinion held by a 
substantial majority of the members of the United Nations that 
there existed a moral obligation on all countries, developed and
9 Quoted in E. D. Brown, The Area Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction, (1986) Vol.n, p.D.222.
10 UN. Doc. A.C.1.PV. 1709 (1969).
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developing, to cooperate with one another to achieve a rational 
and equitable regime for the sea bed, and not to take any action 
in the interim period which would have the effect of prejudicing 
that endeavour. A part from this, my delegation felt that it could 
be of real practical assistance exploitation and in building up 
pressure for early agreement on an international regime, we 
saw it as addressed primarily to the private sector in the 
developed countries who would thus be placed on notice that the 
mles of exploitation of the deep sea bed had not yet been worked 
out. The private investor being well-known to be a prudent and 
cautious individual, with plenty of alternative and lucrative 
investments on dry land as it were, might be slow thereafter to 
invest in ventures operating on the deep ocean floor while the 
law remained in a state of flux.11
Thus, the Moratorium Resolution did not create any sense of binding 
rules upon the developed states because the dispute was completely 
controversial over the character of the regime which governs the sea bed 
and ocean floor. However, for the developing countries the resolution was 
an important step towards protecting the common heritage of mankind.
2. Declaration of Principles
The Declaration of Principles 2749 (XXV), which embodied six 
preambular and fifteen paragraphs, was adopted by the General Assembly 
by votes, one hundered eight in favour, none against and fourteen 
abstention. While there was a general agreement on the concept of the 
common heritage of mankind between developing and developed states, 
these countries disputed the exact meaning of this principle. For the 
developed states, the concept was without any legal content. However, 
developing states viewed that the concept has a legal basis.
In response to the request of the twenty fourth session of the General
11 Quoted in P. S. Rao, The Public Order of Ocean Resources, (1975) p.85.
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Assembly, the Legal Sub-Committee of the Sea-Bed Committee held a 
series of formal and informal meetings held from March to August 1970 
which, failed to reach a final draft Declaration of Principles. However, 
the Chairman of the Sea-Bed Committee, Mr F. Amerasinghe, made an 
enormous effort to reach the draft Declaration of Principles in relation 
with the issue of the sea bed and ocean floor. After extensive negotiations 
and debates between the members, a recommendation for a draft of 
general principles was passed to the General Assembly by the Sea-Bed 
Committee. On December 17, 1970, the General Assembly accepted the 
recommendation and adopted the resolution 2749 (XXV) entitled 
"Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, and 
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction."12
This resolution affirmed that the legal regime of high seas is not 
applicable to the exploration of the deep sea bed and the exploitation of its 
resources. The resolution declared that the deep sea bed and its resources 
are the "common heritage of mankind"; the deep sea bed (Area) is not 
subject to appropriation and no state shall claim or exercise sovereignty 
or sovereign rights over it and its resources; exploration and exploitation 
activities shall be governed by an international regime to be established; 
the Area shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and the 
activities shall be conducted for the benefit of the whole mankind, 
irrespective of the geographical location of the states, taking into account 
the interests of the developing countries.
The Declaration of Principles indicates that the legal regime of the 
deep sea bed is the "common heritage of mankind" and its exploitation 
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind. The Declaration was 
regarded as a milestone for the future international legal regime of the
12 G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970, in (1971) 10 I.L.M., pp.220-
23.
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deep sea bed, under which the Area is not subject to appropriation or any 
national claims. Such actions would be regarded as illegal. The 
Declaration of Principles instigated many legal questions. Among them: 
does the Declaration create a new international law principle to govern 
the sea bed of high seas?. On what basis, would the exploitation and 
distribution of the mineral resources be realized?. Developed and 
developing countries had different views and opinions. Developed states 
confirmed that the Declaration does not create any principles of 
international law and therefore, are considered as recommendations. On 
the other hand, developing states affirmed that the Declaration raises the 
inception of a new regulatory measure and a principle of international 
law. Thus, any exploitation of the resources outside the regime of the 
Declaration is regarded as violative to it and is illegal.
The General Assembly of the United Nations lacks formal legislative 
power. Its resolutions are generally regarded as being without any legal 
binding upon state members of the United Nations. According to Articles 
10 to 14 of the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly is 
allowed to adopt resolutions, which are merely recommendations to the 
state members and are not legally binding upon these states. Article 13 (1) 
of the Charter provides that, the General Assembly is charged with 
making recommendations in order to promote "international cooperation 
in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification." However, despite the lack of 
legislative power, resolutions of the General Assembly have a significant 
effect in international law. They contribute, in particular the labeled 
"Declarations" which may have more political force, to the development 
of a new international law. Mr Lissitzyn argued that,
If such statements or declarations emanate from a large number
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of states and purport to deal with a large matter, they may be 
regarded in some circumstances as indications of a general
consensus amounting to a norm of general international law.13
The affirmative vote of a great majority of state members on a 
resolution may have a significant role in determining its influence on state 
practice. The state practice if supported by the opinio juris , may bring 
the resolution to a possible legal effect upon states. Some examples of the 
resolutions which amounted from mere recommendations to a 
codification of a general rules of international law are: Declaration of 
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space (1962 (XVIII)); the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Res.217 A (III)); and Declaration of Principles Governing the 
Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits 
of National Jurisdiction (2749 (XXV)).
* g r ^ C -
Althoughyadvanced countries voted in favour of the Declaration of 
Principles, they insisted that the Declaration cannot impose any legal 
consequences on states. Because the Declaration is a recommendation 
which offers only guidelines for establishing an international regime. The 
Soviet Union was among the states which regarded the Declaration as not 
being legally binding. The Soviet Union stated:
Needless to say, adoption of the declaration by the General 
Assembly cannot create legal consequences for states in view of 
the well-known fact that decisions of the General Assembly have 
simply the force of recommendations.14
Further, the developed states went on to deny the principle of the 
"common heritage of mankind" as a legal principle for the deep sea bed
13 O.J. Lissitzyn, International Law Today and Tomorrow, (1965) pp.35-36.
14 UN. Doc. A.C.1.PV.1798, p.32.
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and its resources. Although, they did not consider the concept as a legal 
principle, they agree that the resources of the Area should be regarded as 
the common heritage of mankind. For them the common heritage of 
mankind is a,
concept to which the international community can give specific 
legal meaning and as a concept upon which we can together 
construct the machinery and the mles of international law which 
will together, comprise the legal regime for the area beyond
national jurisdiction.15
The Declaration of Principles provided basic regulations reflecting 
the "common heritage of mankind" and represented a significant 
instrument for the future international regime of the deep sea bed. It was 
considered as a bridge that linked the economic gap between developed 
and developing states, as the Somali delegate said:
General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV) was a positive step 
towards narrowing the economic gap between the rich and poor
nations,....16
The developed states led by United States and Soviet Union regarded 
the resolutions e.g., Declaration of Principles and the Moratorium 
Resolution, as having recommendatory powers. Within this context, the 
United Kingdom expressed:
First, like any other resolution of the General Assembly, the 
draft declaration has in itself no binding force. Secondly and 
arising from this, it must be regarded as a whole; and 
interpreted as a whole, and as whole it has no dispositive effect 
until we have agreement on an international regime and, as part
15 UN. Doc. A.C.1.PV. 1779, p.4.
16 UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.I, p.186 (51-52).
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of that agreement, we have a clear, precise and internationally 
accepted definition of the area to which the regime is to 
apply.17
From the viewpoint of the Australian delegation, the Principles of 
the Declaration have no binding effect upon states and are only general 
guidelines for the establishment of a regime.18
In expressing the same opinion on the legal binding of the resolution, 
Mr Schwebel argued that,
General Assembly resolutions are neither legislative nor 
sufficient to create custom, not only because the General 
Assembly is not authorized to legislate but also because its 
members don't mean what they say, in other words, they do not
mean that the resolution is law.19
It can be said that according to the Charter of the United Nations, 
resolutions are not legally binding, but it would be unrealistic to ignore 
their moral obligation which resides in the overwhelming support of the 
majority members of the international community. The Declaration of 
Principles was adopted by an affirmative votes, including both developed 
and developing countries, purporting to provide a legal framework for 
the future international regime of deep sea bed and its resources.
13. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
The concept of the common heritage of mankind is deemed to be the 
cornerstone for the future legal regime of the deep sea bed and the legal
17 UN. Doc. A.C.l. PV. 1799, p.6.
18 UN. Doc. A.C.1. PV. 1777, p.27.
19 S. M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the UN. General Assembly on 
Customary International Law, (1979) A.S.I.L. Proc., p.302.
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concept under which the exploitation of the resources should be 
compatible with its fundamental principles. Undoubtedly, since the 
adoption of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, there has been 
disagreement between the Group of 77 and developed states on the system 
of exploitation of the resources of the deep sea bed. On behalf of 
developing countries, the Group of 77 sought to create a strong 
International Sea-Bed Authority that can control the conduct of activities 
in the Area, while the developed states insisted that the deep sea bed 
exploitation should be carried out byWehnational consortia subject to a 
system of registration.
The notion of the "common heritage of mankind" was finally 
endorsed in Article 136 of the Law of the Sea Convention [hereinafter 
referred as "LOSC"], "The Area and its resources are the common 
heritage of mankind."
The provisions of the Convention seek to meet the interests of 
developed and developing states alike through the establishment of an 
equitable international regime for the deep sea bed, and by which the 
whole mankind will benefit from the exploitation of the resources. 
Correspondingly, Article 137 (2) provides that all rights in the resources 
of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole and as such mankind should 
be represented by an international organization. Also Article 140 (1) 
states that "activities in the Area shall be carried out for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole." The term mankind includes all states and peoples 
who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status 
(LOSC, art. 162 (o)(i)).
The concept of mankind has a comprehensive and universal character 
with regard to the interests of mankind. In other words, the financial and 
economic benefits derived from the sea bed mining should be distributed
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to the international community on a non-discriminatory basis, taking into 
account the needs of the developing countries, including the interests and 
needs of peoples who have not attained full independence or self 
government. According to Mr Dupuy mankind has two significant 
meanings:
—une signification interspatiale, parce que l'humanite regroupe 
tous les contemporains quel que soit le lieu de leur residence, la 
race ou l’ethnie a laquelle les uns et les autres peuvent 
appartenir.
—une signification intertemporelle. parceque l’humanite, ce ne 
sont pas seulement les gens d'aujoud'hui, mais aussi ceux qui 
vont venir. L'humanite se pense au-dela des vivants.20
According to Section 2 of Part XI of the Convention, the 
fundamental principles of the "common heritage of mankind" governing 
the Area are cited in Articles 140,141,143 and 145 of the Convention.
Thus, Article 137 (1) sets out the first fundamental of the common 
heritage of mankind. It stipulates that "no state shall claim or exercise 
sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the area or its resources, 
nor shall any state or natural or juridical person appropriate any part 
thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor 
such appropriation shall be recognized." The second fundamental 
principles is contained in Article 141 which states that the Area shall be 
open "to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all states, whether 
coastal or land-locked, without discrimination and without prejudice to 
the other provisions of this part."
It is clear that the technology and the new techniques can make the 
deep sea bed feasible for installing, for example, nuclear minefields and
20 R.J. Dupuy, Introduction du Sujet, in Workshop of the Hague Academie of 
International Law, (1981) p. 11.
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nuclear missiles; in other words for military purposes. Therefore, for the 
purpose of peace and development of deep sea bed resources, the Area 
must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The third fundamental 
principle is concerned with marine scientific research (LOSC, art. 143) 
and protection of the marine environment (LOSC, art. 145). Last but not 
least, Article 140 of the Convention deals with the matter of benefit to 
mankind. Article 140 (1) provides that, activities in the Area shall "as 
specifically provided for in this part, be carried out for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of states, 
whether coastal or landlocked...."
The Convention endorsed that the deep sea bed and its resources are 
the common heritage of mankind. Therefore, no state shall claim 
exclusive rights or exercise sovereignty and no right of exploitation of the 
resources of the Area can be acquired only in conformity with the 
provisions of the Convention.
Section 2. The Legal Status of the Deep Sea Bed
The issue of the legal status acquired a great importance in the mid 
60s when the exploitation of deep sea bed resources become possible 
thanks to technological advances made by the industrialised countries.
States began to practice their sovereignty over some parts of the seas. 
Beginning with the extension of the territorial sea from three miles to 
twelve miles, states subjected parts of the seas adjacent to their territorial 
seas to their national jurisdiction, such as the Continental Shelf, 
Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone. It was of great concern 
to stop this creeping of appropriation of the seas which was thought to be
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endless. For that reason, the United Nations General Assembly called for 
the international community, by enacting the Moratorium Resolution and 
the Declaration of Principles, to regard the deep sea bed of the high seas 
beyond national jurisdiction as "common heritage of mankind."
The issue of the legal status attracted the attention of international 
bodies such as the ILC and many international legal writers. Lawyers 
differed on the matter of the legal characterization of the principle of the 
high seas. A group of writers regarded the deep sea bed and its resources 
as res nullius-thai is the Area belongs to no one but is subject to sovereign 
rights by effective occupation. In other words, this opinion stipulated that 
high seas are res nullius. A second group viewed that deep sea bed and its 
resources are subject to the freedoms of the high seas and therefore, the 
exploitation of the deep sea bed resources is one of the freedoms. A third 
group argued that deep sea bed mining is permitted because no 
international law principle prohibits it on the basis that "what is not 
prohibited is permitted." However, what is not prohibited by the mles of 
international law is not necessarily permitted by it. Accordingly, it has 
been argued by one of the members of the ILC while speaking on the 
Continental Shelf that, "there were no prohibitive rules forbidding a state 
to exercise rights over the Continental Shelf but there were, on the other 
hand, no permissive rules either."21 This principle was rejected by the 
international community. A fourth group considered that the deep sea bed 
of the high seas is res communis-that is the Area which belongs to every 
one of the international community as common property and nations have 
the right to benefit from it on an equal basis. Roman Law held that certain 
objects were res communis, the property of all of which cannot be the 
object of private rights and subject to the sovereignty of any state. These
21 A.CN.4.SER.A. 1950, (1950) 1 I.L.C. Yearbook, p.220 (32).
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objects generally include: the air, rainwater, water of rivers, the sea and 
its shores.22 Since the speech of the Maltese Ambassador in 1967, the 
international community, with the exception of some states, welcomed the 
"common heritage of mankind" principle as a legal principle applicable to 
the deep sea bed and its resources.
The issue of the legal characterization is still a controversial matter 
which could not be solved within the scope of international doctrine and 
legal writings.
This section will discuss the most striking legal doctrines that have 
been applied to the deep sea bed and its resources.
2.1. Freedom of High Seas Doctrine
The freedom of high seas doctrine can be traced back to Hugo 
Grotius (D utch Scholar) in the seventeenth century. His theory was that 
the seas must be free for navigation and fishing because natural law 
forbids the ownership of things that seem to have been created by nature 
for common use. In his book Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas), 
which was published in 1609, Grotius defended the freedom of fishing 
and navigation and regarded them as susceptible to appropriation. Grotius 
announced and defended the freedom of navigation by affirming that each 
nation has the right to communicate with other nations and to trade with 
them. Because oceans were created by nature as means for trade and 
communication, they must not therefore be subject to appropriation. He 
affirmed that the benefit of any nation from the ocean does not preclude 
other nations to benefit from it as well. He said that,
The sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot 
become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the
22 M. Kaser, Roman Private Law, 81 (2nd ed. R. Dannenbring Transl. 1968).
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use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of 
navigation or of fisheries.23
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 did not 
explicitly mention the deep sea bed exploitation as one of the freedoms of 
high seas. Certain developed countries began claiming that deep sea bed 
exploitation is one of the freedoms of high seas under international law. It 
has been seen that the commentaries of the ILC can be regarded as 
evidence to the fact that the exploitation of the deep sea bed resources is a 
freedom of the high seas. It asserted that the list of freedoms within 
Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas was not restrictive. The 
commentary on Article 2 emphasizes that the ILC has specified four of the 
main freedoms and the Commission "is aware that there are other 
freedoms...."24
It has also pointed out that the Commission explained why it did not 
mention the exploitation of deep sea bed resources as one of the freedoms. 
It is considered that, "...such exploitation had not yet assumed sufficient 
practical importance to justify special regulation."25
It has also been argued that the insertion of the words "inter alia” in 
Article 2 bear witness on the fact that the list of freedoms is not exclusive.
Mr Scelle, one of the members of the ILC, thought that the 
exploration and exploitation of the deep ocean should be regarded as a 
freedom of high seas. Commenting on Article 2, he regarded it important 
to retain the words "inter alia" which make the list of freedoms extend to 
other freedoms such as the right to scientific research and to the
23 H. Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas or the right which belongs to the Dutch 
to take part in the East Indian trade (Magoffin Translation), (1916) p.28.
24 A.CN.4.SER.A.SER.A.1955.Add.l, (1955) 2 I.L.C. Yearbook, pp.21-22.
25 I.L.C. Rep. to General Assembly, UN. Doc. A.3159: Reprinted in 
A.CN.4.SER.A. 1956.Add. 1, (1956) 2 I.L.C. Yearbook, p.278.
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exploitation of the resources of the sea bed.26
Nevertheless, it was doubtful that the ILC intended in its 
commentaries to consider the exploitation of deep sea bed resources as a 
freedom of high seas. Those commentaries do not express or codify 
customary international law, as Vandyke and Yuen said:
These commentaries therefore do not have the force of law but 
they can be used to flesh out a convention when it proves to be 
ambiguous, absurd, or unreasonable.27
Moreover, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas28 did not mention 
deep sea bed exploitation as freedom of high seas. Article 2 (1) of this 
Convention reads:
The high seas being open to all nations no state may validly purport 
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is 
exercised under the conditions laid down by these and by other rules of 
international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal 
states:
1) freedom of navigation,
2) freedom of fishing,
3) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines,
4) freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general 
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all states with 
reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of the 
freedoms of the high seas.
26 A.CN.4.SER.A. 1955, (1955) 1 1.L.C. Yearbook, p.222.
27 Vandyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas":
Which Governs the Seabed ?, (1982) 19 San Diego L.Rev., p.373.
28 U.N.T.S., (1964) Vol.450, p.82.
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According to this provision, it is clear that Article 2 did not insert 
the exploitation of deep sea bed resources as one of the freedoms and 
included only those recognized by the rules of international law.
Since the provisions included in Article 2 were regarded as codifying 
rules of international law, the exclusion of the exploitation activity 
freedom from the list of freedoms of the high seas affirmed that this 
freedom did not exist as a general principle of international law at that 
time.29 Since the time exploitation of deep sea bed resources became 
possible in the mid 1960s, it was subject to the claims of the international 
community as there was no state practice in that area to establish a general 
principle of international law.
It can be said that the commentaries of ILC were inadequate because 
there was no evidence to indicate that deep sea bed exploitation was meant 
to be one of the freedoms of the high seas.
Deep sea bed exploitation cannot be applicable to the freedoms of the 
high seas. It differs completely from the rest of the freedoms of the high 
sea because of the nature of the resources of the deep sea bed as non­
renewable resources. In other words, fishing for example does not reduce 
the potential for the same use by others. The same can be said about 
navigation, lying submarine cables and pipelines. Polymetallic nodules, 
however, are exhaustible resources.
Many states protested against the principle of the "freedom of high 
seas" being applicable on the exploitation of deep sea bed resources. The 
representative of Tanzania for the Third Conference on the Law of the 
Sea stated that,
In order to develop a modem international law, it was inevitable 
that certain concepts and dogmas would be challenged,
29 G. Biggs, Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, (1980) 8 
O.D.I.L.A., p.233.
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particularly that of the freedom of the seas, which was 
completely inappropriate in the modem world. Freedom of the 
seas had ceased to serve the interests of international justice. It 
had become a catchword and an excuse for a few countries to 
exploit ruthlessly the resources of the sea,....30
2.2. Res Nullius Doctrine
Res nullius is determined as "the property of nobody, a thing which 
has no owner, either because a former owner has finally abandoned it, or 
because it has never been appropriated by any person, or because (in the 
Roman Law) it is not susceptible of private ownership."31
The theory of "res nullius" arose from Roman Property Law with 
regard to unclaimed and unoccupied land. Similarly, like land territory 
"res nullius”, the sea bed is abandoned until it is claimed by the first 
comer and acquires sovereign rights. Therefore, ownership could be 
acquired by occupation to become the object of private property.
The sea bed area is analogous to unclaimed land and is therefore 
subject to possession by any first occupier. In other words, the resources 
of the sea bed and ocean floor belong to no one, but are subject to 
exclusive appropriation by the first party that can possess them on the 
basis of "first come first serve." One of the supporters of the res nullius 
doctrine is Mr Richard Young. He bases his arguments on the similarity of 
the sea bed and unclaimed land,
The existing customary law is, of course, rudimentary with 
respect to the deep sea floor. It would presume, however, that 
under this law it is possible in principle for a state to acquire 
rights of a territorial character over a portion of the floor 
through occupation. This view would accord with general
30 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.I, p.93 (67).
31 B.L.D., (5th ed.), (1979) 1174.
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principles for the acquisition of territory on land, and is 
supported in some measure by a limited amount of practice with 
respect to such resources as sedentary fisheries.32
Historically, the res nullius doctrine by which nations can acquire 
sovereign rights by occupation was very popular early in the twentieth 
century and was supported by many legal writers. They treated the sea 
bed as res nullius. Hurst said:
Wherein it was stated that where effective occupation has been 
long maintained of portions of the bed of the sea outside the 
three mile limit, those claims are valid and subsisting claims, 
entitled to recognition by other states.33
The Judge Lauterpacht made it clear that, on the basis of an effective 
occupation without interfering with the freedom of the high seas, the sea 
bed could legitimately be appropriated.34
However, the res nullius theory was rejected by the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf of 1958 as a principle for national claim and 
jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf. It was mentioned in Article 2 of 
this Convention that the rights of exploitation of the natural resources of 
the sea bed were based onOdstmg legal title and not on any doctrine. 
Article 2 provides that,
1. The coastal state exercises over the Continental Shelf sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph (1) of this article are exclusive 
in the sense that if the coastal state does not explore the Continental Shelf
32 R. Young, The Limits of the Continental Shelf-and Beyond, (1968) 62 
A.S.I.L. Proc., pp.233-34.
33 H. Cecil, Whose is the Bed of Sea?, (1923-24) B.Y.I.L., p.34.
34 H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, (1950) B.Y.I.L., 
p.376.
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or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities or 
make a claim to the Continental Shelf, without the express consent of the 
coastal state.
3. The rights of the coastal states over the Continental Shelf, do not 
depend on occupation, effective or national, or on any express 
proclamation.35 This is a very clear indication to the practice of states in 
rejecting this concept.
The trend of rejection of the res nullius doctrine was extended in the 
reports of the ILC. In a report in 1951, it had been said that,
It would seem to serve no purpose to refer to the sea bed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas in question as "res nullius", 
capable of being acquired by the first occupier. That conception
might lead to chaos,....36
Furthermore, the ILC endorsed its rejection of such doctrine in 
another statement:
There were three possibilities for that area of control: it might 
be argued that it was res nulius. That must be contend out as 
being incompatible with the principle adopted on the previous 
day. If the shelf were res nullius, it could be acquired by any 
state, whether littoral or not; and that was inadmissible. It could 
be argued again that it was res com m unis; but that too was 
incompatible with the previous day’s decision. Res communis 
was common property, and the Continental Shelf in that case 
could not be subject to the control and jurisdiction of any 
particular state. It would be better to say that the Continental 
Shelf belonged ipso jure to the littoral state.37
It is clear from these comments that, the ILC rejected the concept of
35 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., UN. Doc. A.Conf. 13.42, 1958.
36 A.CN.4.SER.A. 1951 .Add. 1, (1951) 2 I.L.C. Yearbook, p. 142.
37 A.CN.4.SER.A. 1950, (1950) 1 I.L.C. Yearbook, p.227.
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being a legal basis of the coastal states for exclusive rights over the sea bed 
of the Continental Shelf and its resources, and considered the occupation 
of the sea bed as practically impossible.
In the late 60s and early 70s, the theory of res nullius received a 
warm support from developed states and few legal writers like Northcut 
Ely andLF.E.Goldie. This is because under this doctrine developed states 
could exclusively explore and exploit the deep sea bed and its 
resources,38 and their national entities therefore, may enjoy many 
advantages. Among the advantages are that: the entities that have explored 
and made huge investments in deep sea bed might be in a good position to 
claim the sites. Entities will avoid the unacceptable principles of the 
international regime established by the United Nations, including the 
principle of sharing the benefits obtained from the exploitation of the 
deep sea bed resources. In addition, entities can acquire exclusive rights 
over the sea bed and its resources. As the most concrete example of 
supporting the theory of res nullius was the claiming of exclusive mining 
rights in an area of the deep sea bed in the Pacific Ocean by an American 
Company (Deep Sea Ventures Inc.) in 1974.39
33. Common Heritage of Mankind Doctrine
As a proper legal basis for the international community to claim 
rights to the mineral resources, this principle emerged to fill up a legal 
vacuum and determined the legal status of the deep sea bed and its 
resources as common heritage of mankind.
38 Biggs, op. cit., p.236.
39 Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and Request for 
Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investment, by Deep Sea Ventures Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as Notice of Discovery), reproduced in (1975) XIV I.L.M., 
pp.51-65.
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This theory reveals a notion that the resources of the areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction should be exploited for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole on a common basis via an international agency.
The emergence of this new term in international law was first 
endorsed in 1967 when the Maltese Ambassador made an eloquent speech 
before the United Nations General Assembly. He suggested that the 
principle of the sea bed and ocean floor "should be recognized as having a 
special legal status as the common heritage of mankind."40 In 1969, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Moratorium 
Resolution, and in the following year, the international community agreed 
on several principles in relation to the deep sea bed question.
During the negotiations in the Sea-Bed Committee of the United 
Nations, there were two different opinions: the first supported the 
"freedoms of the high seas" and regarded it as the legal principle to 
regulate the deep sea bed exploitation. The second gave considerable 
weight to the concept of the "common heritage of mankind."
The principle of the common heritage of mankind received a warm 
support from a great majority of states including the developed and 
developing countries. The developing countries regarded the concept as a 
new legal principle in international law which could change the existing 
situation of inequalities between themselves and the developed states. It 
was believed that the legal status of the sea bed beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction is neither res nullius nor res communis, and which 
proved to be inappropriate to the said area, but a common heritage of 
mankind.41 According to the representative of Yugoslavia, the concept is 
extremely important in international law because it would assure 
substantial equality in international relations.42
40 UN. Doc. A.AC. 135.WG.1 .SR.7, 27 June 1968, p. 52.
41 UN. Doc. A.AC .1.PV. 1597, p.23 (Libya).
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The Norwegian representative expressed:
It is now settled...in solemn words and in a most authoritative 
way that the riches on and under the seabed are the common 
heritage of mankind. This is new item in "international law" and 
met with opposition from many quarters...It is a new term and 
it denotes something new in international relations. It is also a 
term which speaks to the imagination of ordinary people like the 
term in outer space treaty that astronauts are "envoys of 
mankind." I believe that terms such as these are often of great 
significance to international life just because they are "loaded" 
terms, because they express a program and an aspiration. They 
appeal directly to people and convey an idea which no elaborate 
legal terminology could ever do. They counteract the inherent 
danger in international law becoming so esoteric that only the 
initiated few understand what it is all about.43
The Maltese Ambassador, Dr Arvid Pardo asserted that, res nullius 
and res communis concepts were unacceptable.44
It was further affirmed by Mr Rinz Morales, the representative of 
Spain that,
The legal regime for an international area of the sea-bed -
which was the common heritage of mankind -  should be created 
in keeping with the principles of social justice and in a spirit of 
co-operation, and that the Declaration of Principles adopted by
the General Assembly in its Resolution 2749 (XXV),....45
States which supported the freedoms of the high seas criticized the 
concept of common heritage of mankind as lacking any precision having
42 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.I, p.92 (54).
43 Quoted in Aguilar, How will the Future Seabed Regime be Organized?, in 
Law of the Sea: Emerging Regime of the Oceans, (1974) pp.45-46.
44 ibid, p.50.
45 UN. Doc. A.AC.138.SC.I.SR.14, 4 August 1971, p.183.
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no legal meaning. The rejection of the common heritage of mankind come 
from industrialised and socialist states. On behalf of socialist countries, 
the Soviet Union provides a different interpretation to the concept by 
asserting that the deep sea bed should be used jointly by all states without 
any discrimination, and without claiming sovereignty or appropriation of 
that area.46
In supporting the freedom of the high sea, the representative of 
Denmark insisted on free access for all states without any discrimination 
to explore and use the resources of the sea bed beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction, but without claiming any sovereignty to any part of 
that area.47
The Belgian representative asserted that they never accepted the 
common heritage of mankind principle as having any clear juridical 
meaning or importance, and that it represented a moral and political 
complex of great value 48
The Principles laid down in the Declaration of 1970, in particular 
the principle of the common heritage of mankind, were subject to 
intensive debate during the sessions of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. Thus, in 1982, the international 
community adopted a Convention on the Law of the Sea in which the 
common heritage of mankind principle was confirmed as the legal status 
for the deep sea bed. Accordingly, Article 136 of the Convention provides 
that "the Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind."
In the light of the foregoing discussions, it can be said that the 
traditional doctrines of res nullius as well as res communis were 
completely rejected from any official discussions concerning the legal
46 UN. Doc. A.AC.138.SR.30, p. 15.
47 UN. Doc. A.AC.135.1.Add.2, 13 March 1968, p.6.
48 UN. Doc. A.C.l.PV. 1788 (1970), p.24.
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status of the sea bed and its resources. In this context, Mr Gidel rejected 
these two concepts from any discussion on the legal status of the high seas. 
He said that,
II faut done categoriquement et definitivement rejeter les 
expressions "res nullius" et "res communis" de la discussion sur 
la condition juridique de la haute mer. Elies obscurcissent
encore un debat deja difficile par lui-meme 49
These concepts were also rejected, as has been seen above, even by 
the ILC discussions on the Continental Shelf. Exploitation as a freedom of 
high seas lacked any support from the international community and also 
lacked the necessary state practice to acquire the status of the freedoms of 
high seas determined by the general rules of international law. In 
criticizing the principle of the freedom of the high seas, Biggs argued 
that,
...those theories...based exclusively on the laws pertaining to the
oceans-such as that of the freedom of the seas -  fail to provide 
adequate justification to deep sea-bed mining because their
subject matter-the oceans -  is only peripheral to the main issue: 
the exploitation of the soil and subsoil underlying that ocean and 
their corresponding mineral resources.50
The areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as the common 
heritage of mankind was widely, if not universally, supported. However, 
while the majority of states insisted on conferring a legal basis and 
meaning on the concept, only a few number of states regarded it as 
ambiguous and incapable of being legally determined.
Resolutions enacted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
49 G. Gidel, Le Droit International Public de la Mer, (1932) Vol.I, p.215.
50 Biggs, op. cit., p.226.
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established the basic principles of the concept and confirmed the general 
majority of support in state practice of the international community to the 
common heritage of mankind as becoming a rule of customary 
international law.
The common heritage of mankind for the majority of states, 
especially developing countries, means that all rights to the Area and its 
resources belong to mankind as a whole, and only an international 
Authority on behalf of mankind can have the exclusive right to carry out 
deep sea bed mining activities. However, for some other states, in 
particular developed countries, the concept means that natural and 
juridical persons are free to explore and exploit deep sea bed and its 
resources, without asserting any exclusive sovereignty or exclusive rights 
over any part of the deep sea bed. For the United States, the common 
heritage of mankind principle,
...means no more than commonness of a common field wherein 
all may pasture their stock, or a common well wherefrom all 
may draw their water, or a common stream in which all may 
fish. Its commonness means that no state may assert exclusive,
territorial sovereignty over any part of it.51
Whereas developed states believed that the legal regime of the high 
seas is applicable to the deep sea bed and its resources, developing 
countries maintained that the common heritage of mankind provided the 
necessary regulations to fill up what was a legal vacuum in the deep sea 
bed.
As a result of these fundamental differences in views on the legal 
meaning of the concept and the legal status of the deep sea bed, each state 
took its own route in determining the legal regime as applicable to the
51 L.F.E. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of The Common Heritage 
of Mankind, (1983) 10 Syracuse J.I.L & Com., pp.80-81.
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deep sea bed. And there has been an emergence of two different systems. 
Firstly, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea system 
embodied an international regime based on the common heritage of 
mankind principle. Secondly, a unilateral system co-ordinated by 
Reciprocating States Agreements based on the principle of freedom of 
high seas.
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CHAPTER TWO 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION SYSTEM
At the eleventh and final session, the Third United Nations 
Conference on the law of the sea succeeded in adopting a Convention1 
embodying a generally acceptable legal regime for the exploitation of the 
deep sea bed based on the so-called "parallel system." On December 10, 
1982, the Convention document was opened for signature. One hundred 
and seventeen states signed the Convention, four nations voted against it, 
and seventeen abstained.
The vote against and the abstentions by several developed countries, 
most notably the United States of America, were founded on the argument 
that the Convention's provisions on deep sea bed mining were 
unacceptable. For example, The United States argued that, certain aspects 
of the envisaged international legal regime of deep sea bed exploitation, 
such as contract approval, production control and mandatory transfer of 
technology are disagreeable and unsupportable. The Convention gives 
states, private entities and the Enterprise of the International Sea-Bed 
Authority parallel access to deep sea bed areas. It will enter into force 
twelve months from the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of 
ratification or accession (LOSC, art. 308 (1)).
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN. Doc.A.Conf. 
62.122. 7 October 1982. Reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M., p. 1261. The Convention as 
adopted contains 320 Articles together with nine Annexes which constitute an integral 
part of this Convention (art. 3 (8)). The four Resolutions adopted with the Convention 
are annexed to the Final Act of the Convention. The Convention received 159 signature 
by the closing date for signature on 9 December 1984. See UN Monthly Chron., 
(August 1986) XXIII (4), p. 107. As of September 1986, the Convention had received 
32 ratifications. See UN Monthly Chron., (November 1986) XXHI (5), p.86.
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The crucial issue which faced the Third Conference on the Law of 
the Sea was the system of exploitation of the deep sea bed. Despite the 
wide difference and in positions between different the attending states, the 
Conference succeeded to adopt a Convention on the Law of the Sea. This 
Convention establishes an international regime to explore and exploit the 
Area and its resources on the basis of the "common heritage of mankind."
The issue of the system of exploitation was part of a struggle by the 
developing states to bring about a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) by which all countries could benefit from the resources to be 
exploited in the deep sea bed. The Convention declares the deep sea bed 
and its resources as "common heritage of mankind."
The object of this chapter is to analyse the essential elements and 
features of the system of exploitation incorporated in Part XI of the 
Convention. It focuses on the parallel system, applications and contracts, 
production control, transfer of technology, pioneer investment and the 
review conference.
It is imperative, therefore to first consider the core of the system, 
that is the "Parallel system" under which the Area will be exploited by the 
Enterprise of the International Sea-Bed Authority and by states and 
private firms, at least for the interim period until the review conference 
reaches an agreement on a new system of exploitation.
Section 1. The Parallel System
The idea of who or which party may conduct activities in the Area is 
not entirely new.2 It has been raised since the enactment of the
2 There were many proposals submitted to the Sea-Bed Committee in 1970 and 
1971. These proposals showed a wide range of views about the International Sea-Bed
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Declaration of Principles, though the Declaration was characterised by 
general features, and did not specify explicitly which party may have the 
right to exploit the deep sea bed.
As regards the system of exploitation of the deep sea bed, two periods 
in the work of the Conference can be distinguished. The first period lasted 
until 1976 and was characterised by ideological controversies and 
opposed sets of objectives between many countries.3 In the said period, 
negotiations on the issue were polarized because of the radical differences 
in views with regard to the conduct of activities. On one hand, the 
developing states wanted an international machinery with discretionary 
powers to conduct activities. Whereas, the developed states favoured the 
idea of the deep sea bed activities being conducted by states parties and 
their entities.
The second period extended from 1976 to the adoption of the 
Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982. During this period, the efforts 
of developed and developing countries focussed on finding a compromise 
for the system of exploitation.
At the Conference, in particular the Caracas Session, the major
debated issue was who may exploit the Area?.4 The Caracas
Machinery, especially, in respect to the power to be enjoyed by the Authority. For 
instance, the Latin American/ Caribbean proposal confers the Authority almost total 
discretion and wide scope to control in all stages in relation to production, processing 
and marketing, and enable the Enterprise to undertake all those activities by itself. 
France and the United States confine the Authority's jurisdiction to a registry body. See 
A.AC. 138.25 of August 3 1970 (USA); A.AC. 138.27 of 4 August 1970 (France); 
A.AC. 138.49 of 10 August, 1971 (Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, El-salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and 
Venezuela).
3 Especially, the irreconcilable views between developed and developing 
countries. The developed states defended the principle of "freedom of high seas", and 
developing states supported the "common heritage of mankind" principle.
4 For more details about what was discussed at the Caracas Session. See
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negotiations exemplified the divergent positions of the developing and 
developed countries on the system of exploitation with regard to two basic 
aspects. These being; (a) whether there should be a single system or a 
multiple system of exploration and exploitation of the sea bed area, and 
(b) The role to be played by the proposed International Sea-Bed Authority 
in the activities of the deep sea bed.
Negotiations in the First Committee have been extremely difficult in 
view of the fundamentally different interests that were to be reconciled. 
Debates in this Committee reflected the basic ideological dispute as to 
whether the exploitation of deep sea bed resources should be left to free 
enterprise or to direct control by the Enterprise of the Authority. While 
the industrialised states contended that the deep sea bed be exploited by 
private enterprises, the developing countries fought for an international 
regime that would conform to the world order goals set out in the New 
International Economic Order.
At the Caracas Session, the Group of 77 made proposals on behalf of 
developing states, centred on the notion of a "unitary system" under which 
an international authority enjoys the right to mine the "common heritage 
of mankind." That is, all activities should be carried out by the Authority. 
At the outset of UNCLOS III, developing countries wanted an 
international body to be the sole representative of mankind for the 
carrying out of exploration and exploitation activities in the Area. This 
idea was in opposition to the claims registry concept espoused by most of 
the developed states. Besides, the Authority should have the flexibility at 
its discretion to confer certain tasks to private entities under contractual 
arrangements.
For the developing countries, the dictates of the Declaration of
UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vols.II and m .
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Principles as well as the aspirations of that category of nations could be 
met only by strong international machinery. In effect, this called for the 
establishment of an international institution with full powers to act on 
behalf of mankind as a whole. This institution was supposed to have the 
legal capacity to exercise effective control over activities in the Area, and 
to have a monopoly on the exploitation of the resources. The object of the 
existence of such an institution is to safeguard the common interests of the 
international community.
The international institution would, at its discretion, be able to enter 
into joint ventures or conclude contracts with states and private entities. 
Moreover, it would have the right to insist on its partner, either to a joint 
venture or to a contract in providing the necessary funds, know-how and 
training for personnel from developing countries.
Therefore, a unitary system whereby exploitation would be 
conducted only by a strong Authority was, indeed, the initial majority 
agreement by socialist and developing countries.
Nonetheless, the firm position of the developing countries was 
opposed by the industrialised countries on the basis that the unitary system 
gives no assurance of access to sea bed resources to states and enterprises.
Developed countries favoured a "single system", whereby 
exploration of the Area and exploitation of its resources shall be carried 
out only by contracting parties and natural or juridical persons under the 
sponsorship of such contracting states. They wanted to promote sea bed 
exploitation by their national mining companies so as to reward them for 
their expenditures on the development of sea bed technology. They 
approached the negotiations with the view that the Authority should act 
mainly as a simple licensing or registration board and, thus, the sea bed 
activities would only be conducted by entities and national undertakings.
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Industrialised countries sought to create a weak international 
authority which would act essentially as a claims registry. They believed 
that the benefit of mankind was best served through a liberal regime based 
on the "laissez faire" for exploitation of the resources of the Area. This 
liberal regime would lead to the increase of metals supply and the 
decrease of prices for all.
The fundamental task of the First Committee during Caracas Session 
was to bridge the huge gap between developed and developing states. 
Unfortunately, Caracas Session ended with indications of polarization. 
The polar positions largely persisted until 1976, when, during the fourth 
session of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, both developed 
and developing countries accepted the idea of "dual system."5 this 
system allowed private entities to mine in line with the Enterprise the deep 
sea bed resources.
Negotiations on the system were designed to ensure that each side of 
the "parallel system" was given a fair opportunity to succeed. Supporters 
of the private side feared the decisive advantages to be given to the 
Enterprise by the Authority and, therefore, sought to restrain the 
potential for disincentives to mining on the private side. However, 
supporters of the Enterprise also feared the monopoly control of 
technology by states and private companies that oppose the Enterprise 
and, thus, sought to ensure that the Enterprise would receive the necessary 
capital and technology to function independently or to enter into joint 
arrangements. Some delegations redirected these negative approaches by 
giving each side some interests in promoting the success of the other.
5 The Chairman of the First Committee incorporated the "dual system" in the 
RSNT at the close of the fourth session. Doc. A.Conf.62.WP.8.Rev.l. 6 May 1976. 
See UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.V, p. 125.
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During the fifth session, the Group of 77 refused to accept the idea 
of the ’’parallel system" embodied in the RSNT. Because the RSNT was 
more favourable to the developed nations. For that reason the issue of the 
system was again insisted upon according to three working papers.6 The 
Group of 77 paper favoured a "unitary system" whereby the Authority 
enjoys an exclusive right over exploitation in the Area. The United States 
paper advocated the "parallel system" which assures access for both the 
Authority and private enterprises. The Soviet Union paper provided for 
exploitation by states' parties and the Authority. The Soviet paper stressed 
the equal rights and opportunity to participate in activities in the Area, 
irrespective of the geographical location of the states.
Nevertheless, the insustrialised states succeeded in turning the 
balance in their favour by embodying the idea of "parallel system" in all 
Negotiating Texts that were produced as from 1977.7
At the seventh session an agreement seemed to have been reached. 
Some changes were made on Article 151, as Mr Nejenga pointed out:
It is precisely with the the object of finding the point of 
equilibrium between the partisans of guaranteed access by states 
and other entities to the Area and the partisans of absolute 
discretion of the Authority that changes have been made in the 
text of article 151 which, while ensuring the participation of the 
states parties and other entities in the activities to be carried out 
in the Area, also give the Authority a predominant role in the 
organization, conduct and control of those activities. This was 
the intention behind the amendments made to article 151, which 
constitutes the heart of the system of exploration.8
6 The three working papers are summarised in the final Report by the Co- 
chairman on the Activities of the Workshop. Doc. A.Conf.62.C.l.WR. 5 September 
1976. See UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.VI, pp. 166-67.
7 The compromise of the "parallel system" was incorporated and revised in the 
following negotiating texts: SNT; RSNT and ICNT, Rev. 1.2.3., and lastly in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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The net results of the negotiations produced an entirely new legal 
regime for the exploration and exploitation activities in the deep sea bed. 
The new regime was the product of difficult negotiations and active 
participation by a large number of countries. This historical compromise 
was subsequently reflected in Article 151 of the ICNT,9 and later in 
Article 153 of the Convention.
The key of the "parallel system" in the Convention is Paragraph 2 of 
Article 153 which stipulates that "activities in the Area shall be carried out 
as prescribed in paragraph 3:
(a) by the Enterprise, and
(b) in association with the Authority by states parties, or state 
enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality of 
states parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, 
when sponsored by such states, or any group of the foregoing which 
meets the requirements provided in this part and in Annex El.
This means that the Authority uses its commercial arm (Enterprise) 
to conduct mining operations, and at the same time issues permits to states 
and private companies so that such companies could operate in parallel 
with the Authority.
The cornerstone of the parallel system is the so-called "banking 
system." The objective of the parallel system is to give states and private 
companies sponsored by states parties, on the one hand, and the Enterprise 
of the Authority, on the other hand, a genuine opportunity to mine the 
deep sea bed. Hence, a state or private applicant for a mine site must
8 Explanatory Memorandum by the Chairman concerning document NG1. 
lO.Rev.l. See Doc. NG1.12 , UNCLOS III , Off. Rec., Vol .X, p.19.
9 ICNT. UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.WP.10. Text reproduced in (1977) 16 I.L.M.,
p.1108.
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propose two sites, one of which should be reserved for mining by the 
Enterprise or by developing countries.
The site-banking scheme, as an important move towards 
compromise, was first introduced in the RSNT, in 1976, and finally 
incorporated in the Convention.10 According to Article 8 of Annex EH 
of the Convention, the applicant must, in order to get a contract, submit 
data relating to mapping, sampling, density of nodules and minerals 
content for two parts of equal estimated commercial value. Within 
f o r ty  five days of receiving such data, the Authority would select a 
reserved site while approving the plan of work for a non-reserved site. 
Reserved areas would be exploited either by the Enterprise or by 
developing countries. However, the designation of the reserved site may 
be deferred for a further period of f o r ty  five days if the Authority 
requests an independent expert to assess whether all data required by this 
Article have been submitted.
The compromise on the system of exploitation of the resources of the 
deep sea bed, which was originally suggested and to a great extent worked 
out by the industrialised countries, became unacceptable to some of these 
countries. As such, when the Convention was adopted, many 
industrialised countries including United States, United Kingdom and 
West Germany refused to sign it. These countries argued that some 
elements of the "parallel system" like production control, transfer of 
technology, review conference and financial terms of contracts were 
unpleasant.
All in all, it can be said that under such parallel system, the Authority 
exploits the Area directly through its Enterprise, would acquire through 
site banking areas of equal value to those mined by private entities, and
1° LOSC, Annex III, art. 8.
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would be guaranteed the loans to enable it to mine such sites. In return, 
qualified applicants have rights to conclude contracts with the Authority 
to mine the deep sea bed.
Section 2. Applications and Contracts
To get the right of access to the Area, entities shall meet certain 
qualifications and respect the procedures for approval set forth in the 
rules and regulations of the Authority. Once the plan of work is approved, 
the plan takes the form of "contract", giving the applicant, therefore, 
security of tenure.
2.1. Qualifications of Applicants
The Convention spelled out categorically the qualifications which 
would be required to be fulfilled by applicants for sea bed mining 
contracts. Three substantial qualifications must be satisfied by an 
applicant in order to get a contract, and to enjoy the exclusive right to 
explore and exploit a site of the Area. These qualification requirements 
are outlined in Article 4 of Annex in of the Convention.
First, applicants Would have to be a state party to the Convention or 
an entity possessing the nationality of states parties or effectively 
controlled by them. In other words, states parties or sponsoring states are 
responsible for ensuring compliance with the Convention by the relevant 
entities.11 Second, the applicant should supply evidence testifying his
11 Article 4 (1) provides that "applicants, other than the Enterprise, shall be 
qualified if they have the nationality or control and sponsorship required by Article 153, 
Paragraph 2 (b), and if they follow the procedures and meet the qualification standards
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financial and technical capabilities, and his performance under previous 
contracts with the Authority.12 Third, each applicant would have to 
agree to accept the Authority's control over deep sea bed activities.
Moreover, other undertakings are required to be completed by the 
applicant. Thus, every applicant is required to comply and accept the 
applicable obligations set forth in the provisions of Part XI, the rules and 
regulations of the Authority and decisions of its organs.13 More 
precisely, applicants are obliged to give the Authority a written assurance 
of a good faith in fulfilling the contractual obligations, and to comply with 
the provisions on transfer of technology.14
With regard to the first qualification, Paragraphs (3) and (4) of 
Article 4 outline the general terms on sponsorship of national entities and 
consortium and on the responsibility of sponsors.
Paragraph (4) of Article 4 specifies what a sponsoring state shall do 
in order to avoid any responsibility for damage caused by the person 
sponsored. Accordingly, so as to ensure compliance with the terms of the 
Convention, the sponsoring state is required to adopt laws and 
regulations, and take administrative measures which are within the 
framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing 
compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.
2.2. Plans of Work
States and entities do not have direct access to the Area and its
set forth in the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.”
12 LOSC, Annex m , art. 4 (2).
Ibid, Annex HI, art. 4 (6) (a).
14 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 4 (6) (c) (d).
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resources, and they can only conduct sea bed mining operations after 
having obtained a contract and an authorisation of production from the 
Authority. Any qualified entity sponsored by a state party must apply to 
the Authority and submit a written plan of work.
Before a mine site is allocated, an application to the Authority would 
have to be submitted covering two sites of equal estimated commercial 
value. Each site should be large enough to support a mining operation. 
Data concerning both sites and their resources must also be submitted, and 
the applicant would indicate the co-ordinates dividing the area into two 
parts of equal estimated value. One of the two sites would be assigned to 
the applicant by the Authority for the proposed operations, while the 
other site would be reserved for the Enterprise of the Authority.
After determining the mine site, the applicant would need a plan of 
work in the form of "contract" authorising him to develop the mine 
s ite .15 Besides, the applicant needs a production authorisation16 
permitting him to produce up to a limited amount of minerals from that 
site each year. Once the plan of work is approved, the applicant is 
automatically conferred exclusive rights to explore the areas designated in 
the plan of work and exploit its resources.17
Under Article 153 (3) of the Convention, all activities in the Area 
have to be carried out in accordance with a formal written plan of work 
drawn up in accordance with Annex IH and approved by the Council after 
review by the Legal and Technical Commission.
The principal provisions of Annex III governing the procedures for 
approval of plans of work submitted by qualified applicants are contained
15 Ibid, Annex HI, art. 6.
16 Ibid, Annex HI, art. 7.
17 Ibid, Annex HI, art. 3 (c).
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in Articles 3 and 6. The fundamental provision of Article 6 is in 
Paragraph (3), which was amended at the eleventh and final session of the 
Conference so as to make it agreeable and satisfactory to the industrialised 
countries.18 Amendments were made on the role to be played by the 
Authority in determining whether the proposed plans of work conform 
with the requirements laid down. The revised Paragraph (3) therefore, 
clearly removes any distrust and doubt that the Authority hold any powers 
of inquest into proposed plans of work other than those enumerated in the 
above provisions. In other words, the Authority's powers are confined to 
those defined much more precisely in Articles 153 (3), 165 (2) (b) and 
162 (2) (j) of the Convention.
The plan of work would have to be approved by the Council of the 
Authority. Such approval of plans of work would normally be almost 
automatic so long as the plan of work was endorsed by the Council's Legal 
and Technical Commission. However, in case the plan of work is rejected 
by the Council itself, a consensus decision of the Council would be 
required.
The procedures of approval of plans of work cited in the Convention 
ensure almost the automatic approval of plans of work. The provisions of 
Annex HI of the Convention dealing with procedures and formalities for 
the submission of applications and plans of work restrict the Authority to 
exercise discretionary powers. Consequently, if a plan of work is in 
conformity with the requirements mentioned in the Convention, the 
Authority cannot reject the plan of work except in certain specified 
circumstances. In such cases the approval of a plan of work is no longer 
sufficient to start commercial production during the interim period,19
18 See the Report of the President of the Conference. Doc. A.Conf.62.L.141 
and Add.l, 29 April 1982, UNCLOS El, Off. Rec., Vol .XVI, p.248 (10).
19 LOSC, art. 151 (3).
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and the contractor has to obtain from the Authority a production 
authorisation.
In all cases, the procedures begin at the level of the Legal and 
Technical Commission. The Commission first reviews the proposed plan 
o f work and submits it to the Council together with its 
recommendations,20 concerning the adequacy of data, sites identified 
and compliance with regulations. These recommendations must be based 
"solely on the grounds stated in Annex III",21 which means that, the 
recommendations shall not be characterized with any political 
consideration or the general policy of the Authority. If plans of work 
have been recommended positively and no objection has been raised in 
writing by any Council member specifying an alleged violation of the 
foregoing rules within a period of fourteen days,22 the Council is 
supposed to approve the plan of work. But, in case an objection is raised 
by a member based on the non-compliance by the applicant with rules and 
regulations of Article 6 of Annex III within the said period, such an 
objection is to be followed by a Conciliation Committee. This Committee 
is formed in attempting to override the objection within another fourteen 
days.23 However, if the objection persists, the plan of work is deemed to 
be approved by the Council unless it is rejected by consensus among the 
Council's members excluding the state which made the application or 
sponsors the applicant in question 24
In case the Legal and Technical Commission recommends 
disapproval or makes no recommendation, the Council may still approve
20 Ibid, art. 165 (2) (b).
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (j) ©•
23 Ibid, art. 161 (7) (e).
24 Ibid, art. 162 (2) ©  (i).
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the plan of work by a three-fourths majority of the members present and 
v o tin g ,25 provided that such majority includes a majority of the 
members participating in the session.26 In case the Council fails to 
approve the plan of work, dispute settlement procedures may be 
prompted e.g., in the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.27 Therefore, there 
exists a powerful weight in favour of the approval of plans of work.
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the adoption of 
recommendations by the Legal and Technical Commission is a crucial 
stage in the procedures for the approval of plans of work. That is why the 
issue of how the members of the Council, particularly the members of the 
Legal and Technical Commission, to be elected took a considerable 
attention during the negotiations at the Third Law of the Sea Conference. 
Hence, a compromise was reached at the final phases of the Conference 
and it was agreed that fifteen members are to be elected with regard to 
equitable geographical distribution and representation of special 
interests.28
Assuming that the proposed plan of work meets the requirements, 
and complies with the rules and regulations of the Authority, the 
Authority may not approve the plans of work and, therefore, not issue a 
contract to a qualified applicant. Though, to preclude any possibility of 
the Authority unreasonably impeding development of the sea bed, it is 
provided that approval of plans of work can be refused only in certain 
specified circumstances.
These circumstances are: First, where there is more than one 
application for the same site, that is all or part of the proposed area falls in
25 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (j).
26Ibid, art. 162 (2) (j) (ii).
27 Ibid, Annex V, sec. 4.
28 This principle is embodied in the LOSC, art. 163 (2) (4).
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a plan of work already approved, or awaiting final decision by the 
A uthority.29 Second, no approval can be given by the Authority in 
respect of areas disapproved by the Council for exploitation, because 
substantial evidence indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine 
env ironm en t.30 Third is the anti-monopoly clause, which allows 
disapproval of the plan of work if it violates anti-monopoly limits.
Under the anti-monopoly clause, the Authority may not approve a 
plan of work sponsored by a state party which already holds: first, 
approved plans in non-reserved sites, together with either site of the area 
in the proposed plan, amount to more than 30 percent of the area of a 
circle of 400.000 square kilometers surrounding the centre of either site 
of the area of the proposed plan. Second, has had plans approved in non­
reserved sites which constitute 2 percent of the total Area, excluding 
reserved sites and areas disallowed on environmental grounds.31 The 
anti-monopoly clause is designed to guarantee that no one state, including 
entities sponsored by it, should hold plans of work covering excessive 
areas of the sea bed.
In spite of meeting the anti-monopoly criteria, the Authority has the 
discretion to determine that such approval of plans of work in question 
would not permit a state party or its sponsored entities to monopolise the 
conduct of activities in the area or to preclude other states parties from 
activities in the Area.32
The issue of rejection of an application for a contract has been given 
great concern by negotiators, especially, at the seventh session in 1978. 
The industrialised countries wanted to impinge that some specific
29 Ibid, art. 6 (3) (a).
30 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (x).
31 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 6 (3) (c) [(i),(ii)].
32 Ibid, Annex in , art. 6 (4).
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conditions be enumerated in the Convention soa&in the event an applicant 
met these conditions, he would be automatically granted a contract. The 
Group of 77, on the contrary, sought that the Authority should have broad 
competence to study each application, and could take its decisions 
according to requirements for each individual case.
23. Financial Terms of Contracts
Among the crucial issues which took a great part of the discussion 
during UNCLOS III, and which proved difficult even to debate over a 
period of three years, was the subject of financial obligations required to 
be fulfilled by the contractors.
Specifically, the debates on the financial arrangements did not start 
until the New York Session in 1977. During this session two different 
proposals were submitted; by United States of America and India. The 
primary type of financial undertakings contemplated during negotiations 
were royalties (production levies) and profit sharing.
The three years period of negotiations was marked by many 
shortfalls for the developing countries. The developing countries mainly 
believed that processing is an inseparable fraction of the activities and 
therefore, to be subject to taxes payable to the Authority. But, the 
developed countries maintained the opinion that transport and processing 
are not part of the activities and, thus, not subject to charges.33 More 
precisely, the argument arose with due regard to the question that, the 
nodules themselves were not salable and, consequently, profits can be 
generated only after they had been processed. In other words, it was
33 Article 170 (1) of the Convention clearly indicates that transport and 
processing are not considered as activities in the Area.
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contended that since transport and processing were not activities in the 
Area, it was not in any circumstance applicable to fix payments before the 
recovered nodules had been transported and processed. Thereafter, 
another problem was raised on how to levy charges on profits with regard 
to the three different stages, mining, transport, and processing since there 
is inter-relation between the three stages.
At the New York Session (sixth session) in 1977, two delegations: 
India and United States of America offered two financial proposals to the 
First Committee. The Indian proposal included both production charge 
and profits payment. It suggested that, the production levy should 
comprise a "flat-rate royalty” of $5 per ton of nodules actually mined and 
a "tax" of 20 percent of the revenue from the sale of processed metals 
derived thereafter from them.34 India supplemented the production levy 
with a profit tax of 60 percent on any net proceeds accruing after the 
contractor's return had exceeded 200 percent of his investment.35 The 
United States, on the other hand, formed the two types of payment 
alternatives. Thus, a contractor who prefers the profit-based alternative 
would be charged depending on the "net proceeds" of the mining stage of 
the operation in each year, and the overall rate of return on investment up 
to that point. There would be no payments if the rate of return is 0 
percent. But the contractor would pay 15 percent of such net proceeds if 
the return did not exceed 25 percent, and 50 percent if the rate of return 
exceeded 25 percent. The other type of payment embodied a fixed 
percentage of the imputed value of the unprocessed nodules, which is to be 
set at one-fifth of the "gross fair market value" of the minerals derived 
from them. From this "imputed value", the contractor would pay 10
34 R. Ogley, Internationalizing the Seabed, (1984) p. 158.
35 Ibid.
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percent in the first ten years and 50 percent thereafter with a choice of 
changing to the profit-sharing system at that point.36 So, while 
"profit sharing" was an alternative to the production levies in the United 
States proposal, it was an accession in the Indian proposal.
Nevertheless, the United States was against the Indian proposal, 
because it contained the so-called "front-end loading", that is burdens 
induced from the start and inappropriate to any success. The United States 
preferred a flexible system, which grant high rates of payments when 
there is high rates of return, and low charges when an operation proved 
unprofitable, that is low rates of return.37
At the seventh session, seven negotiating groups were designated to 
deal with what was called "hard-core issues." Three groups dealt with 
deep sea bed matters. The first with the system of exploration and 
exploitation, and resource policy; the second with financial arrangements; 
and the third with organs of the Sea-Bed Authority.38 During this 
session, financial arrangements were described as one of the seven "hard­
core issues" that halted of the eminence of the Conference.
The central question with respect to the financial obligations were, 
what are the specific amounts of application and annual fees?, and what 
should be the basis for profit calculations?. Both fixed and variable 
payments were considered accordingly. Fixed payments encompass an 
application and an annual fee. The second category (variable payments) 
covers percentages of production or percentages of profit that are fixed 
or that vary according to the rate of return.39 Thus, there were
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 B.H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The Seventh Session (1978), (1979) 73 A.J.I.L., p.3.
39 Ibid, p .1 2 .
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divergence of opinion not only on the sort of payments to be fulfilled, but 
also the opposite percentages.
Many countries submitted proposals with regard to the levels of 
payments which should be fixed. The determination of percentages were 
disputed because there was a substantial difference of opinion regarding 
the amount of cost and the expected profits attributable at each stage. The 
industrialised states, United States, EEC countries and Japan, for example, 
alleged that only 20 percent of the value of finished metals produced from 
nodules could be attributed to the mining stage. The estimate of the 
developing countries ranged up to 100 percent (India). With regard to 
production charges, the USSR advocated a 7.5 percent of the market value 
of the processed metals; Norway 8 percent for the first five years and 16 
percent thereafter. Japan and EEC suggested a much lower production 
charge of 0.75 percent.40
By the second part of the seventh session, Mr Koh, the Chairman of 
the Negotiating Group Two, gave a proposal in an attempt to reach a 
compromise on the types of charges to be levied. In his revised proposal 
which was released at the conclusion of the New York Session, he 
suggested to maintain a $500,000 application fee, an annual fixed fee of $1 
million, and the contractor's choice between a production charge or a 
mixed system that combines a production charge with a share of net 
proceeds.41
During the eighth session, the issue of financial arrangements were 
broadly considered. Article 12 of Annex III of the ICNT., Revised. 1 was 
comprehensively condemned by the industrialised countries, and they 
criticized the annual fixed fee as "front-end loading." The changes 
introduced in the text and which were considered as a significant
40 Ogley, op.cit., p. 159.
41 Supra note 38, p. 13.
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contribution in finding a solution to the complex problems of financial 
arrangements, were aimed at making the financial obligations tolerable 
for the contractors and profitable for the Enterprise so as to generate 
enough funds to be able to enable it commencing its own activities.42 The 
developed countries could not tolerate a "stiff' financial arrangements 
system. They argued that, only a "flexible" system of payment based 
primarily on the profit-sharing could be the best way of preventing the 
deterrence to mining caused by "front-end loading" and initiate an 
optional return and profits to the Authority.43
Generally, Koh's proposals were included in the subsequent revised 
texts, the second and third revisions of the ICNT. Finally, after 
comprehensive discussion in the 1979 session and the subsequent 1980 
New York Sessions, the proposals were embodied in the Convention 
(Article 13 of Annex I I I ) as an agreement on the financial arrangements.
Some identified proposals which were offered during the 
negotiations on the financial arrangements from 1977 to 1979 are shown 
in the following table:44
4^ S. Mahmoudi, The Law of Deep Sea bed Mining, (1987) p. 195.
43 Supra note 38, p. 13.
44 Chart adapted from K. Sebenius, Negotiating the Law of the Sea, (1984) 
pp.41-44.
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P r o p o sa l/  
se ss io n
Application
fee
Fixed
charge
R oyalty ANP Profit share
US-1A  
NY, 1977
$ 0.5 mm 20% 15% o f low increment (0-25% return);
25% o f medium increment (15-25%  
return); 50% o f high increment (>25% 
r e tu r n ).
India-1 
NY, 1977
$60 mm 20% plus 
$5/ ton 
of min­
ed nod­
ules
100% 60% once 200% o f  investment is 
r e c o v ered
USSR  
Gen, 1978
7.5%
N orw ay-
1B
Gen, 1978
\%  years 
-5; 16%
50%
ears 6-
50% years 1-10 
80% years 11-25
Norway-
1A
Gen, 1978
3% years 
1-10; 5% 
years 11- 
25
50%
India-2 
Gen, 1978
10% 100% 50% until 200% is recoverd, 60% 
thereafter
US-2 
Gen, 1978
$ 0.5 mm 2% 20% 30% of low increment (0-7% of return; 
60% of medium increment (7-20% retu­
rn); 70% of high increment (>20% ret­
u rn
Japan 
Gen, 1978
0.75% 20% 25% years 1-10; 50% years 11-25
EEC
Gen, 1978
$ 0.1 mm 0.75% 20% 10% if return < 10%; 18% if return 10- 
14%; 26% if return 14-18%; 34% if 
return 18-22%; 42% if return 22-26%; 
50% if return 26-30%; 58% if return > 
30%
Koh-2A 
Gen, 1979
$ 0.5 mm $1 mm/Y Wo in 1 
st period 
5% in 2 
nd period
15% 45% in 1st period until 200% is recovered 
; 65% in 2nd period after 200% is 
recovered
Norway-3 
NY, 1979
$ 0.5 mm $1 mnVY 2% in 1 
st period 
4% in 2 
nd period
20% 
in 1st 
perioi 1 
40% 
in 2nd 
period
40% in 1st period until 200% is recover­
ed; 75% in 2nd period (after 200% of 
investment is recovered)
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U S/E E C / 
Japan 
NY, 1979
$ 0.5 mm 1% in 1st 
period; 2 
% in 2nd 
period
20% 25% in 1st period until NPV o f  investr 
ent is 0 at 15% discount rate; 50% in 2 
nd period (when NPV o f  investm ent i 
positive at a 15% discount rate
Koh-3B 
NY, 1979
$ 0.5 mm $1 mm/Y i % years 
1-10; 12% 
years 11 
-25
Sources.
Proposals of USSR; Norway-IB; Norway-IA; India-2; US-2; Japan; 
EEC in UNCLOS III, Off.Rec., Vol.X, pp. 66,68,69. Koh-2A, UNCLOS 
III, Off.Rec, Vol.XI, " second report to the First Committee by the 
chairman of Negotiating Group Two", A.Conf.62.C.l.L.22, pp.103-107. 
US-1 A; India-1; Norway-3; US, EEC, Japan; Koh-3B are quoted in James 
K. Sebenius, Negotiating the Law of the Sea, 1984, pp. 41-44.
2.4. Types of Payments
The financial objectives which should direct the Authority to 
approve rules, regulations and procedures concerning the financial terms 
of contracts and in negotiating those terms are set out in the 
Convention.45 The main objective is to "ensure optimum revenues for 
the Authority from the proceeds of commercial production",46 and to 
attract investments and technology to the exploration and exploitation of 
the Area. Over and above, to "enable the Enterprise to commence 
activities effectively at the same time as the other entities."47
During the seventh session, some developed states insisted on 
removing objectives (d) and (e) from the Convention. But, Mr Koh 
sustained his decision to maintain them on the basis that he regarded them
45 LOSC, Annex III, art. 13 (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f).
46 Ibid, art. 13 (1) (a).
47 Ibid, art. 13 (1) (b).
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as "part of the package offered by the developed countries to the 
developing countries for the acceptance of the parallel system of 
exploration and exploitation."48
The Convention has laid down three sorts of charges for the 
contractor:
1. An application fee;
2. An annual fixed fee;
3. Either a production charge only or a mixed system of production 
charge and share of net proceeds.
1. An Application Fee
There was a great divergence of opinion with respect to the amount 
of application fee. Some countries proposed a fee of $US 100.000, while 
others favoured a sum of $US 500.000.49 A general agreement was 
reached among the negotiators to pay a fixed amount for the 
administrative costs of processing the applications which amounts to $US 
500.000 per application.50 According to the Convention, the amount of 
the fee should be regularly reviewed by the Council so that it covers the 
administrative cost incurred.51 However, if the administrative cost of 
processing is less than the fixed amount $US 500.000, the difference 
should be refunded to the applicant.52
48 UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.X, p.63 (2).
49 UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.X, p.64 (5).
50 LOSC, Annex HI, art. 13 (2).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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2. An Annual Fixed Fee
Each contractor shall pay an annual fixed fee of $1 million from the 
date of entry into force of the contract.53 The contractor may stop 
paying the annual fixed fee if the production charge which is due from the 
time of commencement of the commercial production is higher than $1 
million.54
It was argued by the developing states that this type of payment has 
two profits. First, it would encourage production and discourage 
contractors from sitting on their mine sites. Second, the annual fixed fee 
will provide revenue for the Authority even before the commencement of 
commercial production. On the other hand, the developed countries 
objected to the annual fixed fee as it increases the ’’front-end” burden on 
the contractors before production commences55
3. Production Charge or Production Charge plus a Share of Net
Proceeds.
The industrialised countries particularly, EEC countries, Japan and 
United States favoured a mixed system of royalty plus profit sharing 
which prevent heavy "front-end" payments. The USSR with the support 
of many developing countries advocated the royalty-only system, because 
it is more compatible with socio-economic order.
53 Ibid, art. 13 (3).
54 Ibid.
55 UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.X , pp. 64-65 (6).
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1. A Production Charge Only56
Mr Koh was clearly appreciative that the production charge system 
had both advantages and disadvantages. With regard to the advantages, Mr 
Koh said:
First, it is a constant payment of a fixed percentage of the gross 
proceeds from the time of commencement of production and 
would especially helpful to the Authority in the earlier years. 
Second, it assures the Authority of revenues irrespective of the 
profitability of the contractor's project. Third, it frees the 
Authority of the necessity to verify the accounts of the 
contractor. Fourth, it does away with the troublesome question 
what percentage of the contractor's gross proceeds or net 
proceeds is attributable to the mining of the resources of the 
contract area.57
Speaking of its disadvantages, Mr Koh said:
First, the heavy obligation may be difficult if not impossible for 
some contractors to bear at the outset of their commercial 
production. Second, under this system, the revenues to the 
Authority do not vary with the profitability of the contractor's 
operation.58
The production charge is calculated on the basis of a certain 
percentage of the market value of the processed metals produced from the 
polymetallic nodules recovered from the area covered by the contract.59
56 After several revisions of the percentage rates it was, thus, worked out that 
the production charge would ascend in two stages. For more details about the 
legislative history of this provision, see UNCLOS ID, Off. Rec., Vol.XI, pp. 104 and 
(for text of para. 7, 106; Vol.XII, pp.78-79 and (for text of art. 12 (5) ) 86; and 
VoLXIII, pp. 125-126 and (for text of art. 12 (5)) 128.
57 UNCLOS ffl, Off. Rec., Vol.X , p.66.
58 Ibid.
59 LOSC, Annex m , art. 13 (5) (a).
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This percentage is 5 percent of the market value of processed metals 
produced from the nodules for each of the first ten years of commercial 
production, and 12 percent for the rest of the contract’s period.60
2. A Mixed System of Production Charge and Share of net Proceeds
The alternative system which had occupied the attention of the 
negotiators, includes both royalty and profit-sharing. This system has 
also, its merits and shortcomings. Speaking of its merits, Mr Koh said:
First, it places less burden on the front-end than the first system 
does. The Authority's revenues rise with the rising level of the 
contractor's profitability.61
Of the shortcomings, he said:
First, it is much more complicated than the other system and is 
more difficult to administer. Second, the back-end payment to 
the Authority is not assured. If the contractor does poorly, the 
Authority does poorly too.62
This mixed system,63 which was designed for capitalist contractors, 
encompasses two components, a production charge and a share of net 
proceeds. According to the mixed system, the production charge is 
determined differently during the two periods of commercial production. 
The first period commences in the first accounting year of commercial
60 Ibid.
61 UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.X, p.67.
62 Ibid.
63 This mixed system was like the ’’production charge only” system, revised in 
the eight session in 1979 so that it can be acceptable to both industrialised and 
developing countries.
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production and ends when the contractor's development costs64 with 
interest on the unrecovered portion thereof are fully recovered by the 
contractor's cash surplus, that is his gross proceeds minus operating 
costs65 and his payments to the Authority.66 During the first period the 
production charge will be 2 percent of recovered metal market value. The 
second period which begins in the year following the termination of the 
first period, the production charge is 4 percent.67 Nevertheless, if in any 
accounting year, the payment of 4 percent production charge results in the 
fall of the return on investment below 15 percent, the production charge 
shall be 2 percent for that particular year.68 In other words, if during the 
second period it happens that, the return on investment in any accounting 
year drop below 15 percent, the production charge then will be decreased 
to 2 percent in that accounting year.
It was admitted in the Conference that, the production charge rate of 
4 percent based on the market value of the processed metals can be a heavy 
burden for the contractor even during the second period, especially so, in 
a particular year the contractor's project is doing badly.69
The highly com plex formula of the share net-proceeds element 
survived in the Convention (Annex III, Article 13 (6)), only after 
controversial debates.70
6 4 Development costs means all expenditures incurred prior to the 
commencement of commercial production. LOSC, Annex ID, art 13 (6) (k).
65 Operating costs means all expenditures incurred after the commencement of 
commercial production . LOSC, art 13 (6) (k).
66 LOSC, Annex ffl, art. 13 (6) (d) (i).
67 Ibid, art. 13 (6) (a) (ii) and (d) (ii).
68 Ibid, art. 13 (6) (a) ( ii) .
69 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XII, p.79.
70 For a legislative history of this formula, see UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.X, 
pp.58-69 and pp. 144-154; Vol.XI, pp. 104-107; Vol.XII, pp.77-83 and pp.86-88; 
Vol.XUI, pp.124-128 and pp.128-130; and Vol.XTV, pp.167 and pp.179-181.
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A share of the contractor's Attributable Net Proceeds (ANP), which 
would be received by the Authority, is to be assessed on the basis of 
various levels of the contractor's return on investment. Thus, the higher 
the level of return on investment the greater the rate of payment. The 
period in which commercial production is carried out is divided into two 
parts. The first ends when the contractor's development costs are fully 
recovered by his cash surplus. The rates of payment are higher in the 
second period of commercial production than in the first.
The method employed to calculate the Attributable Net Proceeds, 
was the combination of the "cost-ratio method" and the predetermined 
constant ratio method.71 Using the "cost-ratio method", Attributable Net 
Proceeds will be based on the ratio of the development costs of mining the 
nodules to the contractor's total developments costs, including not only 
the costs of mining but also the costs of transport and production of the 
metals.72 The product of this ratio and the contractor's total net proceeds 
form the Attributable Net Proceeds are as follows:
development costs of mining the nodules
Attributable Net Proceeds =---------------------------------------- X total net proceeds.
development costs mining, transport, and processing
Via the "predetermined constant ratio" method, Attributable Net 
Proceeds may not drop under 25 percent of the total net proceeds for 
three metals, specifically cobalt, copper and nickel in an integrated 
project, comprising mining, transport and production.73 In all other 
cases, including a four metal integrated project, viz; cobalt, copper, nickel
71 For details, see UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XII, p.79.
72 LOSC, Annex HI, art. 13 (6) (c) (ii).
73 Ibid, art. 13 (6) (e).
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and manganese; the Authority may, in its rules, regulations and 
procedures, prescribe "appropriate floors which shall bear the same 
relationship to each case as the 25 percent floor does to the three-metal 
case ."74 Nevertheless, if the contractor engages in mining only, 
Attributable Net Proceeds means the whole of the contractor's net 
proceeds.75
The payment from net proceeds is based on an incremental 
schedule 76 From that portion of net proceeds which represents up to 10 
percent return on investment, the contractor shall pay to the Authority 35 
percent in the first period and 40 percent in the second. This amount 
augments to 42.5 percent in the first period and 50 percent in the second 
period for that portion of net proceeds which represents between 10 
percent to 20 percent return on investment. On the portion connected to 
more than 20 percent return on investm ent, the contractor shall pay 50 
percent in the first period, and 70 percent in the second.77
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, art. 13 (6) (n) ( i ) .
76 Ibid, art. 13 (6) (c) (ii).
77 Ibid, art. 13 (6) (c) (ii).
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Portion of ANP on which return 
on investment is:
Share of the Authority
First period of
commercial product­ Second period of
ion commercial production
greater than 0% but less than 35% 40%
10%,
10% or greater but less than 42.5% 50%
20%,
_ 20% or greater. 50% 70%
The return on investment in any accounting year is determined as the 
ratio of Attributable Net Proceeds in that year to the development costs of 
the mining sector of the project.78 This formula offers benefits to both 
the miner and the Authority. According to this formula, the miner will 
benefit from low rates of taxation when the annual return on investment is 
low, and the Authority will enjoy the benefit of high rates of tax when the 
annual return is high 7^
Ultimately, consideration is to be taken with regard to the 
monetisation of the formula. In other words, to determine in money terms 
the Authority's share of the contractor's net proceeds. The single system 
and the mixed system would supply varying amounts of earnings for the 
Authority and diverse internal rates of return for the contractor 
depending on the technical and economic aftermath of sea bed mining 
projects.80 The figures shown in Table (1) of Annex (E) demonstrate the 
distinction of the Authority’s receipts and the contractor's internal rates
78 Ibid, art. 13 (6) (m ).
70 For more details about the Formula, see Mr Koh's Report, in UNCLOS III, 
Off. Rec., Vol.XII, p.79.
80 Ibid.
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of return. These figures assumed a mining operation financed with 100 
percent equity which pays United States taxes after sharing with the 
Authority. It was mentioned that the internal rates of return would be 
higher by about 1 to 3 percent if national taxes were not levied. 
Furthermore, it was indicated that the internal rates of return would also 
alter if debt-equity ratio was 1:1.81
The Table (1) below makes mention of six cases, A, B, C, D, E, F. 
The six cases were illustrated by the Chairman of the First Committee, Mr 
Koh as follows:
"Case (c) is the original Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
baseline set of assumptions. Case (A) represents a low-profit situation 
with higher costs and lower ore grade (development costs and operating 
costs are increased by 25 percent, research and development costs are 
increased to $150 million, and ore grade is reduced to 2.4 percent). Case 
(B) is the same as case (A) but with metal prices increasing 1 percent per 
year. Case (D) increases metal prices to near-current levels and the 
original Massachusetts Institute of Technology baseline costs. Case (E) is 
the same as case (D) except that the original Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology baseline development and operating costs are increased by 25 
percent and prices are allowed to increase by 2.5 percent per year. Case 
(F) is the same as case (E) but with the original MIT baseline cost 
estimates."82
Table (1) in Annex (E) shows payments to the Authority under the 
mixed system which are from about $260 million to about $2 billion as the 
contractor's internal rates of return range from about 6 percent to 24 
percent. In the baseline case, payments to the Authority are $574 million.
8* Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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Under the single system, payments range from about $527 million to 
about $1.3 billion with payments in the baseline case equal to $599 
million. The contractor's internal rates of return range from about 5 
percent to 25 percent.
Case (E) represents the situation in which the original baseline price 
and cost estimates are revised to reflect more current values, and metal 
prices are allowed to increase 2.5 percent per year. Some observers 
believe this case to be more realistic. Payments to the Authority in case 
(E) would be $1,792 million under the mixed system and $1,312 million 
under the single system."83
Table (1). "Monetisation of the Proposed Tax Systems." Annex (E \
Single System  ( production charge only ) Mixed System  ( of production charge and 
share of net p roceeds )
C ase Paym ents to
Authority ( $ milli­
ons)
Internal ra tes  of 
re tu rn  (%)
First year of 
second  peri­
od (year)
P aym ents to Autho­
rity ($ m illions)
In ternal ra ­
te s  of retur- 
n (%)
A 527 5.1 258 6.1
B 638 7.9 20 429 8.5
C 599 13.9 8 574 13.8
D 807 20.1 5 1.015 19.5
E 1.312 20.9 6 1.792 20.2
F 1.312 25.0 5 1.964 23.9
83 Ibid, p.80.
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The aim of the developing countries, in particular the delegation of 
India, during the negotiations on the financial arrangement was to insist 
on the maximal amounts of taxes upon the contractors and thereby 
assuring the greatest conceivable incomes for the Authority. A 
comparison between the Convention's provisions on the financial terms 
and what was demanded by developing states show how far away these 
provisions are from that purpose. For instance, while the industrialised 
countries claimed that, only 20 percent of Attributable Net Proceeds of 
the value of finished metals produced from nodules could be attributed to 
the mining stage, the developing countries claimed a great percentage of 
about 60 percent. Indeed, the Convention reveals the aim of the 
industrialised countries by establishing a minimal percentage (25 percent 
of Attributable Net Proceeds).84 The industrialised countries, especially 
the United States weresatisfied and pleased with the result of the 
negotiations and thus, the issue of financial arrangements was not among 
the critical aspects, until 1982 after the Reagan administration took over 
that the United States sought to renegotiate.85
It is interesting to note that, the value by which the production charge 
and the net proceeds are assessed, is determined in a market completely 
monopolised and controlled by multinational entities (consortia). The 
regime of the financial arrangements is almost in the benefit of the 
industrialised countries.
2.5. Tenure of Contract
84 LOSC, Annex IE, art. 13 (6) (e).
85 Ogley, op.cit., p.161.
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Throughout the contract period, the Authority will supervise 
operations and may require operators to transfer to it any data necessary 
for the performance of its function^6 Thus, in compliance with the 
terms of plans of work and production authorisations to which operators 
will be contractually bound, can be checked as can compliance with other 
regulations concerning, for example, environmental matters or the 
obligation of operators to establish training schemes for personnel from 
the Authority or developing states.87
The Authority may impose monetary penalties, and in serious cases 
suspend or terminate the contract. In all cases however, the contractor has 
the right to take the matter through the dispute settlement procedure.88 
Between the entry into force of the Convention and the end of the review 
conference,89 Article 155 (5) of the Convention provides that, as long as 
a contract is signed, the rights under the contract over the life of the 
mining operation will remain unaffected by actions of the review 
conference. Thus, billions of dollars of investment made by commercial 
undertakings that result in contracts issued before the review conference 
are immune to from the effects of future changes. In fact, this principle is 
clearly recognized in the Convention. The Convention provides for 
security of tenure in Article 153 (6), which stipulates that "a contract 
under paragraph 3 shall provide for security of tenure. Accordingly, the 
contract shall not be revised, suspended or terminated except in 
accordance with Annex III, articles 18 and 19." Moreover, much more
86 LOSC, Annex in , art. 14.
87 ibid} arts. 15-17.
88 Ibid, art. 18; arts. 186-91.
89 Fifteen years after the first commercial production has started, the 
Convention requires that a conference should be convened to review and evaluate the 
system of exploitation.
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security of tenure is provided in Article 19 of Annex HI. Article 19 
provides that if changes occur in which the contract becomes inequitable, 
or the achievement of objectives in the contract or in Part XI of the 
Convention becomes impracticable or impossible, the contract must not 
be revised without the consent of both parties. Besides, the contract must 
not be suspended or terminated except in accordance with Article 18 of 
Annex III. In other words, neither the Authority nor the contractor has 
the right to modify the terms of a contract, except in compliance with 
Articles 18 and 19 of Annex COL90
However, there are exceptions on the principle of security of tenure 
whereby, the contract can be revised, suspended, or terminated. These 
exceptions are provided for in Articles 18 and 19 of Annex HI.
The contract can be terminated only if, in spite of warnings by the 
Authority, the contractor had conducted his activities in such a way as to 
result in serious persistent and willful violations of the fundamental terms 
of the contract, the relevant provisions of the Convention, the rules and 
regulations of the Authority; or if the operator fails to comply with a fmal 
binding decision of an applicable dispute settlement body.91
Furthermore, the contract might be revised if new circumstances 
make the contract inequitable, impracticable, or impossible.92
In each instance, except for emergency cases,93 the Authority may 
not punish a contractor until the contractor has had a reasonable 
opportunity to exhaust remedies available under Part X I94
It means therefore that, such security of tenure might be somewhat
90 LOSC, art. 153 (6).
9 1 Ibid, Annex HI, art. 18 (1).
92 Ibid, Annex III, art. 19 (1).
93 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (w).
94 Ibid, Annex III, art. 18 (3); also Part XI, sec. 5.
76
pointless and insignificant, since the grant of contracts does not entitle a 
contractor to produce minerals until he has received a production 
authorisation, or if the issue of an authorisation is unduly delayed.95
Section 3. Transfer of Technology
The issue of compulsory technology transfer envisaged in the 
Convention was problematic to the industrialised countries, especially, 
their private industries which depend on market forces, and much of the 
technology is basically possessed by such private entities.
For instance, the United States did not support the provisions on the 
mandatory transfer of technology, by arguing that it would bring 
pressure upon private firms to give away their valuable assets to the 
Enterprise and developing countries.96 In other words, private 
companies are anxious that requirements on technology transfer might be 
imposed on them to disclose their expensive know-how to other countries. 
Such know-how is considered as an industrial secret which needs to be 
employed for the exclusive economic benefit of the owners.97
It was generally conceded that the actual technology should be kept a 
m atter of secrecy to safeguard the manufacturer’s, or developer's
95 E. D.Brown, Seabed Energy and Mineral Resources and the Law of the Sea, 
Vol.2, The Area Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, (1984) p.IL420.
96 S. Houston, An Analysis of the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the Law 
of the Sea, (1985) 10 U.Day.L. Rev., p.334.
97 J. Kodwo, The Foreshadowed Global Legal Regime of Deep Seabed 
Exploration and Mining and some Pre-emptive National Legislative Enactments, (1983) 
Ll.M.C.L.Q., p.274.
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copyrights or patents on account that, such unlimited transfer of 
technology would devastate the economic value of the trade secret to the 
mining company for subsequent licensing.98
Mandatory transfer of technology will have momentous expense to 
the miners since, it comprises a marked exception to the western 
commercial concept of trade secrecy and competition. On that account, it 
is not surprising that municipal legislation do not include any provision in 
relation to transfer of technology.99
It has been suggested that, under the provisions on technology 
transfer, United States entities cannot stand to do business. Richard A. 
Legatski attested before the Sub-committee on Oceanography,
Technology is defined much more broadly than in commercial 
practice, to include the very essence of the engineering skill 
which permits owners of an advanced technology to maintain a 
competitive advantage in the market place; employees of the 
"Enterprise" who misuse confidential or proprietary 
information after a transfer are subject to only taken penalties so 
the risk of commercial or military espionage is quite real; since 
U.S. patent law is not extraterritorial in effect, there is no 
equivalent to "patent" protection on the high seas; should a loss 
of proprietary information occur, the treaty text provides no 
compensation for the owner of the affected technology; any 
technology not made available to the Enterprise must also be 
withheld from the resource company which is seeking the right 
to mine in the first instance. Therefore, for want of need 
equipment, the resource may not be able to conduct operations, 
and the technology supplier will lose a market. The burdens 
imposed on technology suppliers would create disincentives to
98 Marsteller & Tucker, Problems of the Technology Transfer Provisions in the 
Law of the Sea Treaty, (1983) IDEA ( the Journal of Law aiid Technology)., p. 170.
99 McDade, The Interim Obligation Between Signature and Ratification of a 
Treaty, (1985) 32 Netherlands I.L.R., pp.39-40.
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innovation, thereby damaging the economies of all nations at 
least indirectly.100
Notwithstanding, the fundamental objective of the provisions on 
mandatory transfer of technology is to facilitate the access of the 
Enterprise and of the developing countries to deep sea bed mining 
technology, under fair and reasonable terms and conditions. This is to 
assure that such technology is not monopolised or limited to the developed 
countries. Accordingly, entities are required to transfer technology for 
the Enterprise to function competitively and simultaneously as private 
consortia, and for the benefit of developing countries.
As far as developing countries are concerned, their objective is not 
only to get the technology working in the developing countries, but also to 
facilitate the developing countries to bring about a "certain amount of 
technological autonomy so that it can make its own technological decisions 
with a full awareness of what the world has to offer."101
The deep sea bed mining technology transfer,102 as a key issue in the 
developing countries campaign for a New International Economic Order, 
was debated in the First Committee during UNCLOS HI.
The transfer of technology is not a new concept, but has emerged as a 
concrete issue even prior to the start of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. Thus, according to various statements 
submitted to the Sub-Committee Three of the Sea-Bed Committee since
1°° Houston, op.cit., p.333.
1 °! Gamble & Pontecorvo, Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the 
Oceans, (1974) p.86.
!°2  Transfer of technology was identified by the United States in the resumed 
eight session as one of the outstanding issues remained in the deep sea bed mining. See
H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth 
Session (1979), (1980) 74 A.J.I.L., p.6.
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1971, many participants from developing countries contended that, so as 
to narrow the gap between the rich and poor nations of the world and to 
engage entirely in the exploration and exploitation of deep sea bed 
resources, the industrialised countries should share their technical know­
how with the developing countries.103 In this context, developing 
countries regard transfer of technology as part of the "common heritage 
of mankind" which might contribute in their successful economic 
development.104
The efforts of the developing countries were successful in having the 
issue of technology transfer, which can be regarded as one of the 
important elements of the so-called New International Economic Order, 
discussed and debated in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea. From the very beginning of the Conference, developing states 
endorsed the effective role which the technology plays in the economic 
development of all countries.105
The huge gap between the developed and developing countries is 
effectively illuminated in the access of marine technology of deep sea bed, 
which is monopolised by a few developed countries. During the 
negotiations on the law of the sea, developing countries' view was that, the 
technology should be regarded as a striking means of promoting and
103 See supra note 101, pp.91-92.
104 Article 13 of the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. UN. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 15 Jannuary 1975, reprinted in (1975) 14
I.L.M., p.251. This Article acknowledges the need for developing nations to acquire 
technology on terms appropriate to their own capacity to pay for and benefit from such 
transfer.
105 See e.g., the statement of the Tanzanian representative, in UNCLOS IQ, Off. 
Rec., Vol.II, p.346. The Cuban representative stated that "the wealth and the 
technological superiority of many developed countries derived in part from imperialist, 
colonialist and neo-colonialist policies of exploitation of the developing countries.'* See 
ibid., p.347.
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enhancing the socio-economic development of poor countries.106 
Developed and developing countries argued that all states should profit 
from the development of marine technology by giving all states the right 
of access to marine technology.107
It was accepted during the negotiations of the Conference by many 
delegations that in order to exploit the Area effectively, it must be ensured 
that the Enterprise and developing states will have access to the substantial 
technology, but the transfer of the technology should not be so onerous as 
to be unsupportable to the developed countries. However, after a long 
debate on the issue, the efforts of both countries were not successful. The 
developing states wanted unlimited time on the transfer of technology, 
and a broad concept of technology so as to include different stages of 
mining, processing, marketing, and transport technology. Hence, the
106 Numerous statements with regard to this matter were presented by many 
representatives from developing countries. The representative of Sri Lanka said: "as 
long as marine technology remained in the hands of a few developed countries, the 
peoples of A sia, Africa and Latin America would be unable to harvest effectively the 
resources of the sea which they so desperately needed." See UNCLOS in, Off. Rec., 
Vol.n, p.337. The representative of Cameron also stated that "developing countries had 
often spent large sums of money to import technology from developed countries which 
was in some cases already outmoded,....Taking a laissez-fair approach to transfer of 
technology would aggravate certain aspects of under-development instead of 
eliminating them...." Ibid, p.340. Mr Bayonne, the representative of Congo stipulated 
that "scientific research and the transfer of technology could help to establish more 
equitable economic relations between developed and developing countries." Ibid, 
p.353. The representative of Venezuela asserted that "it was in the interest of the whole 
international community to seek ways of narrowing the technology gap by facilitating 
the transfer of technology from the developed countries to the developing countries." 
Ibid, p.343.
107 xhe representative of Romania affirmed that"... The programmes proposed 
in that document would give all states, and especially the developing countries access to 
marine science and technology on an equitable basis." See UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., 
Vol.IV, p. 103. Guinea delegation also stated that the transfer of technology "was a 
means of rectifying past injustices and bringing about a more equitable distribution of 
the world's wealth...." Ibid, p. 103.
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developed states opposed what was contemplated by developing countries 
in order to protect their technology which is a private property.108
Provisions and terms of technology transfer went through some 
important changes during the negotiations in favour of the industrialised 
countries. For example, modifications which were introduced on the 
related provisions in Annex n , Paragraph 4 (c) (ii), aimed at removing 
the transfer of technology obligation as a precondition for obtaining a 
contract, and instead to oblige the applicant to agree to undertake to 
negotiate with the Enterprise and to make available to the Enterprise after 
receiving a contract, the technology he would use on fair and reasonable 
commercial terms.109 Another change in the ICNT. Revised. 1 was that 
the contractor is required to make the technology available to the 
Enterprise, if the Enterprise finds that it is unable to obtain the same or 
equally efficient and useful technology on the open market and on "fair 
and reasonable terms and conditions."110 Furthermore, the important 
change in technology transfer provisions was the introduction of a ten 
year limit from the time the Enterprise begins commercial production for 
demanding any contractor to transfer the technology to the Enterprise.111
Nevertheless, the developed states failed to eliminate Article 5 (1) (e) 
of Annex II in ICNT. Revised. 1 which requires the contractor to transfer
108 The United States representative confirmed that "in the United States such 
technology was private property and therefore not subject to government transfer." He 
added that "his delegation would find it impossible to agree to any such provision." See 
UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.IV, p. 103.
109 According to the ICNT provisions on transfer of technology, the Authority is 
permitted to issue contracts, pending agreement on technology transfer. In other words, 
the conclusion of the contract with the Authority was preconditioned to the transfer of 
technology.
110 UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.WP. lO.Rev. 1. Annex II, art 5 (1) (c).
H I Ibid, Annex n , art. 5 (7). Annex II o f the ICNT. Rev.l became Annex III in 
the Second and Third Revision of the ICNT.
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the technology to the developing countries conducting activities in the 
reserved areas. Alternatively, they made such a transfer conditional in the 
sense that such an obligation existed only if "technology has not been 
requested or transferred...to the Enterprise."112 The final attempt to 
achieve a compromise is contained in Article 5 of Annex m  of the 
Convention.
In discussing the question of technology transfer from developed 
countries to the Enterprise and developing countries, one must first define 
the term "technology."
The notion of technology is rather vague, and several interpretations 
are given to the concept in question. Technology is generally conceived of 
as "the application of science to the solving of well-defined problems."113 
According to T. Franssen, transfer of technology could merely consist of 
transferring technical know-how to major industrial and service sectors 
in the economy, or could be defined as to include the total process of 
transferring scientific and technical know-how, including training of 
scientific, technical, managerial, and administrative personnel, the 
development of science policy institutions to other nations.114 Marine 
technology as it appears in a report of the Secretary General prepared for 
the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, is
a product of mains attempt to control or adapt to the ocean 
environment by means of rationally organized systems of 
operations.115
112 ICNT.Rev.2.and 3. Annex m , art. 5 (3) (e).
H 3  Mirabito, The Control of Technology Transfer - the Burke - Hartke 
Legislation and the Andean Foreign Investment Codes: the MNE faces the Nations, 
(1975) 9 Int'l.Law., pp.215-216.
114 See supra note 101, p.90.
H 5 Report of the Secretary General, Description of some Types o f Marine 
Technology and Possible Methods for their Transfer, in UN. Doc.
83
The Convention on the Law of the Sea defines technology as 
encompassing "...the specialized equipment and technical know-how, 
including manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and technical 
advice and assistance, necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a viable 
system and the legal right to use these items for that purpose on a non­
exclusive basis."116
It is worth noting that the definition of the construct "technology" has 
been introduced by some changes. For instance, the word "specialised" 
was added "to make more specific the kind of technology to which this 
article refers."117 Another amendment was the word "viable."118 The 
intention of Mr Nejenga behind making those changes was "to establish in 
a clear and acceptable manner that the technology in the context of this 
provision covers all the operations referred to in all paragraphs of Article 
5 particularly, in Paragraph 5 which refers to the recovery and 
processing of minerals from the area. In other words, the system has to be 
comprehensive."119
Nonetheless, developing countries did not accept the formulation of 
the provision. Nor did they accept Mr Nejenga's assertion th a t"... this 
addition is enough for this purpose and no other more specific terms in 
the definition are required."120 Thus, developing countries insisted on a 
more explicit definition of technology which includes, processing 
technology as w ell.121 The Chairman refused the demand of the
A.Conf.62.C.3.L.22, UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.IV, p.202.
116 LOSC, Annex HI, art. 5 (8).
117 UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.C. 1 .L.27, UNCLOS in, Off. Rec., Vol.XHI, p.115
(22).
HS.Ibid.
119 Ibid.
!20 ibid.
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developing countries on the basis that "any change in this provision made 
at this time would create serious difficulties for some delegations."122 
Therefore, the definition of technology as incorporated in the Convention 
does not embrace processing technology.
Part XIV of the Convention deals with the general principles which 
govern the transfer of technology entitled "development and transfer of 
marine technology." The aim of this part is to promote the marine 
scientific and technological capacity of states particularly, developing 
countries and accelerate their social and economic development.123 States 
are required to promote the acquisition, evaluation and dissemination of 
marine technological knowledge and facilitate access to such data; the 
development of necessary technological infrastructure to facilitate the 
transfer of marine technology; the development of human resources 
through training and education of nationals of developing states; and 
international co-operation at regional, subregional and bilateral levels.124 
These objectives might be achieved through the establishment of 
programmes of technical co-operation, promotion of favourable 
conditions for the conclusion of agreements, holding of conferences, 
seminars and symposia on scientific and technological subjects, 
exchanging technology scientists of and other experts.125
According to Article 144 of the Convention, technology transfer of 
deep sea bed mining shall be conducted by the Authority through taking 
measures in accordance with this Convention. The International Sea-Bed 
Authority is entrusted to co-ordinate the acquisition of technology for the
121 UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.C. 1 .L.28, UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.XIV, p.162.
122 Ibid.
123 LOSC, art. 266 (2).
124 Ibid, art. 268.
123 Ibid, art. 269.
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benefit of the Enterprise and developing countries.
The Convention provides that the applicant must undertake to make 
available to the Enterprise and developing countries, the necessary 
technology on fair and reasonable terms and conditions.126 Consequently, 
to guarantee the access to the necessary technology, the contractor is 
legally entitled and obliged to transfer the know-how he employed in sea 
bed activities. The transfer is to be done only when such technology or 
equally efficient and useful technology is not available on the open 
market.127
The transfer can be accomplished by virtue of licenses or any other 
appropriate arrangements agreed upon negotiations with the Enterprise 
and which shall be set forth in a specific agreement supplementary to the 
con trac t.128 It was, accordingly, asserted at the ninth session that 
violations of those terms concerning transfer of technology may bring 
about suspension or termination of the contract.129
In the event that, the technology employed by the contractor is not his 
property and he is not legally authorised to transfer it to a third party, 
then he is required to either obtain a written assurance from the owner 
indicating that the owner is prepared to directly negotiate with the 
Enterprise for such a transfer;130 or he should by means of an 
enforceable contract acquire from the owner the legal right to transfer to 
the Enterprise the technology he uses if the Authority so requires and
126 Ibid, art. 144 (2) (a).
122 Ibid, Annex IE, art. 5 (3) (a). E the Enterprise cannot find such technology 
in the open market, the Authority's Enterprise would have the option of buying it from 
the contractor.
128 Ibid, Annex IE, art. 5 (3) (a).
129 UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.C. 1 .L.27, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XIII, p.114
(14).
130 LOSC, Annex El, art. 5 (3) (a).
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whenever it is possible to do so without causing substantial cost to the 
contractor.131
Under the first situation, if the Enterprise decides to negotiate 
directly with the owner of the technology, the contractor is required upon 
a request from the Enterprise to facilitate the acquisition of the 
technology.132 However, this undertaking is to be applicable only if the 
technology in question is not available on the open market. If it happens 
that the contractor fails to negotiate this assurance and, consequently, it is 
not obtained, the technology in question shall not be used by the 
contractor concerned in carrying out activities in the Area.133
For the second case, the Enterprise may decide to acquire from the 
owner, not by virtue of direct negotiations with the owner but by means 
of an enforceable contract, the legal right to transfer such technology. 
This obligation also applies only if such technology is not available on the 
open market.134 In order to achieve this objective, the Authority is to be 
informed of any substantial corporate relationship between the contractor 
and the owner of the technology in question.135 The closeness of this 
relationship and the degree of control or influence exercised on the owner 
will be regarded relevant in this determination. If the contractor fails to 
acquire from the owner the legal right to transfer the technology, he may 
not gain or qualify for any subsequent application for approval of a plan 
of work.136
One of the crucial issues during the negotiations on technology
131 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 5 (3) (c).
13  ^Ibid, Annex HI, art. 5 (3) (d).
133 Ibid, Annex HI, art. 5 (3) (b).
134 Ibid, Annex III, art. 5 (3) (c). This provision goes on to explain that the 
contractor must take all feasible measures to acquire such technology.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
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transfer was the requirement to transfer such technology to the 
developing countries. Accordingly, the contractor is obliged, after the 
Enterprise commences commercial production, to take the same measures 
as with regard to the Enterprise so that technology will be available to 
developing countries. That is, options of the technology transfer open to 
the Enterprise shall also be assigned to developing states oragroup of 
developing states applying for a contract on one of the reserved sites.137
Under this obligation, developing countries do not have an absolute 
right to the transfer of technology. Thus, the undertaking applies only 
when developing states would involve transfer of technology to a third 
party (state) or their nationals.138 Moreover, this obligation shall apply 
only if the technology has not been requested by the Enterprise or 
transferred by that contractor to the Enterprise.139 Finally, this 
undertaking is only applied on reserved sites, where developing states 
have applied for a contract under Article 9 of Annex III.140
The objective of the developing states was to gain access to the 
advanced technology so as to be able to compete with the developed states 
and to participate effectively in the activities conducted in the Area.
The right of access to technology can be considered as a real 
breakthrough to ease the establishment of a New International Economic 
Order. To this extent, it seems that provisions of the Convention would 
meet part of the developing states' objectives. Generally, the objective of 
the obligation of technology transfer according to the provisions of the 
Convention is to allow the Enterprise and developing nations to have 
access to the advanced technology.141
^ 7 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 5 (3) (e).
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
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Having discussed the ways on how to transfer the technology from 
the contractor to the Enterprise and developing states, attention will be 
directed to other matters related to transfer of technology.
One of the important questions related to the technology transfer is 
the training programmes. The contractor is required to "draw up 
practical programmes for the training of personnel of the Authority and 
developing states, including the participation of such personnel in all 
activities in the Area which are covered by the contract ....”142 As it was 
argued that, even if the developing states are provided with the advanced 
technology, they still need well trained people to operate and preserve the 
technology. From this context, it was generally acknowledged during the 
negotiations by many delegations from developing countries and even 
from developed countries that training programmes play an important 
role in the effective transfer of technology.143
The obligations of the applicant for the transfer of technology, as set 
forth in Article 5 (3) of Annex III, are subject to a time limit 
contemplated in Article 5 (7).144 The objective of the industrialised
14 1 Ibid, art. 144.
14  ^Ibid, Annex HI, art. 15; art. 144 (2).
143 See e.g., statement by the representative of France. He asserted that training 
and educational programmes "were one of the ways to carry out the transfer of 
technology." UNCLOS ID, Off. Rec., Vol.II, p.339 (47). Many other countries 
affirmed the importance of the personnel training. For example, Nigeria said: "the most 
effective means of transfer was by training and education." Ibid, p.348 (15); Senegal, 
"Personnel qualified in marine technology were needed by the developing countries." 
Ibid, p.354 (76); Madagascar, "Existing international agencies and the International 
Seabed Authority should draw up programs for training personnel from developing 
countries in marine technology, using the knowledge and experience of advanced 
industrialised countries, which should be urged to co-operate fully to ensure the 
success of the programmes." Ibid, p.336 (3).
144  Article 5 (7) of the Convention states that "the undertakings required by 
Paragraph 3 shall be included in each contract for the carrying out of activities in the 
Area until 10 years after the commencement of commercial production by the
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countries during the negotiations on transfer of technology was to 
accommodate and restrict a time limit for technology transfer. Indeed, on 
the basis of the demands of the industrialised countries, the compromise 
was reached by fixing a ten year period to transfer the technology.
The transfer of technology requirement starts even before the plan of 
work is approved. The provisions of the Convention put it clear that in 
applying to the Authority for approval of a plan of work, the applicant 
must provide "a general description of the equipment and methods to be 
used in carrying out activities in the Area, as well as other relevant non­
proprietary information as to where such technology is available.”145 In 
addition, following the approval of the plan of work, the applicant must 
inform the Authority on the descriptions given if a substantial 
technological change or innovation is introduced.146
The operator is also required to transfer non proprietary data 
relevant to the effective exercise and the function of the Authority, such as 
data which are necessary for formulation of rules by the Authority 
regarding protection of environment and safety.147 However, data 
transmitted to the Authority shall not be disclosed to the Enterprise or to 
any other party. In addition, data given to the Enterprise shall not be 
divulged to the Authority or any one external to the Authority.148 
However, data transferred to the Authority on the reserved areas may be 
disclosed to the Enterprise.149
Commensurate with Article 4 of Annex III, states are responsible to
Enterprise, and may be invoked during that period."
145 LOSC, Annex JU, art. 5 (3) (1).
146  Ibid, Annex ffl, art. 5 (3) (2).
147 Ibid, Annex m , art. 14 (1) (2).
14  ^Ibid, Annex HI, art. 14 (3).
I49  Ibid.
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guarantee within their legal system that, the contractors they sponsor shall 
perform the terms of contract and obligations under this Convention.150 
Subsequently, states parties are responsible for obtaining the technology if 
their operators fail to conform to the measures mandating transfer of 
technology.151
A group composed of those engaged in activities in the sea bed and 
those who have sponsored entities engaged in such activities, and states 
parties having access to such technology, may be convened either by the 
Council or the Assembly. This group will act to effectively ensure that the 
Enterprise can acquire the necessary technology to commence in a timely 
manner the recovery and processing of minerals. To this end, states 
parties are required to take all feasible measures within their own legal 
sy stem .152 Seemingly, this relevant provision does not show that 
governments may be compelled to arouse appreciable expense, and 
possibly to intrude in their national market place by virtue of 
expropriation or other means, but it implies in addition that, the 
Enterprise must be given processing technology also.153
Disputes on the terms of technology transfer are subject to 
compulsory dispute settlement. Therefore, it is provided in the provisions 
that disputes over the fairness and reasonableness of the terms on which 
transfer is offered may be submitted by either party to binding 
commercial arbitration according to UNCITRAL rules, or other rules 
and regulations laid down by the Authority.154 The Sea-Bed Disputes
150 Ibid, Annex III, art. 4.
151 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 5 (5).
152 Ibid.
153 J. Breaux, Technology Transfer: A Case Study of the Inequity of the New 
International Economic Order, (July 1979) 13 Marine Technology., p.22.
!54 LOSC, Annex HI, art. 5 (4).
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Chamber has jurisdiction over disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of a relevant contract or a plan of work.155 Unless however, 
the parties otherwise agree such disputes over a contract must be 
submitted, at the request of any party to the dispute, to binding 
commercial arbitration.156 The commercial arbitral tribunal does not 
have any jurisdiction over the interpretation of the Convention and 
therefore, it shall refer such question of interpretation to the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber for a ruling.157 In case of absence of an arbitral 
procedure in the contract, the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance 
with the UNCITRAL arbitration rules or such other arbitration rules as 
may be prescribed in the rules, regulations and procedures adopted by the 
Authority.158 The transfer of technology provisions were disputable. For 
example, the term "commercial" which was inserted in the "reasonable 
terms" clause. It has been argued that it is hard to reunite a mandatory 
transfer with commercial terms and conditions.159
It is important to note that the most controversial aspect in relation to 
the marine technology during the negotiations was the transfer of deep sea 
bed mining technology.160 During the negotiations, participants 
attempted to find a compromise on the transfer of technology profitable 
to developing states, and less burdensome to developed countries.
If the contractor complies with the provisions laid down in Article 5 
of Annex III and related provisions, he is guaranteed the exclusive right to 
explore and exploit the area covered by the plan of work in respect of a
155 Ibid, ait. 187 (c) (i).
156 Ibid, art. 188 (2) (a).
157 Ibid, art. 188 (2) (a) (b).
158 Ibid, art. 188 (2) (c).
159 Supra note 153, p.22.
160 The debates took place in the First Committee, where many delegations 
especially, from developing countries competed to ensure the access to deep sea bed 
mining technology for the profit of the Enterprise and developing states.
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specified category of resources. No other entity can operate in the same 
area, even for a different category of minerals as it might interfere with 
the contractor's operations.161 Moreover, the operator enjoys a security 
of tenure.162
To sum up, it can be said that the technology transfer, as an important 
element of the New International Economic Order and as a significant 
mean of promoting the socio-economic development of mankind, has got 
an efficacious role to play to narrow the huge gap and to reform the 
economic imbalance between the developed and developing countries.
Section 4. Production Policy
According to the production policy set out in Article 151 of the 
Convention, the International Sea-Bed Authority shall establish a 
production system control and a system of compensation for affected land 
based producers. In addition, the Authority is empowered to enter into 
and engage in international commodity arrangements covering all sea bed 
minerals extracted from the Area provided that such agreements involve 
producers and consumers countries. These measures are geared to achieve 
the objective of protecting land-based producers and promoting the 
development of the common heritage for the benefit of mankind as a
161 LOSC, Annex III, art. 16.
162 Ibid.
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whole. Accordingly, the Convention intends to encourage the production 
of sea bed minerals with the least possible harm to the land-based 
producers of the same minerals.
The production control formula 163 set out in the Convention 
establishes a system of a fixed quantity control of which miners would be 
allowed to produce a certain fixed percentage. This would be projected on 
the basis of an annual increase in the world's demand for nickel, 
equivalent to a previous five years prior to the commencement of 
commercial production from the deep sea bed.
The projections are derived from "trend lines" based on the most 
recent 15 years period for which actual nickel consumption data are 
available. 164 The Authority's Enterprise would be entitled to produce up 
to 38.000 tons of nickel a year from the total seabed production ceiling to 
be established by the Authority itself in each year.
The formula uses nickel « as the specified limit for the 
production of the four metals nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese. In 
other words, the overall production control system relates mineral
163 The production limitations scheme was strongly objected by the United 
States, and was one of its reasons not to sign the Convention. J. Breaux explains the 
Reagan administration's position on production limitation. He stated: ''production 
limitations are something that we consider unprecedented in any international 
commodity arrangements. We feel that they are inappropriate. It is not sufficient to say 
that the U.S. should not worry about production ceilings...[t]he fact that they exist will 
cause market distortions and affect investment patterns, and they discriminate against 
developed countries in the Area of sea bed mining." See J. Breaux, The Case Against 
the Convention, in A. Koers & H. Oxman, The 1982 Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, (1983) 10 L.Seainst. Proc., pp. 12-13. Generally, the United States protected any 
production control which impede the ability of American mining companies to produce 
at profit maximizing levels. See M. Banks, Protection of Investment in Deep seabed 
Mining: Does the U.S. have a Viable Alternative to Participation in UNCLOS III, 
(1983) 2 Boston.U.l.L.J., p.282.
164 LOSC, art. 151 (4) (b).
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production to the world annual increase in nickel consumption. However, 
the puzzling question which might be asked is, why was nickel 
chosen as a standard of limitation?. Many answers were provided in this 
respect. However, the main reason of selecting nickel was just 
for the sake of convenience.!65 It has been argued that . nickel 
was chosen simply because nickel has been considered the most 
commercially important product.166 In illustrating why the limit is based 
on the nickel metal, Mr Langevad stated that the source of revenue for sea 
bed mining will come from nickel, so naturally the production of this 
metal will be maximized; and for this reason, therefore, the control of sea 
bed mining imposes a limit on the amount of nickel to be produced rather 
than on any of the other metals (copper, cobalt and manganese).167 In 
explaining the importance of the nickel, Mr Hauser said that, nickel was 
chosen as the standard because nickel will account for at least half to two 
thirds of the proceeds from the sales of processed metals and the 
recoverable quantity of nickel thus appears to be decisive for the 
economic success of a project.168
The objectives of the production limitation formula is firstly; to 
protect "the developing countries from adverse effects on their economies 
or on their export earnings resulting from a reduction in the price of an 
affected mineral, or in the volume of exports of that mineral, to the extent 
that such reduction is caused by activities in the Area."169 Secondly, to
165 Effects of the Production Limitation Formula under Certain Specified 
Assumptions: Report of the Secretary General Doc. A.Conf.62.L.66, 24 February 
1981, UNCLOS IE, Off. Rec., Vol.XV, p.l21(15).
166 Cameroon & Georgehiou, Production Limits-Who Benefits?, (1981) 5 
Marine Policy., p.267.
167 G. Langevad, Production Policy For the Deep Sea Mineral Resources, 
(1981) 5 Marine Policy., p.265.
168 W. Hauser, The Legal Regime for Deep Seabed Mining under the Law of 
the Sea Convention, (1983) p. 118.
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promote "the growth, efficiency and stability of markets for these 
commodities produced from the minierals derived from the Area, at 
prices remunerative to producers and fair to consumers."!70 Indeed, the 
formula was schemed to strike a balance between two different interest 
groups, namely, the industrialised consumer countries, and land-based 
producers.171
Land-based producers will be affected by deep sea bed production, 
the price they receive will be lower, the quantity they can sell will be 
smaller and consequently, their income will decrease.172 During the 
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, it was pointed out that, the 
developing countries fears were based on the fact that if their customers 
become sea bed mineral producers and therefore suppliers of their own 
domestic market, it will deprive them of their traditional markets.173
Mr Arsenis, the representative of UNCTAD at UNCLOS III 
admitted that, because of sea bed production, the total export earnings of 
the land-based producers would grow less rapidly or might even decline. 
Also "the impact of sea bed production would probably be particularly 
adverse for developing producer countries because they dependent more
169 LOSC, art. 150 (h).
170 Ibid, art. 151 (1) (a).
171 Within the group of land-based producers, there are advanced countries, such 
as (Canada, Australia), and developing countries, but many are developing countries 
which are much more dependent on their meniral industries and whose economics 
depend heavily on the export revenues earned from menirals. It has been reported that 
"the production limitation formula has evolved during a number of discussions and 
various factors were introduced in order to balance, as far as possible, different 
interests and to take account of imponderable and erratic events." Doc. 
A.Conf.62.L.66, supra note 165, p. 121.
172  See the statement of the Brazilian representative, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., 
Vol.II, p.29 (64).
173 Report o f the Co-ordinators of the Working Group o f 21 to the First 
Committee. A.Conf. 62.C.1.L .28, UNCLOS ID, Off. Rec., Vol.XIV, p.164.
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on the minerals concerned for export earnings and government revenue 
than did the developed producer countries."174 Ogley put it clearly that 
the closure of land-based mines can leave communities devastated and 
resources-labour, social capital and infrastructure unused.175
The contribution of the developing producers was shown to be quite 
bulky, since 42 percent of 1968 world production value of manganese, 14 
percent of nickel, 43 percent of copper, and 70 percent of cobalt were 
produced in developing countries.176 Moreover, in 1975 Chile 
contributed 14 percent of the non-communist copper supply of 6.533 
tons, while Zambia supplied 11 percent. The two countries and 
Mauritania form a Copper Association known as CIPEC which controls 
about 38 percent of the world mine production and 72 percent of the 
export trade of mine and smelter products.177 With regard to cobalt,
Zaire alone produced about 59 percent of the 1975 non-communist 
production, and together with Zambia and Morocco accounted for 76 
percent.178
Several studies have been carried out to demonstrate the impact of 
deep sea bed mining on land-based producers and metal markets.179 The 
impact on the markets may be substantial resulting in the fall of prices. It
174 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.II, p.27 (45).
176 Ogley, op.cit., p. 181.
176 R. Akesson, The Law of the Sea Conference, (1974) 8 J.W.T.L., pp.291-
92.
177 L. Antrim, The Role of Deep Seabed Mining in the Future Supply of Metals, 
in T. Kildow, Deep Sea bed Mining, (1980) p.90.
178 Ibid, p.91.
179 For example, see Reddy & Clark, Effects o f Deep sea Mining on 
International Markets for Copper, Nickel, Cobalt, and Manganese, pp. 107-123; L. 
LaQue, Impact of Deep Ocean Mining on Developing Countries, pp.93-95, in T. 
Kildow, op.cit.; L. LaQue, Prospects for and from Deep Ocean Mining of Ferro­
manganese Nodules, (1981) A.D.I., pp.86-90.
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was illustrated that four ocean mining projects by 1990 would diminish 
the nickel price by about 7 percent and would yield an annual benefit to 
U.S. consumers of about 130 million dollars.I80 The table below also 
illustrates how the four ocean mining projects reduces the price of cobalt 
by 25 percent, and at the same time leading to an annual economic benefit 
to U.S. consumers of 70 million dollars.18!
Table:182 Market impact of Deep Ocean Mining 1990 and 2000.
price 
without 
ocean 
mining 1 
(1)
price 
with 
ocean 
mining 1 
(2)
price 
effect 
of ocean 
mining 1 
(3)
consu­
mption
without
ocean
mining
(d's
consu­
mption 
with 
ocean 
2 mining 2
consu­
mption 
effect of 
ocean 
mining 2 
(G\
net benefits 
to U.S.
consumers 
from ocean 
mining 3 
m
Nickel
1990
U.S. 2.84 2.63 0.21 311 315 4 131
Total non- 
communist 2.84 2.63 0.21 839 1021 182 391
2000
U.S. 3.04 2.93 0.11 431 439 8 96
Total non­
communist 3.04 2.93 0.11 1129 1240 121 262
Cobalt
1990
U.S 10.00 7.56 -2.44 14.5 15.0 0.5 72
Total non­
communist 10.00 7.56 -2.44 46.4 48.9 2.5 233
2000
U.S. 10.00 8.14 -1.96 21.3 23.7 2.4 88
Total non­
communist 10.00 8.14 -1.96 64.0 76.0 12.0 275
ISO C. Burrows, The Net Value of Manganese Nodules to U.S. Interests with 
Special Reference to Market Effects and National Security, p. 132, in T. Kildow, 
op.cit.
181 Burrows, op.cit., p. 132.
182 Quoted in Burrows, op.cit., p. 131.
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Column (3)= (2) - (1); Column (6)= (5) - (4); Column (7)= (3) x [ (4) 
+ 0.5 x (6) ] x 2.000.
1.1978 Dollars per pound. 2. Thousands of short tons. 3. Millions of 
1978 dollars.
A further introduction of two more ocean mining operations in 1995 
would cause a decrease of the price by another 10 percent. Thus, 6.50 
dollars will be realized from one pound instead of 10.00 dollars. 
Pertaining to the nickel metal, four ocean mining operations in 1990 can 
cause a price drop of 6 percent and two additional mining operations in 
1995 would cause another decline in the price of 2 percent.183
It can be deduced from the impact of sea bed production on land- 
based producers that the developing countries loses a considerable share 
of foreign exchange earnings and their concern about the effects of sea 
bed production is justified.
Deep sea bed mineral production has been considered as a 
supplement to land-based sources of nickel, copper, cobalt and 
manganese.184 Surely, in the future, when the land ore reserves will be 
nearly depleted, the deep sea bed mineral source will be of great value as 
an alternative.185
The establishment of a production formula186 will possibly at least
!83 Reddy & Clark, op.cit., p.l 10.
!84 Antrim, op.cit., p.84.
L. LaQue, Prospects for and from Deep Ocean Mining of Ferro-manganese 
Nodules, (1981) A.D.I., p.88.
186 It has been said that the free market forces approach is in theory contradictory 
with the provisions on production control policy. See I. Chamey, The Law of the 
Deep Seabed Post UNCLOS III, (1984) 63 Oreg.L.Rev., p.28. The incompatibility 
which exists between the production control formula and the free market approach, it is 
because the free market approach is regarded-the approach was supported by developed
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protect the land-based producers from substantial effects on the markets 
by limiting production levels of metals from deep sea bed.
The problem of effects of deep sea bed mining was raised even 
before the UNCLOS E l was convened. In the second session of the Ad- 
Hoc Sea-Bed Committee on June 21, 1968, Argentina requested the 
question of the exploitation of the deep ocean floor to be considered, as it 
should not have adverse effects on the exploitation of the land resources 
by the developing nations.187 Furthermore, it was mentioned in the 
preamble of the Declaration of Principles that the duty to "minimize the 
adverse economic effects caused by fluctuation of prices of raw materials 
resulting from such activities."
During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
efforts were made to design a production policy scheme for deep sea bed 
mining which will reflect the interests of land-based producers and 
industrialised consumers. At the Caracas Session (second session) of 
UNCLOS H I , the issue had been enhanced through reports and studies 
undertaken and completed by UNCTAD. It was reported by the 
UNCTAD that land-based producers will be affected by sea bed 
production and the consequence would be that their total export earnings 
from those minerals would grow less rapidly than they would have done 
o therw ise.188 In a study case related to three minerals, UNCTAD 
reported that with a very modest volume of sea bed output in 1980, the 
export earnings of the developing countries in that year would be lower 
by 360 million dollars.189
countries during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea-to be an 
instrument to make decisions on production and prices of menirals. See, M. Marcoux, 
Seabed Meniral Resource Production and the Free Market, (1973) 6 N.R.L., p.218.
187 S. ODA, The Law of the Sea in our Time- II the United Nations Seabed
Committee 1968-1973, (1977) p.20.
188 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.I, p. 183.
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At the fourth session 1976, the RSNT19*1 embodied three elements of 
the production policy. These are: production limitation, commodity 
agreements and compensation system. The RSNT permitted operators to 
produce a fixed rate equivalent to the increase in world demand for 
nickel. The RSNT also allowed the Authority to negotiate and participate 
in such agreements on behalf of all production in the Area, not only on the 
reserved part under its direct control. The production limit which was to 
last for at most twenty five years, had to be derived from the growth 
segment of nickel market provided that, this should be at least 6 percent 
per annum.191 The Authority was given the power to prescribe a system 
of compensation as a measure to protect against adverse economic effects 
of sea bed production.192
At the fifth session, Zambia delegation wanted to introduce certain 
amendments to Article 9 of the RSNT on production policy. Zambia 
suggested that the interim period should be renewed from time to time, 
and more effective measures of protection against adverse economic 
effects on developing countries which produce or export minerals to be 
set.193
In trying to reach an agreement in the 1978 negotiations, Richardson 
and Beesley, representatives of the United States and Canada respectively, 
tried to establish a production ceiling policy acceptable to all delegations. 
The agreement was known as the "Can-Am formula.”194 The formula
d89 Ibid. See also the statement made by Mr Arsenis, special representative of 
UNCTAD's Secretary General before the First Committee, summarized in UNCLOS 
HI, Off. Rec., Vol.n, pp.26-30.
190 Doc. A.Conf.62.WP.8.Rev.l, UNCLOS ID, Off. Rec., Vol.V, p.125.
191 RSNT, Part I, Annex I, para. 21.
192 RSNT, Part I, art. 28, para. 2 (xi).
193 UNCLOS IE, Off. Rec., Vol.VI, p.77 (44).
194 L. Filardi, Canadian Perspectives on Seabed Mining: The Case of the
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specified calculations of a logarithmic regression line on nickel demand 
based on the last fifteen years of available data. The trend line define two 
figures: 1) the growth segment of five years prior to commercial 
production; and 2) 60 percent of the growth segment beginning at the first 
year of commercial production. The respective annual sums of items 1 
and 2 constituted the production limit available to seabed miners for each 
year of the interim period.195
According to Ogley, the "Can-Am formula" had three advantages for 
the miners. First, a time limit beginning five years before commercial 
production commences and lasting twenty five years was set to the interim 
period, unless superseded by a commodity agreement before then. 
Second, the method of deriving the limit was precisely drawn, finally, it 
was made clear that the Authority could regulate mining other than 
nodule mining only by amendment of the Convention.196
Unfortunately, the formula was objected to by other industrialised 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, which generally refused the 
production limitation scheme and specifically, the "Can-Am formula." 
The United Kingdom argued that the production limitation policy would 
freeze economic activity, increase prices and prevent the necessary 
investment for sea bed mining.197 At the resumed eighth session, the 
United Kingdom maintained its position stating that the policies set forth 
in Article 150 and Article 151, Paragraphs 1 and 2, required 
improvement in order to produce a text that would be generally 
acceptable to delegations.198 The United Kingdom representative came at
Production Limitation Formula, (1984) 13 O.D.I.L.A., p.470.
195 Ibid.
196 Ogley, op.cit., pp. 187-188.
197 Filardi, op.cit., p.470.
198 UNCLOS IH, Off. Rec., Vol.Xn, p.33 (88 ).
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the ninth session to confirm that the "formulation of article 151 in the 
RSNT was unacceptable to his delegation."199
Another progress took place in Negotiating Group One, led by Mr 
Nandan of Fiji. Mr Nandan conducted intensive consultations in order to 
ensure a production limitation policy,200 involving the interested parties, 
that is, the land-based producers and the consumers. However, Nandan 
could not reach a consensus on setting up an acceptable production 
formula.201
The Chairman of the Group of 77 made it clear before the First 
Committee that, unless substantial changes were made in the floor figure 
contained in the Nandan proposal or in the percentage figure in the clause 
intended as a safeguard, the proposal would not be acceptable to the 
Group of 77.202 The Canadian delegation agreed with the Group of 77 in 
principle that, unless both kinds of changes were made, the proposal 
would not be acceptable to his delegation.203 However, the views of 
Columbia and Chile on the Nandan proposal were pessimistic. Columbia 
stated that, "the intelligent proposals by Mr Nandan with certain 
amendments would provide for more appropriate protection of land- 
based producers, and represented an acceptable basis for negotiation."The
199 UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., VolXIII, p.25 (14 ).
200 Technical studies were conducted by Sub-Group of Technical Experts of 
Negotiating Group 1 of the First Committee on the production limitation formula, under 
the Chairmanship of Mr Archer who reformulate the production formula provision "in 
such a way as to reflect fairly faithfully a formula which proved acceptable to all the 
interest groups." See Explanatory Memorandum by the Chairman Concerning Doc. 
NGl.lO .Rev.l and Doc. NG1.12, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.X, pp.19-20. Also 
Reports, Docs. NG1.7; NG1.9; and NG1.11, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.X, pp.28- 
51.
201 Filardi, op.cit., p.472.
202 UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., VoLXIII, p.8 (19).
203 Ibid.
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Chilean delegation said that, ’’the text submitted by Nandan could form the 
basis for future negotiations, and that the proposals for financial 
arrangements and the settlement of sea bed disputes were acceptable."204
All in all, amendments were included in production limitation 
provisions. The industrialised states took into consideration the effect of 
the interim production limitation in periods of low growth. They 
maintained that, the production ceiling should not be permitted to fall 
under a certain minimum level which was called a "floor." Thus, in order 
to satisfy the demand of the industrialized countries, a new paragraph was 
embodied in Article 151 providing a minimum of 3 percent increase in 
nickel consumption in periods of low growth provided that the resulting 
ceiling did not for any given year exceed the total projected increase in 
nickel consumption.205
The final years of the negotiations on the production limitations 
reached a compromise after modifications were inserted in the ICNT. 
Revised.2 and the Draft Convention.206 Therefore, the production 
limitation system was embodied in the Convention.
4.1. Calculation of the Production Quotas
Mr Nandan said:
we all know that the production control scheme is a complicated
204 Filardi, op.cit., p.473.
205 h . Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The Ninth Session (1980), (1981) 75 A.J.I.L., p.216.
206 For more details see Doc. A.Conf.62.L.35, in Annex I, Mr Nandan's Report 
on Negotiations Relating to Production Policies, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XI, 
pp.86-90; A.Conf. 62.C.1.L.27, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XIII, p.113, pp.120- 
123; A.Conf. 62.C. 1 .L.28 and Add.l, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XIV, p.161, 
pp.163-166.
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system involving mathematical and statistical principles and 
when these are translated into legal language they are even more 
puzzling 207
The production limitation formula or the " ceiling-floor-safeguard 
formula" as it was described,208 is devised to guarantee that the nickel 
production will not exceed a certain rate of growth of nickel's world 
consumption. It was outlined in the Secretary General's report that the 
ceiling-floor-safeguard formula is an over-all formula for calculating the 
ceiling for commercial production of nickel from the polymetallic
nodules under the various conditions that may arise.209
Hereinafter, an attempt is made to briefly describe the scheme as
documented. An interim period is to be established, in which a production 
limitation is to be imposed, and it is designed to start five years prior to 
January 1 of the year in which the earliest commercial production was 
planned to commence under an approved plan of work. The interim 
period should last 25 years or until the end of the review conference or 
until the day when new agreements between interested parties enter into 
force, whichever is earliest.210 As an example, presume that the year of 
earliest commercial production is 2000. The interim period begin five 
years prior to January 1, 2000, that is, January 1, 1995, and should last 
for 25 years, in this case December 31, 2020, or until the end of the 
review conference or until the day new agreements are entered into force, 
whichever is earliest.
207 Doc. A.Conf.62.C. 1 .L.28 and Add. 1, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XIV, 
p. 164.
208 Doc. A.Conf.62.L.66, supra note 165, p.121 (11).
209 Ibid, p. 121 (14).
210 LOSC, art. 151 (3).
105
1. The Ceiling Component
It is calculated as the whole of the increase in world nickel 
consumption over five years prior to the first commercial mining, plus 60 
percent of the increase of nickel consumption during the period between 
the year before the earliest commercial production and the year for which 
authorisation is sought.211 In other words, the ceiling is defined as the 
sum of: first, the difference between the trend line values for the year 
prior to the year of first commercial production and the year immediately 
before the interim period. Second, plus 60 percent of the difference 
between the trend line values for the year for which the production 
authorisation is being applied for and that for the year immediately before 
the year of commercial production.
Example.
Assuming that world consumption of nickel data is given by company 
(A), based on the assumed 3.0 percent increase in world nickel 
consumption from 1979 to 2000 as follows:
211 Ibid, art. 151(4) (a) [i] [iij.
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Year World consumption 
of nickel (thousa­
nd metric tons)
Year World consumption 
of nickel (thous- 
nd metric tons)
1979 435 1990 820
1980 488 1991 880
1981 510 1992 910
1982 543 1993 968
1983 590 1994 977
1984 670 1995 1001
1985 689 1996 1067
1986 710 1997 1099
1987 730 1998 2010
1988 753 1999 2020
1989 794 2000 2070
Assuming that a contractor applies in 1995 for authorisation to mine in 
2000. In order to determine the production ceiling for the year 2000, a 
method is to be followed. First, to establish in 1995 a trend line for nickel 
consumption on the basis of the most recent available data covering a 15 
year period, from 1979 to 1994, using an original trend line derived from 
that data. Second, to determine the trend line values for the following 
years:
1. The year prior to the commencement of the interim period 
(1994).
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2. The year prior to the year of earliest commercial production 
(1999).
3- The year of earliest commercial production (the year for which a 
production authorization is being sought), in this case year 2000. 
Therefore, according to the above table, the trend line values for the:
1. Year 1994 is = 521 thousand metric tons.
2. Year 1999 is = 664 thousand metric tons.
3. Year 2000 is = 714 thousand metric tons.
The nickel production ceiling for the year 2000 would be: (664-521) 
+ 60% of (714-664)=173 thousand metric tons.
This calculation of ceiling is applicable as long as the rate of increase 
of the trend line does not fall below 3 percent.212
2. The "Floor" Component
Is designed to prevent and secure during a period of low growth in 
nickel world consumption that the producers enjoy a protection of a 
minimum allocation of tonnage. Hence, if the annual rate of increase in 
the original trend-line is less than three 3 percent, the ceiling is to be 
calculated on the basis of a new trend line passing through the original 
trend-line value for the first of the fifteen years period, whose data is used 
and increasing at a rate of 3 percent.213 The Secretary General illustrated 
in his report that, if the annual rate of increase of the trend-line is less than 
three percent, then the ceiling is calculated on the basis of a trend-line
212 The method of determination of the production ceiling is prescribed in details 
in Article 151 (4) of the LOSC.
213 LOSC, art. 151 (4) (b) [ii]. The new trend-line is a "trend line starting from 
the same base amount as the original trend line but increasing at a rate of 3.0 percent 
annually, Doc. A.Conf.62.L.66, supra note 165, p. 123 (31).
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which increases at a notional 3.0 percent annually. This is the so-called 
floor clause and it does not indicate a minimum below which commercial 
production of nickel from the polymetallic nodules can not fall; rather it 
specifies a minimum annual rate of increase of the trend-line on the basis 
of whose values the ceiling is calculated.214 This new trend line increasing 
at 3.0 percent annually is then used in a similar calculation to that 
specified in the ceiling clause. The difference between the values trend 
line for the year prior to earliest commercial production and the year 
prior to the commencement of the interim period is added to 60 percent of 
the difference between the value for the year for which the production 
ceiling is calculated and that for the year prior to the earliest commercial 
production.215
However, the calculation made according to the floor clause is 
subject to a safeguard clause.
3. The Safeguard Component
It seeks to guarantee that the nickel production ceiling calculated 
under the floor clause for any year of the interim period should not 
exceed the difference between the original trend line values for that year 
in question, and the original trend line value for the year immediately 
prior to the commencement of the interim period216 so as not to harm the 
profits of the land-based producers of sea bed metals. In other words, 
under the safeguard clause the amount calculated under the floor clause 
must be compared with the amount of the difference between the value on 
the original trend line for the year for which the production ceiling is
214 See supra note 165, p.121 (13).
215 See supra note 165, p. 123 (32).
216 LOSC, art. 151(4) (b) [ii].
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calculated and the value on the original trend line for the year prior to the 
commencement of the interim period and the lesser of these two amounts 
is the production ceiling.217
Example
Presuming that, the ceiling calculation is made under the floor clause 
and that, the production ceiling on the basis of this new trend line is 260 
thousand metric tons. According to the safeguard clause, this amount must 
be compared with the amount of the difference on the original trend line 
between the values for the year prior to the beginning of the interim 
period (year 1994) and the year for which the production ceiling is 
calculated (year 1999), and which is 143 thousand metric tons. Therefore, 
the amount which would constitute the production ceiling is the lesser 
amount, and in this case is 143 thousand metric tons.
Mr Nandan said that the safeguards a mechanism j'would protect the 
land-based producers from any possible distortion of their existing 
market because of the minimum production ceiling. The safeguard 
mechanism will ensure that irrespective of the guaranteed tonnage sea bed 
production under the minimum ceiling will not be allowed to exceed 100 
percent of the growth segment for that year as calculated under the 
original provisions of Article 151.218
4.2. Production Authorisation219
217 See supra note 193, p. 123 (33).
218 Doc.A.Conf.62.C.1.L.27 and Add.l. Report o f the Co-ordinators o f the 
Working Group of 21 to the First Committee, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XIII , 
p. 122 (15).
219 Article 7 of Annex HI and Article 151 (2-7) of the Convention deal with the 
procedures of granting production authorisation. Thus, according to Article 7 (1) of 
Annex ID, six months after the entry into force of the Convention and thereafter each
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The miner who has an approved plan of work may not commence 
commercial production unless he has applied and received a production 
authorisation.220 Production authorisation will not be issued before the 
start of a five-year period to the planned commencement of commercial 
production under the plan of work concerned. In other words, they have 
to be applied for within five years of the foreseen start of commercial 
production. For example, if commercial production is expected to start in 
January 2000, a production authorisation will not be issued before 
January 1995.
The operator shall stipulate in his application the annual quantity of 
nickel he intends to recover under the approved plan of work, and the 
production authorisation for that quantity shall automatically be granted 
by the Authority provided that, the quantity of the tonnage already 
authorised in earlier rounds does not:
1) Exceed the "nickel production ceiling", as calculated in the year of 
issuance of the authorisation, during any year of planned production 
falling within the interim period, or 2) contravene the obligations of the 
Authority under a commodity agreement or arrangement.221
Nevertheless, a degree of flexibility is authorised in the level of
annual production. On that account, a miner may in any year produce up
to 8 percent more than the level of annual production indicated in his
production authorisation provided that, the over-all amount of production
does not exceed that designated in the authorisation. Though, any excess
over 8 percent and up to 20 percent in any year, or any excess in the first
fourth month, the Authority considers all applications submitted during the 
immediately preceding.
220 LOSC, art. 151 (2) (a).
221 Ibid, Annex III, art. 7 (1); art. 151 (2) (d).
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and subsequent years following two consecutive years in which excess 
occurs, must be negotiated with the Authority, which may require the 
miner to obtain a supplementary production authorisation to cover the 
additional production.222
It is provided that the Authority will not grant such a supplementary 
authorisation until it has proceeded on other pending production 
applications and has taken into consideration other likely applications, so 
as not to discriminate other applicants 223
In granting such production authorisations, the Authority must be 
guided by the principle of not exceeding the total production allowed 
under the production ceiling in any year, that is 20 percent of the original 
allocation.224 Moreover, the Authority must not allow any miner to 
produce a quantity in excess of 46.500 tons of nickel per year 225
It can happen that, the authorisations sought in a round of 
applications could not comply with the ceiling i.e., exceed the total 
production tonnage permitted. In this case, a process of selection would be 
applicable between applicants. That is to say, if production had to be 
allocated to certain producers, the Authority has the power to make such a 
selection. The Authority shall make the selection on the basis of objective 
and non-discriminatory standards set forth in its rules, regulations and 
procedures226 The Authority shall give priority to those applicants who:
a) give better assurance of performance, taking into account their 
financial and technical qualifications and their performance, if any, under 
previously approved plans of work,
222 Ibid, art. 151 (6) (a).
223 Ibid, art. 151 (6) (b).
224 Ibid, art. 151 (6) (a).
223 Ibid, art. 151 (6) (b).
226 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 7 (2).
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b) provide earlier prospective financial benefits to the Authority, 
taking into account when commercial production is scheduled to begin,
c) have already invested the most resources and effort in prospecting 
or exploration.227
It is interesting to note that the industrialised countries feared that 
such selection could be biased if controlled by developing nations, even 
though the Convention has specific provisions intended to prevent such 
favouritism.22^
Applicants who were refused to be given production authorisations 
in previous rounds, would be given a priority in subsequent rounds over 
other applicants.229
It is also provided that "whenever fewer reserved areas than non­
reserved areas are under exploitation, applications for production 
authorisations with respect to reserved areas shall have priority."230
4.3. Commodity Agreements
The Authority is entrusted with a right to participate in any 
commodity conference including all interested parties, that is producers 
and consumers, in order "to promote the growth, efficiency and stability 
of markets for those commodities produced from the minerals derived 
from the area, at prices remunerative to producers and fair to 
consumers."231
227 Ibid, Annex IE, art. 7 (3).
22& C. Brewer, Deep Seabed Mining: Can an Acceptable Regime Ever be Found, 
(1982) 11 O.D.I.L.A., p.49.
229 LOSC, Annex HI, art. 7 (4).
230 Ibid, Annex IE, art. 7 (6).
231 Ibid , art. 151 (1) (a) (b).
113
Participation of the Authority in such commodity agreements shall 
be in respect of all production in the Area and not only that part relating 
to the Enterprise. Nonetheless, some delegations considered that it was not 
for the Conference to decide the precise nature of the Authority’s 
participation, and that the Authority should participate in such commodity 
conferences only in respect of the production of the Enterprise.232 
Whereas, other delegations felt that the Authority should participate in 
respect of all production derived from the Area.233
However, Mr Nandan tried to accommodate these different opinions 
by removing the article "the" referring to "the production in the Area." 
Nandan's intention was to leave as much freedom of action in this matter 
as possible. He believes that "these commodity conferences will establish 
their own rules of representation, and it would be unfortunate if the 
Authority was constrained in its role because of some inflexibility in this 
provision."234 Accordingly, the Authority would have wide powers to act 
effectively in these commodity arrangements, and therefore, maintain 
prices at an equitable and remunerative level for the benefit of all 
producers and consumers.
Regarding such commodity agreements as the most effective long­
term and satisfactory solution to secure stable prices, the industrialized 
countries came to view such agreements as economically unacceptable. 
Thus, during the eleventh session of UNCLOS ID, the United States 
delegation referred to these provisions of the Draft Convention as an 
obstacle in the development of sea bed resources "by denying the play of 
basic economic forces in the market place."235
232 Doc. A.Conf.62.C. 1 .L.28 and Add.l, UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.XIV, 
p.165.
233 Ibid.
234 ibid.
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4.4. Compensation System
This system is designed to assist the developing countries which 
suffer from adverse effects caused by sea bed production. Moreover, 
other measures than the financial compensation are to be taken, such as 
economic adjustment assistance as well as co-operation with international 
organizations.236
The objective of the compensatory system is to ensure protection for 
developing countries against the adverse effects of deep sea bed minerals 
exploitation on their economies. In other words, to protect against 
reduction in the price or in the volume of export of minerals exported, as 
long as the reduction is caused by activities in the Area.237
Mr Langevad thought that financial compensation is not a practical 
solution, as it would be quite difficult to evaluate a figure for financial 
losses objectively, including potential and future losses of land-based 
producers due to sea bed mining separately from normal market 
changes.23**
To sum up, it can be said that, the production control scheme is an 
effective device to secure and maintain an appropriate and legitimate 
balance between the economic interests of land-based producers and the 
sea bed producers with due account to the interests of consumers.
Section 5. Protection of Pioneer Investment
235 UN Monthly chron., (June 1982) XIX (6), p.16.
236 LOSC, art.151 (10).
237 ibid.
238 Langevad, op.cit., p.264.
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During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
developed countries insisted on calling for the protection of investment 
made by their private consortia on exploration of the deep sea bed.
The issue of protection of investment was first raised by the United 
States during the eighth session (1979). The aim of the United States in 
bringing up this matter was to create a priority for the pre-Convention 
investors in parallel with a similar priority for the Enterprise.239 
However, during the tenth session, the United States paper was withdrawn 
by its sponsor at the time the country began its review of the entire Draft 
Convention.
The issue was raised again during the eleventh session by many 
western states including the United States. Negotiations on this subject 
took place first in informal meetings of the Working Group of 21 on sea 
bed matters, then in private negotiations chaired by President Koh and the 
Chairman of the First Committee Mr Engo.240 The negotiations which 
took place in the Group of 21 were based on four informal working 
papers submitted by the Group of 77 and western industrialised states. 
The United States and the rest of industrialised countries contended that 
their consortia would not enter the next phase of exploration which 
required huge investments, unless they are secured access by obtaining 
production authorisation to exploit seabed minerals. The Group of 77 
objected and argued that, PIP regime should not limit the competence of 
the Authority after the entry into force of the Convention and that, the 
parallel system should be maintained by requiring each pioneer to submit 
two mine sites. In addition, they maintained that the benefits of PIP should 
be preserved only for entities whose sponsoring states became parties to the
239 P. Bruckner, Preparatory Investment under the Convention and the PIP 
Resolution, in 17 L.Seainst. Proc., (1984) p. 181.
240 UN Monthly Chron., (June 1982) 19 (6), p.9.
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Convention.241
On March 29, 1982, Messrs Koh and Engo, Coordinators of the 
Group 21, recommended Resolution II in a report and explained the 
rationale for the proposal as follows:
It is a demonstrable reality that six consortia and one state have 
been investing funds in the development of sea bed mining 
technology, equipment and expertise. The programme of their 
research and development has arrived at a point when they must 
invest substantial amounts of funds in site-specific activities. The 
industrialised countries representing these consortia have been 
demanding that the Conference and the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea should recognize these preparatory investments. We 
feel that this is a legitimate request provided that the 
preparatory investments of these pioneers will be brought 
within the framework of the Convention and provided that the 
interim arrangement is transitory in character.242
Accordingly, the protection of investment requested by the western 
countries is a legitimate demand provided these pioneers investment will 
be brought within the framework of the Convention and provided that, 
the interim arrangement is transitory in character. The Conference 
reached a compromise at the eleventh session and adopted Resolution n, 
which would guarantee a protection of investments made by the consortia 
of western countries.
The scheme devised by the Conference is set out in Resolution II, 
which is not part of the Convention.243 However, the Convention had to
241 Bruckner, op.cit., p. 182.
242 See supra note 240. Also Doc. A.Conf.62.C.l.L.30, 29 March 1982, 
UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.XVI, p.272 (15).
243 Resolution II was not incorporated into the Convention, because it was 
intended to take effect before the Convention enters into force.
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be adjusted to the scheme, since many of the guarantees it affords will 
extend into the first generation of sea bed mining operations.244
The Soviet Union strongly disagreed and expressed dissatisfaction 
with the PIP resolution scheme, because it discriminated against her. The 
soviet Union went on to consider the scheme as an unfair system for the 
granting of the status of pioneer investor to juridical persons listed in 
Sub-paragraph 1 (a) (i) (ii). Moreover, the Soviet Union disputed the 
privileged position accorded to the companies of the western 
countries.245
The PIP resolution gives the existing sea bed mining consortia 
significant advantages. Actually, the scheme is designed to insure the 
protection of pioneer investments made by the companies, and enable 
them to qualify for registration by the Preparatory Commission as a 
pioneer investor.
States registered as pioneer investors would be entitled to explore 
without commercially exploiting a selected area of the deep sea bed until 
the Convention comes into force. Over and above, the scheme would 
guarantee pioneer investors priority over all others, except for the 
Authority's Enterprise.246
Resolution II which established a regime to govern preparatory 
investment, aims "to ensure that the Enterprise will be provided with the 
funds, technology and expertise necessary to enable it to keep pace with 
the states and other entities... with respect to activities in the Area",247 
and also legitimate the investments made by companies and states in
244 See supra note 241, pp. 10-11, or Doc. A.Conf.62.C.l.L.30, UNCLOS
III, Off. Rec., Vol.XVI, p.272 (15).
246 Doc. A.Conf.62.L.133, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XVI, p.240.
246 UN Monthly Chron., (June 1982) 19 (6), p.9.
247 The last Paragraph of the Preamble of Res. n.
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pioneer activities.
Nevertheless, so that any pioneer investor would be able to engage in 
sea bed mining production, it has got to pass through three stages. These 
stages are:
1. Registration as a pioneer investor. 2. Approval of plans of work in 
the form of a contract. 3. A production authorisation.
5.1. Registration as Pioneer Investor
Under the extended final version of the scheme Resolution II, 
Paragraph 1 (a) identifies the number of those who could qualify for 
pioneer investors status. Those who qualified as pioneer investors are 
limited to eight states or entities, plus an unspecified number from 
developing countries under the form of three categories as follows:
Category (1) consists of:248 a) France, Japan,249 India and the USSR;
or
b) a state enterprise of each state; or
c) one natural or juridical person possessing the nationality of, or 
effectively controlled by, each state or its nationals.
Category (2) consists of: four entities, whose components companies 
have the nationality of, or are controlled by one or more of the eight 
nations currently involved in multinational consortia: Belgium, Canada,
24  ^Res. II, para. 1 (a) (i).
249 The French and Japanese consortia which could qualify under the scheme of 
Resolution II are: (1) Deep Ocean Minerals Association (DOMA) (registered in Japan as 
a public corporation): composed of 38 Japanese companies in trading, mining and 
metallurgy, shipbuilding and heavy industries, steel, shipping, cables, electric 
appliances and fisheries. (2) Association Francaise pour l'Etude et la Recherche des 
Nodules (AFERNOD) (registered in France): Centre National pour l'Exploitation des 
Oceans, Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Societe Metallurgique le Nickel, 
Chantiers de France-Dunkerque. See UN Monthly Chron., (1982) XIX (6), p . l l .
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Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom 
and the United States.250 The four consortia are as follows:
1. Kennecott consortia (uncorporated): Sohio (USA); Rio Tinto-Zinc 
(United Kingdom); British Petroleum (United Kingdom); Noranda Mines 
(Canada); Mitsubishi (Japan).
2. Ocean Mining Associates (registered in United States): United 
States Steel (United States of America), Union Miniere (Belgium), Sun 
(United States), Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (Italy).
3. Ocean Management Incorporated (incorporated in United States): 
Inco (Canada), Metallgesellschaft (Federal Republic of Germany), 
Preusag (Federal Republic of Germany), Salzgitter (Federal Republic of 
Germany), SEDCO (United States), Deep Ocean Mining (Japan).
4. Ocean Minerals Company (OMCO) (United States partnership): 
Standard Oil of Indiana (United States), Lockheed Aircraft (United 
States), Billiton (Netherlands, Subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell), BKW 
Ocean M inerals (Netherlands, Subsidiary of Royal Bos Kalis 
Westminster).251
Category (3) consists of:252 a) any developing states; or
b) any state enterprise of such state; or
c) any natural or juridical person possessing the nationality of, or 
effectively controlled by, such state or its nationals; or d) any group of the 
foregoing.
Registration with the Preparatory Commission as a pioneer investor
250 The reason for not notifying the names of the consortia in Resolution n, is 
the opposition of the Soviet Union on the ground that "it was improper for the 
Conference to name companies and give them the status of pioneer investors." See 
Ogley, op.cit., p.232.
251 UN Monthly Chron., (1982) XIX (6), p.10.
2^2 Res. II, para. 1 (a) (iii).
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would entitle a state or entity to explore but not exploit a selected area of 
the international sea bed and enable it priority over others when applying 
to the Authority for commercial production. Nonetheless, requirements 
should be fulfilled before entities may qualify for registration as pioneer 
investors.
With regard to the first two categories, entities are qualified under 
the following requirements:
1. every state must sign the Convention before it or its enterprise or 
national or juridical person may qualify. The purpose of this requirement 
is to preclude any state from the privileges acquired under the scheme if 
the state intend not to sign the Convention.
2. To qualify as registered pioneer investor; an applicant must have 
spent at least 30 million US dollars by January 1,1983, and 10 percent of 
that on a specific site.
3. The "certifying state" which has signed the Convention and of 
which the applicant is a national, shall issue a certificate certifying the 
level of expenditure made in pioneer activities. Though, where the 
prospective pioneer investor is a state, the evidence will take the foim of a 
statement by that state certifying the level of expenditure.253
One of the important aspects of the PIP system, is the link between 
pioneer status and signature of the Convention. This issue represents a 
legal controversy, as regards to the first requirement, that is certifying 
states must, in order to obtain registration of a pioneer investor, be 
signatories to the Convention. If for example, a consortium consisted of 
four companies from four states; in compliance with Resolution II, the 
compromise is that, only one of these companies have to come from a state 
which has signed the Convention.254 But in order to obtain a contract, that
253 Ibid, para. 2 (a).
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is to have the plan of work approved, and production authorisations after 
the Convention enters into force, it is necessary for the certifying states to 
become parties to the Convention, including all those to which component 
entities of a consortium belong.255 Resolution II however, provides for 
the devolution of pioneer status to successors that may belong to a state 
signatory to the Convention and for the changing of nationality of pioneer 
investors whose certifying states fail to ratify the Convention or to accede 
to it.256
Pertaining to the foregoing discussion, the Soviet Union objected to 
what they described as the discriminatory nature of the scheme for the 
different categories of investors. They stated that, whereas the Soviet 
Union or India would have to sign the Convention in order to qualify for 
pioneer status, a country such as the United States or the Federal Republic 
of Germany could benefit from the scheme without signing, since, their 
firms would merely have to be associated in a consortium with companies 
from a signatory state. The Soviet Union said that, "it would be unable to 
support the president's draft resolution on pioneer investments in the 
form in which it stood", and accordingly it will be unable to become a 
party to the Convention if the resolution... still contains provisions which 
place the USSR in an unfavourable position vis-a-vis several other states." 
Consequently, the USSR abstained from voting on the adoption of the 
Convention.257
Responding to the complaint of the USSR, President Koh said that, 
the resolution also favoured the Soviet Union. He explained that, despite 
the Soviet Union being a relatively new comer in the development of sea
2^4 ibid, paras. 1 (a) (ii), 1 (c), and 2 (a). Signature is required by all four states.
255 Ibid, para. 8 (c) and 10 (a).
256 Ibid, para. 10 (b).
257 UN Monthly Chron., (1982) 19 (6), p .l l .
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bed mining technology it had, however, been guaranteed one mine site 
compared to the four sites which would have to be shared by seven 
western states.258 He also pointed out that, the developing countries had 
been able to extract from the industrialised countries an even greater 
concession as no plan of work for mining the sea bed could be approved 
unless all of the states whose companies made up the consortium were 
parties to the Convention 259
According to the third category, entities must, in order to qualify for 
registration as pioneer investors, perform two requirements:
1. The developing state concerned must be a signatory of the 
Convention.
2. Evidence must be produced by the state concerned of the same 
level of expenditure as required for category (1) entities. The deadline for 
such expenditure is January 1,1985.
Many countries in the Conference expressed concern that the scheme 
is a major concession to the demands of the industrialised countries. China 
viewed the scheme resolution on preparatory investment as having 
accommodated "too much the demands of a few industrialised powers and 
provided privileges and priority status to those countries and their 
companies."260 Albania stated that the pioneer investment scheme would 
make it possible for imperialists and transnational corporations to seize 
the resources of the ocean floor.261
If the requirements of the applicant are brought to completion, the 
Commission is required to register the applicant after applying to it for
258 Doc. A.Conf.62.L.141, 29 April 1982 , UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.XVI, 
p.247 (9).
259 ibid, p.247 (8); see also UN Monthly Chron., (June 1982) 19 (6), p . l l .
260 UN Monthly Chron., (June 1982) 19 (6), p.20.
261 UN Monthly Chron., (1983) XX (2), p. 16.
123
registration as a pioneer investor, provided such application is to be 
accompanied by a certification of expenditure as stated above. Such 
applicant shall ensure before making an application that, his application 
does not overlap an area for which another application is made or is 
already allocated as pioneer area.262
In applying for such registration a "banking-system" similar to that 
set forth in the Convention is set up. Each pioneer area registered with the 
Preparatory Commission under the PIP resolution must be large enough 
for two mining operations. The Commission shall, within fourthy five 
days of receiving the application for registration, allocate half of the total 
area to the pioneer investor, and the other half shall be banked for either 
the Enterprise or developing state.263 In the site allocated to the pioneer 
investor, the applicant has exclusive rights to conduct exploratory 
activities but not commercial production.264 Each investor is registered 
in respect to only one area,265 which shall not exceed 150.000 square 
kilom eters.266 Furthermore, at least a 50 percent portion of this area, 
must be gradually relinquished to the international area after a period of 
eight years.267
Pioneer investors are required to perform certain responsibilities. 
Financially they have to undertake certain charges, that is each pioneer 
investor would be required to pay a $250,000 fee to the Commission for 
registration plus $250,000 when he applies for a plan of work of a mining 
contract.268 Besides, there would be an additional fee of $1 million per
262 Res. n, paras. 2 (a); 5 (a).
263 Ibid, para. 3 (a) (b).
264 Ibid, para. 3 (b).
265 ibid, para. 4.
266 ibid, para 1 (e).
267 ibid, para. 1 (e) (i) (ii) (iii).
268 ibid, para. 7 (a).
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year, from the time the pioneer area is allocated, payable to the Authority 
after the investor's plan of work has been approved.269 Each pioneer 
would also be expected to spend at least a certain amount on their sites, the 
amount of expenditure is to be determined by the Preparatory 
Commission.270
Registered pioneer investors and their certifying states are 
recommended to guarantee that, the Enterprise will have the funds, 
technology and the expertise necessary for it to begin viable and 
competitive operation.271 Pioneer investors would be demanded to 
entrust themselves to ensure that the Enterprise of the Authority is able to 
conduct activities in deep sea bed "in such a manner as to remain in step 
with states and other entities."272 Likewise, pioneer investors would be 
bound to explore areas of the deep sea bed for the Authority's Enterprise 
at the request of the Preparatory Commission on a cost-reimbursable 
basis plus 10 percent interest (per anum); to provide personnel training 
designated by the Preparatory Commission; and to undertake to perform 
the transfer of technology to the Authority's Enterprise before the entry 
into force of the Convention.273 Finally, the certifying states would be 
required to provide periodic reports on the activities of individual 
pioneer investors or on those of their own deep sea bed mining entities to 
the Preparatory Commission.274
Overlapping Claims.
269 Ibid, para. 7 (b).
270 ibid, para. 7 (c).
271 ibid, para. 12.
272 u n  Monthly Chron., (1982) XIX (6), p. 12.
273 ibid, para. 12 (a).
274 ibid, para. 12 (b) (ii).
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Another issue which is crucial to the commencement of deep sea bed 
exploitation is the resolution process over overlapping claims. Without 
resolving disputes over overlapping claims, investors will not have the 
security of mining sites to prevent claims from other parties and make 
enormous investments. Investors may not invest huge capital until there 
exists an effective mechanism for resolving overlapping claims.275 
Undoubtedly, successful resolution of conflicts claims will therefore, 
ensure the security of mine sites and guarantee a profitable return on an 
investment.27^
To overcome this problem, Paragraph 5 (a) of Resolution II provides 
that, "any state which has signed the Convention and which isaprospective 
certifying state shall ensure, before making applications to the 
Commission under Paragraph 2, that areas in respect of which 
applications are made do not overlap one another or areas previously 
allocated as pioneer areas. The states concerned shall keep the 
Commission currently and fully informed of any efforts to resolve 
conflicts with respect to overlapping claims and of the results thereof."277
This provision requires that, all overlap conflicts be resolved before 
any applications for registration as a pioneer investor can be made to the 
Preparatory Commission. Resolution II also includes a primary timetable 
for all prospective certifying states, including all potential claimants, to 
resolve their conflicts by negotiations prior to March 1, 1983. Hence, if
275 h . Breen, The 1982 Dispute Resolving Agreement: The First Step Toward 
Unilateral Mining Outside the Law of the Sea Convention, (1984) 14 O.D.I.L.A., 
pp.205-06.
276 Ibid.
277 Paragraph 5 was based on proposals made by a group of five western states 
(Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and the United 
States). A.Conf.62.L.122, UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.XVI, pp.231-32.
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conflicts are not resolved through negotiations, the prospective certifying 
states shall submit such conflicts claims to binding arbitration not later 
than May 1,1983, to be completed by December 1,1984 278
If conflicts eventually reach binding arbitration, an arbitral tribunal 
would base its decisions on the following factors in determining priority 
among pioneer investors applicants:
1. The continuity and extent of past activities relevant to each area in 
conflict and to the application area.
2. The date on which the pioneer investor (or its predecessor or 
component organization) began activities at sea in the application area.
3. The financial cost of activities measured in constant United States 
dollars in the overlapped area and in the application area.
4. The date when those activities were carried out and the quality of 
those activities.279
Since 1982, there have been several attempts to design a method to 
resolve conflicts concerning overlapping claims.
The first attempt was initiated by Canada in 1982. Canada as a 
prospective certifying state brought to discussions in July 1982 a 
Memorandum of Understanding on the settlement of conflicts with 
respect to sea bed areas [hereinafter referred to as Canadian MOU]. 
Participation in the MOU was limited to prospective certifying states or 
pioneer investor states, hence, leaving out those that did not sign the 1982 
Convention.280
278 Res. II, para. 5 (c).
279 ibid, para. 5 (d).
280 M. Hoagland, Conflict Resolution in the Assignment of Area Entitlements for 
Seabed Mining, (1984) 21 San Diego L.Rev., p.547. States that were excluded are the 
United States, West Germany, United Kingdom, Belgium and Italy. The MOU was 
attached to Resolution II, that"the parties including all potential claimants will seek to 
resolve their conflicts by means of negotiations or other procedures of their choice in
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However, the negotiations on the MOU proved unsuccessful and 
failed to produce an agreement. Among the reasons of the failure were: 
first, the MOU failed to cater for non-signatories of the United Nations 
Convention, because it was envisaged in the MOU that only signatories of 
the Convention would be parties to it. Second, was the perspective of the 
Soviet Unionon the negotiations. The Soviet Union censured that certain 
participants in the Canadian MOU negotiations ’’insistently advocated the 
setting of time limits for the exchange of co-ordinates which were 
considerably later than the time limits established in Resolution II, an 
arrangement which would be to the advantage only of countries which 
have not signed the Convention and are not interested in its 
application."281
The Soviet Union went on later to condemn in a letter addressed to 
the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission affirming that such,
countries were endeavouring to ensure that the formal 
resolution of conflicts in line with the procedure being 
elaborated at the initiative of Canada could begin only after they 
had in practice completed among themselves the above division 
[of the most promising sea bed areas] by means of a separate 
agreement.282
The second attempt to negotiate agreements on mechanisms of
resolving overlaps claims was initiated by four western states. On
September 2,1982, the United States of America, United Kingdom, West
Germany and France concluded an agreement for resolving disputes on
accordance with Paragraph 5 (c) of the resolution governing preparatory investment.1 
See ibid.
281 Brown, op.cit., p.n.721.
282 Ibid, pp. H.721-22.
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conflicts mining claims known as "Agreement Concerning Interim 
Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed."283
The 1982 Agreement was a mechanism to resolve overlapping claims 
of areas by applicants, and it provides that every state party to the 
Agreement must first resolve domestic conflicts in compliance with its 
own domestic rules 284 The Agreement aims to promote the identification 
and resolution of conflicts arising from applications made by pioneer 
investors on or before March 12,1983.285
Signatory governments can assist license applicants to resolve 
conflicts claims voluntarily. If conflicts have not been resolved six months 
after the effective date of the interim Agreement, and the applicants are 
not "parties to a written agreement submitting the conflict to a specified 
binding conflict resolution procedure", conflicts must be resolved 
through binding arbitration.286
The 1982 Agreement was seen as a potential and dependable 
mechanisms for identifying and resolving mining conflicts, in order to 
provide for the security of mine sites.287
Within the scope of mechanisms of resolving conflicts claims, it is
283 1982 Agreement, in (1982) 21 1.L.M., p.950.
284 ibid, art. 7. Most domestic legislation interdict to issue licenses to applicants 
that overlaps claims of reciprocating states. Therefore, such legislation respect claims 
by states with similar sea bed mining laws through reciprocity mechanism.
285 ibid, para. 1. The interim agreement raised international criticism and was 
considered as a threat to the Convention, even though, the Resolution II postulates the 
existence of such mechanisms. The Agreement was criticized on the basis that first, it 
was not a global system by reason of failing to include potential sea bed miners such as 
Japan, USSR and India. Second, this arrangement assumes a further agreement which 
provides a mutual recognition of sea bed claims under national legislation. See Brucker, 
op.cit., p. 187.
286 ibid, Appendix 1. The Preamble o f the Agreement affirmed that the 
Agreement was concluded without undermine to the decisions of the parties of the 
United Nations Convention.
287 Breen, op.cit., p.214.
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clear that, the provisions of the Convention permit the parties of the 
conflict to choose any peaceful means for the settlement of disputes.288 
The Convention provides that, states concerned should before submitting 
applications, resolve conflicts with respect to overlapping claims.289 
Accordingly, the provisions of the Convention call for voluntary actions 
to resolve conflicts of overlapping claims.
The problem of conflict resolution was of great concern for the 
Preparatory Commission during its sessions and meetings. The solution to 
the problem has seen a significant progress during the work of the 
Preparatory Commission.
Preparatory Commission and Conflict Resolution Issue.
Before discussing the problem of conflict resolution through the 
sessions of the Commission, a word must be said about the Preparatory 
Commission.
Resolution I,290 which was adopted with the Convention, provides 
for the establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the International 
Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea. The Preparatory Commission will remain in existence until the 
conclusion of the first meeting of the Assembly of the International Sea- 
Bed Authority. It will consist of states which have signed or acceded to the
288 LOSC, art. 280; art. 282.
289 Res> para> 5 (a)#
2 9 0  r cs i  js annexed to the Final Act o f the Convention. UN. 
Doc.A.Conf.62.121 (21 October 1982). Reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M., p.1254. 
Those states which signed the Convention and the Final Act have the right to participate 
fully in the decision-making process of the Preparatory Commission. However, those 
which signed only the Final Act have the right to be present only as observers during 
the Commission debates.
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Convention. However, Final Act signatories could only participate in the 
Commission as observers with full rights of deliberation but not of 
participation in decision making.
The Preparatory Commission consists of: 1. General Committee. 2. 
The Plenary. 3. Special Commissions: 1) Special Commission 1 deals with 
the issue of adverse effects of sea bed mining on developing land-based 
producer states, 2) Special Commission 2 on the Enterprise, 3) Special 
Commission 3 entrusted with the task of preparation of the drafts of the 
regulations for deep sea bed mining (the mining code), 4) Special 
Commission 4 assigned with the establishment of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 4. Officers. It is interesting to note that 
the most important function of the Preparatory Commission is with 
respect to the PIP provisions of Resolution n.
After having briefly illustrated the structure of the Preparatory 
Commission, it is now important to go through the sessions of the 
Commission where the matter of overlaps and conflict resolution was a 
controversial issue.
During the second session, held between March 19 to April 13,1984 
in Kingston (Jamaica), it was stressed that resolution of conflicts was not 
the duty of the Preparatory Commission but that of the applicant. 
However, this should not hamper the Chairman of the Preparatory 
Commission to use his good offices in order to complete procedures for 
conflict resolution.291
Many attempts were made by prospective certifying states so as to 
resolve conflicts among the claimants. Canadian government disputed any 
registration of application which overlapeiwith other pioneer sites. It
291 R. Mostapha, A study on the Progress of Work in the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Seabed Authority and for the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea, (January-June 1986) 26 Indian J.I.L., p. 128.
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asserted that any registration of application for a mine site "would be 
incompatible with the requirements of Resolution II unless prior to 
registration, the applicant could demonstrate that the area in respect of 
which the application is made does not overlap with any other pioneer 
site. It is the Canadian position that "the resolution of such conflicts 
among prospective pioneer states, including all potential claimants, is 
essential in the interest of a successful implementation of the Convention 
. . . . " 292
At the Geneva Meeting, held between August 13 to September 5, 
1984, prospective states continued their efforts to resolve overlaps and 
proceeds for registration. Nevertheless, disagreement raised between 
pioneers of the first group with regard to the cut-off dates and procedures 
to be followed in conflict resolution. On cut-off dates, while the USSR 
proposed September 1, 1984 as the deadline for submission of 
applications, France and Japan had proposed dates in and after December 
1984. With respect to the procedures which should guide conflicts 
resolution, the USSR favoured negotiations as a means for a conflict 
resolution; whereas, Japan preferred binding arbitration. As a solution to 
this dispute, the Chairman announced that, the applicants should resolve 
overlaps by negotiations. Since negotiations could involve a third party, 
the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission called on the first group to 
meet on December 17,1984, to resolve overlaps conflicts.293
The Chairman of the Preparatory Commission declared on August 
31,1984, during the Geneva Session August 13 -  September 5,1984 that 
the parties concerned had reached an agreement on an "Understanding on 
the Procedure for Conflict Resolution Among the First Group of
292 UN. LOS.PCN.40, 11 April 1984.
293 Mostapha, op.cit., p. 128.
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Applicants."294 This Agreement, which was conceded by the parties 
concerned (France, Japan, India, USSR) aimed 2Lt resolvu^overlapping 
claims on mining sites. During the Geneva Meeting, the first group met to 
interchange lists of co-ordinates of the areas claimed by them. While it 
was possible to resolve provisionally the conflict between Japan and the 
Soviet Union, the overlap between the Soviet Union and France did not 
get a solution.295 The Chairman of the Preparatory Commission 
reported, during Geneva Session August 12 -  September 4, 1985, that 
intensive efforts will be made "to resolve the issues that still remain" 
before the next spring 1986 session of the Commission.296 If the efforts 
were successful and an understanding has been reached, then the 
Commission will proceed with "examination of the rules for registration, 
adopt them and proceed to the next stage."297
Paragraph (9) of the Understanding declares that the Understanding 
"will apply to all applicants who will have submitted their applications to 
the Preparatory Commission by 9 December 1984."298 However, the 
Understanding was criticized by many delegations. The Netherlands 
views were that, the issue of conflict resolution can only be solved by 
agreements encompassing "all parties which may be affected by
294 Statement of the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission regarding the 
Understanding on Resolution of Conflicts among Applicants for Registration as 
Pioneer Investors, UN. LOS.PCN.L.8, 31 August 1984. The Understanding achieved 
by the parties concerned is in two parts. The first part is an Understanding on the 
Resolution of Conflicts among Applicants for Registration as Pioneer Investors and the 
second part is an Understanding on the Procedure for Conflict Resolution among the 
First Group of Applicants. See ibid.
295 Mostapha, op.cit., p. 130.
2 9 6  Report o f the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, UN. 
LOS.PCN.L.27, 3 September 1985, p.4.
297 Ibid.
298 UN. LOS.PCN.L.8, 31 August 1984, p.2, Part I.
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overlapping on any particular site."299 it has also been insisted that, the 
main objective of Resolution II must be preserved with regard to "all 
identified pioneers as long as Resolution II is valid and may not be given 
up because of the expiration of the date of 9 December 1984. It is the 
sovereign right of a state to become party to a Convention by signature 
followed by ratification or by accession."200
The parties of the Understanding responded to those attacks. 
Accordingly, the French delegation stated that the Understanding "is 
merely in necessary implementation of the mandatory provisions of 
Resolution II."201
The Commission focussed its attention during the Geneva Meeting on 
the so-called "Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Sea Bed 
Matters",202 which was adopted and signed on August 3, 1984 by eight 
states; the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Japan, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States.
The parties of the Provisional Understanding affirmed in a letter 
addressed to the Preparatory Commission that the objective of the 
Agreement is "to ensure the minimum need of avoiding possible future 
conflicts due to overlapping claims for mine sites, and as such, fulfills in 
part the requirements of Resolution II to resolve overlapping claims."202
The Group of 77 opposed such agreement based on national 
legislation and reciprocal agreements which purport to regulate and 
authorize deep sea bed activities. The Group of 77 strongly affirmed that
299 UN. LOS.PCN.60, 26 April 1985, p.l.
200 Ibid, p.2.
201 UN. LOS.PCN.67, 16 August 1985, p.2, see also LOS.PCN.68, 69, and 
70, 16 August 1985.
302 Reprinted in (1984) 2 3 p.1354.
303 UN. LOS.PCN.45, 16 August 1984, p.2, see also LOS.PCN.46 and 
LOS.PCN.48, 16 August 1984.
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any activities based on such Agreements outside the Law of the Sea 
Convention were illegal. In the words of the Group of 77 "such 
Agreements are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Law of the Sea 
Convention and have no legal validity."304 Consequently, an important 
declaration was adoptedwich alleged that any claims incompatible with the 
Law of the Sea Convention shall not be recognized and are wholly 
illegal.305
On 3 and 21 August, Japan and France submitted applications to the 
Commission for the registration as pioneer investors of the Japanese 
enterprise, Deep Ocean Resources Development Co., Ltd (DORD),305 
and the French enterprise, Association Francaise pour l'Etude et la 
Recherche de Nodules (AFERNOD).307
Further to the signing of the Provisional Understanding, the United 
States issued on August 29,1984 exploration licenses for three of the four 
consortia, Ocean Mining Associates (OMA) 156.000 square kilometers, 
Ocean Management Inc (OMI) 135.000 square kilometers, and Ocean 
Minerals Company (OMC) 165.000 square kilometers. The fourth 
consortium, Kennecott (KCON), which had applied for two licenses 
totalling 191.000 square kilometers requested a delay in issuing of the 
license in waiting for acquiring a license from the United Kingdom.308 
The granting of these licenses were for sites in the Clarion-Cliperton
304 Statement by the Chairman of the Group of 77 delivered on 13 August 1984, 
UN. LOS.PCN.48, 16 August 1984, p .l (4).
3°5 Mostapha, op.cit., p. 132.
306 UN. LOS.PCN.50, 22 August 1984, Annex, p.l.
307 UN. LOS.PCN.51, 23 August 1984, Annex, p .l. The USSR also submitted 
on July 20, 1983 an application for registration as a pioneer investor of the Soviet 
enterprise (Souther Production Association for Marine Geological Operations) 
(Yuzhmorgeologiya). See UN. LOS.PCN.31,24 October 1983.
308 L. Kimball, Short-term Dilemmas and Long-term Prospects at PrepCom, 
(January 1985) 9 Marine Policy., p.73.
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Zone in the Pacific Ocean. However, the licenses were likely overlapped 
by the areas applied for by the Soviet Union, but they were not in conflict 
with the areas claimed by France, Japan and India.
The Ocean Mining Associates (OMA) consortia wrote a letter to the 
Soviet enterprise, Yuzhmargeologiya, on November 2, 1984 notifying it 
of the issuance on August 29, 1984 of a license numbered USA-3 for 
exploration in part of the international sea bed area of the Pacific 
Ocean.309 Responding to it, the General Director of the Soviet enterprise, 
Yuzhmorgeologiya, informed (OMA) that the enterprise did not 
recognise that it possessed "any of the rights described in the license."310 
Seven exploration licenses were granted to the consortia between the 
summer 1984 and the end of 1986, under the national legislation by the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany.311
During the third session, held between March 11 to April 4,1985 in 
Kingston (Jamaica), no real breakthrough was achieved among the 
prospective pioneer investors on overlaps conflict and therefore, the 
adoption of rules and regulations for registration. While the overlaps 
between the Soviet Union and Japan was provisionally resolved, the 
overlaps between France and the Soviet Union remained without any 
solution. The factor which enforced that impasse was the declaration of 
Belgium, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands that they might refuse the 
registration of a Soviet site that conflicted with the sites claimed by the 
consortia of which their national companies form part. Moreover, the
309 Letter dated 10 June 1985 addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory 
Commission, UN. LOS.PCN.64, 1 July 1985.
310 Letter is reproduced in UN. LOS.PCN.64,1 July 1985, Annexes I and n , at 
Annex II, p.6.
311 S. Mahmoudi, The Law of Deep Seabed Mining, (1987) p.321.
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four states maintained that an acceptable overlaps resolution process must 
include all potential pioneers identified in Resolution n .312
Because of the impasse in finding a solution to the overlaps conflicts, 
the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission asserted that after all 
efforts were exhausted with regard to the issue of overlapping claims and 
according to the mandate of the Chairman to use his good offices, the 
Commission will look after the issue and deal with the practical problems 
arising as a result of the Geneva Understanding and proceed with the rules 
for the registration of pioneers.313
At the Geneva Meeting, held between August 12 to September 4, 
1985 in spite of efforts made by the Chairman to make progress in solving 
the problem with the prospective pioneer investors, the Geneva Meeting 
did not come out with any progress in finding a solution or agreement for 
the issue and as a result, the implementation of Resolution II was 
delayed.314
The problem of conflict resolution on overlaps continued to be of 
great responsibility of the Preparatory Commission. In using his good 
offices to find a solution to the problem, the Chairman launched in 
February 1986 some talks with the first group (France, Soviet Union, 
Japan and India) at Arusha (United Republic of Tanzania). The result was 
fruitful in that the first group reached an agreement on resolving 
overlapping claims through equal sharing of overlapping areas known as 
"Arusha Understanding."315 The scheme was a successful result of 
considerable efforts and comprehensive consultations made by the
312 l  Kimball, Holding Pattern or Forward Motion?, (October 1985) 9 Marine 
Policy., p.341.
313 Mostapha, op.cit., p. 130.
314 L. Kimball, Heated Exchange in Geneva, (January 1986) 10 Marine Policy.,
p.60.
315 UN Monthly Chron., (August 1986) XXIH (4), p. 108.
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Chairman of the Preparatory Commission Mr Warioba (Tanzania), and 
acting Chairman Mr I.G. Jhingran (India). The objective was to resolve 
the conflicts and then to continue to adopt rules for registration of pioneer 
investors and registration of first group of applicants.316 According to 
the Arusha Agreement, specific portions of the North East Pacific Ocean 
would be preserved upon registration for the first group, except India 
which would be given exclusive rights to an area in the Indian Ocean since 
it had no conflicting claims.317
The aim of the formula was to provide an agreeable solution to the 
first group of investors as well as to the Commission on behalf of the 
Authority without harming the profits of the consortia. Thus, in order to 
effectuate and achieve this purpose, the overlapping areas were to be 
equally shared between all applicants, and even between the applicants and 
the related consortia ..318
France, Japan, and the Soviet Union agreed that, upon registering as 
pioneer investors, parts of their application areas which overlap wjth 
potential applicants would be relinquished for possible future applications 
by four consortia.319
Mr Jhingran told the Commission on September 5, 1986 that by 
recognizing the rights of pioneer investors, the Agreement would give 
"practical effect" to the new regime for deep sea bed mining under the 
Convention. The Preparatory Commission was of the view that "there can 
only be one regime for deep sea bed mining and that is the regime
316 UN Monthly Chron., (November 1986) XXIII (5), p.89.
317 Ibid.
318 Mahmoudi, op.cit., p.319.
319 See supra note 316, p.89. The Arusha Understanding included time tables 
and procedures for registration of the group of pioneers, and provided for a similar 
treatment to be given other potential applicants.
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contained in the Convention." He added by saying that, "it is the hope and 
expectation of all of us here that every one will eventually work within 
that regime for the sake of peace and good order in the oceans and the 
security of the rights of all those who are interested in deep sea bed 
mining."320
The German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the Eastern 
European states called on the Commission to approve the scheme of 
"Arusha Understanding" at the subsequent session and then proceed with 
the registration of pioneer investors.321 However, France regarded the 
scheme as imperfect but well balanced, and if all members of the 
Commission supported the scheme, it could enter into force.322 The 
Assembly was satisfied with the important decision of the Preparatory 
Commission on September 5, 1986 establishing a mechanism for 
registering potential applicants for pioneer investors status, and resolving 
overlapping claims to portions of the sea bed area in the North-East 
Pacific Ocean by France, Japan and the Soviet Union.323
At the fourth session, held between March 17 to April 11, 1986 in 
Kingston (Jamaica), comprehensive debate were conducted with regard to 
the enforcement of "Arusha Understanding." During this session, a 
declaration was adopted condemning the granting of mining licenses by 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.324
The negotiations on the scheme "Arusha Understanding" continued at 
the resumed fourth session, New York August 11 -  September 5 in 
summer 1986, and a modified version of the "Arusha Understanding" was
320 See supra note 316, p.89.
321 UN Monthly Chron., (August 1986) XXIII (4), p.108.
322 ibid.
323 UN Monthly Chron., (February 1987) XXIV (1), p.82.
324 UN. LOS.PCN.78, 21 April 1986.
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proposed as an annex to the statement made by the acting Chairman of the 
Preparatory Commission.325
Later at the fifth session, Mr Rabah Kenouaze (Algeria) acting as 
Chairman conceded that a significant progress had been made and more 
time is needed so as to accomplish the discussions.326
As a result of the delay in submission of the revised applications of 
the first group of investors by March 25,1987, an extension was granted 
by the Commission for the submission of revised applications based on 
intersessional discussions by the first group, not later than one week 
before the Commission's summer session.327 In a letter dated August 3, 
1984, the first group (France, India, Japan and the Soviet Union) 
indicated that a comprehensive settlement of practical problems has been 
reached between those delegations, and the USSR estimated that it would 
be in a position to submit a revised application to the Preparatory 
Commission towards the end of November 1987.328
As a way to enforce the efforts in finding a solution to the problem, 
the Commission decided to establish a group of technical experts which 
would examine the revised applications of the first group.329 Acting as a 
Chairman, Mr Rabah stated that, the procedures adopted "will not affect 
the priority and equal treatment of all the applicants of the first group and 
are without prejudice to the interests of the potential applicants."330
The Preparatory Commission faced serious difficulties for the
323 Statement on the Implementation of Resolution II, UN. LOS.PCN.L.41.
R ev.l, 11 September 1986, pp.9-13.
326 UN Monthly Chron., (August 1987) XXIV (3), p.40.
322 Ibid.
328 UN. LOS.PCN.91, 3 August 1987.
329 The Technical Group was intended to convene in August 1987 and make a 
report to the General Committee which would then decide on registration. See supra
note 326, p.40.
330 See supra note 326, p.40.
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implementation of Resolution n , in particular, the problem of conflict 
resolution of overlapping claims. Despite the significant progress and the 
considerable efforts made by the chairman of the Preparatory 
Commission together with the prospective pioneer investors in finding a 
solution, the Commission was and will still be in need of more time to 
achieve a final solution to this problem.
5.2. Approval of Plans of Work
Within six months after the Convention on the Law of the Sea enters 
into force, the pioneer investor must submit a plan of work so as to 
proceed pioneer activities in the Area. The plan of work must be 
approved by the Authority if the applicant met the requirements laid 
down in the provisions of the Convention and the rules, regulations and 
procedures of the Authority.
However, the Authority may not accept a proposed plan of work that 
overlaps with a previously approved plan.331 Priority is to be given to 
pioneer investors in respect of approval of plan of work over any other 
applicant apart from the Enterprise of the Authority. So as to approve the 
plan of work, the states whose companies are involved in the pioneer 
consortia must be parties to the Convention.332
It is worth pointing out here the situation of not being party or 
signatory to the Convention by giving an example of one of the four 
consortia, Kennecott consortium. This consortium include participation 
of three countries, United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. Let us presume 
that the Kennecott consortia has been registered as a pioneer investor after
331 LOSC, Annex HI, art. 6 (3) (a).
332 Res. II, para. 8 (c).
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certification from Japan government. The question here is what is going 
to happen when the consortia apply for approval of a plan of work, 
without United Kingdom being party to the Convention. Surely, 
according to Paragraph 8 (c), if Kennecott consortia remained with one 
non-signatory of the Convention (United Kingdom), the plan of work 
cannot be approved. Nevertheless, as a solution, consortia of category (2) 
are permitted to change their nationality and sponsorship to that of any 
state party to the Convention provided that, the state to which it transfers 
has effective control.333
5.3. Production Authorisations
Before the commencement of commercial production, each pioneer 
investor must apply so as to obtain a production authorisation allowing 
him to produce up to a specified amount of minerals.334 The right of the 
pioneer investor to obtain a production authorisation is limited despite his 
privileges and priorities over all applicants apart from the Enterprise of 
the Authority. Correspondingly, production authorisations are to be 
issued in relation to Article 151 and Annex III, Article 7 of the 
Convention.335 In other words, production limitation system embodied in 
Article 151 of the Convention has to be applied. Thus, applicants whose 
production if authorized would exceed the production ceiling, will only 
get a priority for the granting of the next production authorisation 
allowed by the production ceiling.336
333 ibid, para. 10 (b). This Paragraph was designed to collaborate the registered 
pioneer investor which found itself unqualified to acquire approval of a plan of work 
because its sponsoring state failed to sign the Convention.
334 ibid, para. 9 (a).
335 ibid, para. 9.
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If two or more pioneer investors can not accommodateiwithin the 
ceiling, they may agree among themselves upon either the apportionment 
of the allowable production or the establishment of an order of 
priorities.337 But, if the parties failed to reach an agreement in three 
months, the dispute must be submitted to a binding arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rales.338
In conclusion, it can be said the PIP resolution system acts as an 
induce mechanism to meet the basic objectives of the prospective sea bed 
miners by protecting the mining investments made by the consortia of the 
western countries. The Deputy Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, Mr 
Leigh Ratiner reported:
Under the resolution, four existing mining consortia (each of 
which includes or is controlled by U.S.companies) plus projects 
sponsored by the government of Japan, France, the USSR and 
India, would have guaranteed automatic access to the strategic 
raw materials of the seabed for the first generation of seabed 
mining. Altogether, ten seabed mining entities are entitled to all 
of the mineral production likely or possible from the seabed for 
the next 30 to 50 years: metal market projections indicate that 
demand for manganese, copper, cobalt, and nickel from the 
seabed is unlikely to reach, much less exceed, the production 
capacity of these grandfathered miners during that period. 
Thus, with the notable exceptions of mandatory technology 
transfer and the procedure for amending the treaty, the 
offensive ideological provisions of the treaty would not 
effectively apply before the middle of the twenty first century.
By that time there would have been a through treaty review and 
an opportunity to renegotiate.33^
33  ^Ibid, para. 9 (c).
337 Ibid, para 9 (d) (f).
33  ^Ibid, para 9 (g).
339 S. Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 
(1982) 60 For.Aff., pp.1014-15.
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At the end of the Spring Session of the Preparatory Commission in 
Kingston (Jamaica), the Chairman of the Commission recognised the 
implementation of Resolution II as one of the matters to be dealt with by 
the Special Commission and the Plenary and that the Preparatory 
Commission will adopt by consensus rules and procedures for the 
implementation of Resolution II and therefore, protect the pioneer 
investors.3411
Section 6. Review Conference341
At the contention of many developing countries, which did not want 
to commit themselves endlessly to the contemplated deep sea bed mining 
system (parallel system) in its initial form, a procedure for a fundamental 
review of the deep sea bed mining system fifteen years after the start of 
the earliest commercial production, was embodied into the 
Convention.342 The option of fifteen years is owing to the presumption 
that the first generation of exploitation of minerals of deep sea bed shall 
be accomplished during that limit period and thereafter, the Convention
3411 Bruckner, op.cit., p. 192.
341 Article 155 of the Convention considers the review procedure of the system 
of exploitation of deep sea bed. Moreover, Article 154 provides for a periodic review. 
According to Article 154, every five years from the entry into force of the Convention, 
the Assembly shall undertake a general and systematic review of the manner in which 
the international regime has operated in practice and if necessary, the Assembly may 
take measures in accordance with the provisions of Part XI and related Annexes to 
improve the operation of the regime.
342 See, Sea Law: A Rendez Vous With History , UN Monthly Chron., (June 
1982) 19 (6), p.8.
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requires a conference to be held to assess the envisaged "parallel system" 
of deep sea bed.
The review of the system of exploitation which was subject of Article 
155 went through some changes during the negotiations on the law of the 
sea. These changes however, were gradually in favour of the 
industrialised countries which objected to Article 153 of the ICNT 
concerning a review conference on the system. This Article has been 
revised to omit many of the difficulties facing the industrialised states 
objectives, including the said "moratorium" on the approval of new 
contracts and plans of work in case no agreement could be reached within 
five years after the start of the review conference and moreover, to 
exclude the idea of an automatic change to a unitary system of exploitation 
by the Authority if the review conference fails to reach agreement within 
five years.343 Indeed, Article 155 (6) (the moratorium) was identified by 
the United States delegation on the resumed eight session as one of the 
outstanding issues remaining in the deep sea bed negotiations344 which 
would endanger their fundamental economic interests.
Provisions of Article 153 of the ICNT; which envisaged a review of 
the system of exploitation after twenty years from the entry into force of 
the Convention in order to establish whether during that period "a balance 
has been maintained between the areas reserved for the Authority and 
developing countries and the contract areas exploited by states, states 
entities, natural or juridical persons in association with the Authority",345
343 H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 
Seventh Session 1978, (1979) 73 A.J.I.L., pp.9-10.
344 H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The Eight Session 1979, (1980) 74 A.J.I.L., p.6.
34  ^ ICNT, art. 153 (2). This Article provides that if no agreement has been 
reached within five years to improve the provisions concerning the system of  
exploitation, "activities in the Area shall be carried out by the Authority through the
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were strongly criticized by the developed countries. Industrialised 
countries strongly objected such provisionson the basis thatifycould deeply 
jeopardize the likely long-term character of the international regime as it 
requires that if agreement to the contrary is not reached within twenty 
five years, the regime shall automatically be changed into a "unitary 
system" ruling out direct access by contractors. In addition, the developed 
countries feared an ultimate evanescence of the parallel system as a result 
of a review conference in favour of joint arrangements under the control 
of the Authority.346
On the suggestion of the Chairman of the Negotiating Group One,
Mr F. Nejenga and many developing countries, the ICNT. Revised. 1
provided that, if no agreement could be reached within five years, the
Assembly of the Authority might decide that "no new contracts or plans of
work for activities in the Area shall be approved"awaiting such
agreement.347 In this way Mr Nejenga hoped to exert some pressure on
all parties concerned to work towards agreement of some kind to continue
the system either unchanged or with such amendments as were
ad o p ted .348 The industrialised states renounced the idea that a
m oratorium  was an appropriate alternative to agreem ent.349
Undoubtedly, Richardson for the United States warned that, his country
"could not agree to the possible termination of its right to access to deep
sea bed minerals at the time the need for them may become more
Enterprise and through the joint venture-provided however that the Authority shall 
exercise effective control over such activities." Ibid, art. 153 (6).
346 Mahmoudi, op.cit., p.191.
347 iCNT.Rev.l, art. 155 (6). UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.WP.10.Rev.l.
348 Ogley , op.cit., p. 169.
349 h . Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The Ninth Session 1980, (1981) 75 A.J.I.L., p.217.
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acute.”350
A compromise was incorporated in the second and third revisions of 
the ICNT by eliminating the said "moratorium." As an alternative to the 
said "moratorium", in the event of failure to accomplish an agreement on 
the system of exploration and exploitation within 5 years, the review 
conference might adopt by a two-thirds majority vote, amendments to the 
system. These amendments should enter into force for all states parties 
one year after being ratified or accepted by two-thirds of them.351 It was 
made clear, that such amendments would not affect the contracts 
approved.352
According to the Convention, the decisions concerning modifications 
in the provisions related to the system of exploitation shall be taken by 
consensus and recourse to voting should not be made unless all efforts to 
reach agreement on any amendments by way of consensus have been 
exhausted.353 In the situation where agreement on changes was not 
reached by a review conference on the system of exploitation within five 
years after the start of this review, the conference could approve 
amendments within the ensuing twelve months by a three-fourths 
majority. These amendments will enter into force and would take effect 
for all states parties twelve months after the ratification or accession of 
three-fourths of states parties.354 Thus, it would be easier to modify the 
Convention under this review procedure than it would be under the 
regular procedure for amendment. The regular procedure for the 
amendment of the Convention would have required consensus in the
350 Ogley, op.cit., p. 169.
351 UN. Doc.A.Conf.62.WP. 10.Rev.3, art. 155 (6).
352 Ibid. See also Ogley, op.cit., p. 169.
353 LOSC, art. 155 (3).
354 Ibid, art. 155 (4).
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Council as well as, a two-thirds vote in the Assembly of the Authority 
followed by acceptance by three-fourths of the states parties to such 
Convention.355 It has been observed that through such review procedure 
"a real legislative power is entrusted to the review conference by means of 
a majority vote machinery which should bestow on developing countries 
the power of the last word/'356
The review conference will take its decisions according to the rules 
used by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
unless it decides otherwise, including not voting before all efforts at 
consensus have been exhausted. Furthermore, the majority required in 
adopting the amendments and the number of ratifications and accession 
for the amendements to enter into force for all states parties to the 
Convention have been raised from two-thirds to three-fourths majority. 
The three-fourths majority was a change added at the end of the session on 
the president’s proposal.357 When all efforts at consensus were exhausted, 
then the review conference would take a two-thirds majority vote 
decisions on substantive matters, including a simple majority of all 
delegations participating in the session.358
Whatever the amendements might be, the Convention guarantees 
that, as long as a contract is signed between the entry into force of the 
Convention and the end of the review conference, the rights acquired 
under existing contracts will remain unaffected by actions of the 
review.359 Moreover, not only the rights of the contractor but also the 
terms and conditions of the contract shall not be affected because any
355 See supra note 342, p.8.
3^6 j. Dupuy, The Notion of Common Heritage of Mankind Applied to the 
Seabed, in Rozakis, p.207.
357 See supra note 342, p.8.
358 Ibid.
359 LOSC, art. 155 (5).
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modifications in the contract may be brought about only with the consent 
of the parties.360 This security of tenure is ensured in Article 153 (6) of 
the Convention. Consequently, any investment decisions made as a result 
of contracts granted before the end of the review conference are protected 
from any effect of future changes.
The special objectives laid down for the review conference are to 
secure, inter alia, whether the envisaged system of exploitation has 
achieved its purposes in all respects, including the development and use of 
the Area and its resources so as to foster a healthy development of the 
world economy and a balanced growth of international trade for the 
benefit of mankind as a whole. Also, among the objectives outlined for the 
review conference, is to secure whether the system has resulted in the 
equitable sharing of benefits derived from activities in the Area.361
Whatever necessary changes and amendements on the system, few 
provisions regarding the activities in the Area are to be maintained and 
ensured regardless of the result of the work of the review conference. 
First, the review conference shall protect the maintenance of the principle 
of the common heritage of mankind. Second, the international regime for 
the equitable exploitation of the resources of the Area for the benefit of 
mankind, in particular, the interests of the developing countries by an 
Authority which will organize, conduct, and control activities in the 
A rea.362 Last but not least, the review conference shall ensure the 
maintenance of the rights of states and their general conduct in relation to 
the Area, and their participation in activities in the Area in conformity 
with this Convention.363 As regard the right of access of the states to the
360 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 19 (2).
361 Ibid, art. 155 (1).
362 Ibid, art. 155 (2).
363 Ibid.
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Area, no clear and specific reference is made in Article 155 (2). One may 
interpret it as referring to the right of participation of states in the 
activities in the Area according to Article 153 (2)(b), but it may be 
construed as referring to the rights of states under Article 11 of Annex HI 
of the Convention concerning joint arrangements with the Enterprise 
where the activities are totally controlled by the Authority.364
The result of the review conference is quite arduous to anticipate. 
However, it would be based on the level of eminence of the parallel system 
during the first mining generation. As far as this system is concerned, it 
can be pointed out that, the developing countries are in a better position to 
amend the system through their own majority according to the decision­
making procedure. This privilege to the developing countries can be the 
only component of the parallel system which can be employed to modify 
the envisaged system.
It is nevertheless likely that, an essentially different sea bed regime 
could enter into force for all parties with the approval of only three- 
fourths of the states parties.365
The conclusion which can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is 
that The system of exploitation embodied in the Convention, based on the 
so-called the parallel system, favours an international regime whereby 
exploitation is conducted by states parties and their enterprises on the one 
hand, and by the Enterprise of the Authority on the other in accordance 
with the rules laid down in the Convention and the rules, regulations and 
measures adopted by the Authority.
The system of the Convention seems very attractive and favorable
3^4 Mahmoudi, op.cit., p. 191.
363 I. Chamey, The Law of the Deep Seabed Post UNCLOS III, (1984) 63 
Oreg.L.Rev., p.41.
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for the majority of states especially, developing countries. It contains 
many positive and significant accomplishment for the general interests. It 
ensure substantial benefits to the international community especially 
developing states from revenues acquired from mining the deep sea bed. 
The Enterprise of the Authority and developing countries will profit 
from the transfer of the advanced technology of the developed states. By 
virtue of the production control, Land-based producers will be secured 
from any adverse effects caused by the production of minerals from deep 
seabed.
The financial terms imposed on contractors including application 
fee, an annual fixed fee and either a production charge only or a mixed 
system of production charge and share of net proceeds, are for the 
purpose of guaranteeing optimum revenues for the Authority and to 
enable the Enterprise to commence exploitation competitively with other 
private entities. The financial terms imposed on miners are regarded by 
developed states as burdensome.
Potential investors in deep sea bed mining will be guaranteed a 
protection of their huge amounts of capital invested in carrying out 
activities of exploration and exploitation of deep sea bed and its resources 
made before the Convention enters into force. The protection of pioneer 
investment was of great concern for the developed states and their 
industries. Resolution II adopted by the Third United Conference On the 
Law of the Sea provides such security.
The system of exploitation of the Convention may be changed by a 
three fourths vote. This review mechanism is laid down in the Convention 
and provides for a revision of the parallel system. The review may permit 
modifications in the system if it does not properly work. However, 
developed states fear that the access guaranteed to the private entities by
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the parallel system could be eliminated by the review conference.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE INTERNATIONAL SEA-BED AUTHORITY (ISA)
Fundamental differences in points of view relating to the 
establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority existed between the 
participants at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. The disputes 
were centred on the functions of the Authority; the distribution of powers 
between the Assembly and the Council; the decision-making system of the 
organs, the composition of the Council.
Certain countries, especially developed states, favoured an 
international Authority that was charged only with issuing licenses and 
taking of measures for the safety of the marine environment. Other 
countries, especially developing countries, supported a strong Authority 
with powers to exercise complete control to regulate the activities of 
exploration and exploitation of the Area and its resources.
The Authority will be composed of an Assembly as the supreme 
policy making organ where members are represented on the basis of 
sovereign equality; a Council as the executive organ implementing the 
general policies of the Authority where members are represented on the 
basis of equitable geographical distribution and special interests; a 
Secretariat and an Enterprise as the operational organ of the Authority. 
This Enterprise will enjoy direct access to the exploitation of the 
resources of the Area as well as transportation, processing and marketing 
of the recovered metals. The Authority is also supported by a system of 
settlement of deep sea bed disputes. The disputes might arise between the 
Authority and contractors because of the regulations and rules adopted by 
the Authority to regulate deep sea bed activities.
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This chapter will discuss, in three sections, the functions of the 
Authority, the principal organs of the Authority, and finally the system of 
settlement of deep sea bed disputes.
Section 1. Functions of the Authority
The most important contribution of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Convention is the creation of the 
International Sea-Bed Authority which was a consequence of having 
announced the Area and its resources as the "common heritage of 
mankind." This new international organization will be responsible for the 
implementation of the regime set up in Part XI of the Convention. Thus, 
in performing its duty, it has been endowed with exclusive powers mainly 
through enacting rules, recommendations, procedures and measures. 
These powers are to be exercised by two organs, namely a Council and an 
Assembly.
The Authority is the institution through which the general policies in 
relation to the administration of the Area based on the principle of 
"common heritage" should be implemented. It is authorised to undertake 
directly commercial and industrial activities in the Area including 
transport, processing and marketing of minerals recovered from the Area 
either on its own or participating in joint ventures and entering into 
contracts with state parties, natural and juridical persons provided it 
retains an effective supervision over the conduct of activities. The 
Authority has the responsibility to put into effect and constrain 
international law in the Area by means of its legislative power through 
adopting rules and regulations enacted by the Council and the Assembly. 
To that end, its jurisdiction would encompass all the necessary activities
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including supervision, regulation and control for the purpose of 
establishing the appropriate legal regime set forth in the Convention.
During the negotiations, the main issues which dominated the debates 
were the structure of the Authority and its functions. Each group of 
participants sought to impose its own concept on how the structure would 
be and what role the Authority should play. In fact, the long complex 
negotiations on the mechanism of the International Sea-Bed Authority was 
a political rather than a legal struggle between developing and developed 
countries.
The draft articles and proposals introduced to the Sea-Bed 
Committee reflected the divergent positions and views of both developing 
and developed states. In the light of their statements, the industrialised 
countries insisted and wanted a weak Authority by which its role will be 
limited to a licensing Authority having no significant powers to get 
involved in sea bed mining.1 Industrialised states were opposed to the 
creation of a powerful body enjoying wide discretion in regulating the 
exploitation of the sea bed. Their attempts were to minimize and limit the 
Authority’s powers and restrict the scope of its functions by excluding, 
for example, scientific research; protection of marine environment; and 
commercial activities (processing, transporting and marketing), in order 
to avoid any effective Authority in the Area which might interfere in 
states' freedom to exploit the deep sea bed.
It can be said that the aim of developed countries was to create an 
international licensing system under which the International Sea-Bed 
Authority would grant only mining contracts to states and their nationals.
On the other hand, the developing states favoured and sustained a
1 See e .g ., D oc. A .C on f.62 .C .l.L .6 . Made by U.S.A.; D oc. 
A.Conf.62.C.l.L.8, made by the EEC, UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.III, pp.169, 
173.
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strong Authority trusted with adequate powers so as to be able to conduct 
activities in the Area with exclusive jurisdictions and effective control. 
They wanted a highly effective body in charge of promoting the 
production of minerals and undertaking directly commercial operations 
through the Authority's Enterprise. They thought that a strong Authority 
would guarantee to the developing states a full participation in mining sea 
bed and ensure what General Assembly had repeatedly declared the Area 
and its resources as "common heritage of mankind." On behalf of 
developing countries, the Group of 77 called for a powerful Authority 
with wide discretion and exclusive right to mine the deep sea bed.2
In spite of the divergent views between the developed and developing 
countries about the role and functions of the Authority, all participants 
agreed on the need to create an international organization which would be 
in charge of implementing the regime.
Because of the wide functions which are alloted to the Authority, it is 
necessary to proceed only with examining the most important ones.
In the Convention, there are no specific Articles defining the 
Authority's purposes and its duties. However, provisions dealing with its 
functions are disseminated right through several headings outlined in Part 
XI of the Convention. For instance, "Use of the Area Exclusively for 
Peaceful Purposes"; "Protection of Marine Environment"; "Participation 
of Developing States in Activities in the Area"; "Legal Status of the Area
3
and its Resources."
1-Development and Co-operative Research
The Authority may carry out marine scientific research concerning
2 Doc. A.Conf.6.C.l.L.7. UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.III, p.172.
3 LOSC, arts. 141, 145, 148, 137.
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the Area and its resources, and may enter into contracts for that purpose. 
The Authority shall promote and encourage the conduct of marine 
scientific research in the Area, and shall coordinate the results of such 
research and analysis when available.4
Accordingly, the first assignment of the Authority for research and 
development should be the achievement of joint venture with state parties 
and other entities. Joint venture will probably provide both the Authority 
and the mining contractor with several potential interests. For the 
Authority, joint venture seems to be an ineluctable option by reason of 
the considerable benefits which can be gained, in particular in the initial 
period of ten years. Therefore, the Authority will acquire access to 
technological resources and that will be an advantage and an opportunity 
for the developing countries to be assisted to explore their sea bed mining 
infrastructure in their Continental Shelves and Economic Zones. 
Moreover the Authority will gain a financial profit by diminishing the 
investment risks by virtue of sharing costs; and the possibility for an 
efficient training for personnel of the Authority.
The mining contractor in the joint arrangement could also obtain 
worthwhile benefits. The contractor will improve and develop his 
technology in order to be prepared for commercial production ; to have 
access in reserved area and the mine site of the Authority; and to elicit a 
prodigious security for their investments by sharing transactions and 
ventures risks.
Thus, it can be said that the completion of joint venturesbetween the 
Authority and any entity may be deemed in action the most common 
favourable workable approach for the undertaking of sea bed 
exploitation.
4 Ibid, art. 143 (2).
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2-Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed
The Area "shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by 
all states,whether coastal or landlocked,...."5
In 1970, a Treaty was concluded prohibiting the emplacements of 
atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destmction in the sea bed and 
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.6 This Treaty suffers from 
weaknesses outlined in the inadequate provisions for surveillance and 
enforcement. The International Sea-Bed Authority will be equipped with 
organizational mechanism for guidance and surveillance and therefore, it 
will be effectively prepared to take over this task if the Convention comes 
into force. This function is the responsibility of the Legal and Technical 
Commission provided with a staff of high standards in the field. To fulfill 
this duty, the Commission is endowed with powers to conduct inspections 
in the Area so as to determine whether the sea bed is exempt from the 
arms race and preserved for peaceful purposes. Hence, the Commission 
shall make recommendations to the council in relation to the establishment 
of a monitoring programmes. This programmes shall observe, measure, 
evaluate and analyse, by recognized scientific methods, the risks and 
effects of activities in the Area with respect to pollution of the marine 
environment in order to ensure that "existing regulations are adequate and 
complied with and co-ordinate the implementation of the monitoring 
programmes approved by the council."7
The Commission shall also make recommendations to the Council 
regarding the direction and supervision of a staff of inspectors "who shall
5 Ibid, art. 141.
6 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Seabed and the Ocean Floor 
and in the Subsoil Thereof, (1971) 1 0 1.L.M., pp.145-51.
7 LOSC, art. 165 (2) (h).
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inspect activities in the Area to determine whether the provisions of this 
part, the rules, regulations and procedures prescribed thereunder, and the 
terms and conditions of any contact with the Authority are being complied 
with.”8
Finally, the members of the Commission shall upon request by any 
state party or other party concerned "be accompanied by a representative 
of such state party or other party concerned when carrying out their 
function of supervision and inspection."9
Therefore, it is meaningful to extend the scope of the monitoring 
and surveillance activities of the Authority in the sea bed to include 
authentication of conformity not only with the provisions of the 
Convention on the reservation of the Area exclusively for peaceful 
purposes, but also with the sea bed disarmament treaty as part of 
international law.
3-Organisation. Control and Conduct Activities in the Area
According to Article 153 (1) of the Convention, activities in the 
Area shall be organised, carried out and controlled by the Authority on 
behalf of mankind as a whole.
The Authority is responsible for organising the activities by 
implementing the general and the specific policies set forth in Part XI of 
the Convention and that can be achieved through adopting rules, 
regulations and procedures in its day-to-day management of the Area to 
establish the international regime on sea bed exploitation. The Council 
plays a significant role in organising the Area. It adopts rules and
8 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (m).
9 Ibid, art. 165(3).
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decisions in connection with different matters (contracts, financial 
arrangem ents, com m ercial operations, pro tection  of marine 
environment.. .etc.).
As far as the Council's role in implementing the regime of the 
Convention is concerned, one of its Commissions, the Legal and Technical 
Commission, is in charge of controlling and supervising the activities 
conducted in the Area. The Council will provide a body of inspectors to 
inspect the activities of the contractors and their compliance with the 
provisions of the Convention.10
The Authority shall also have the right to take measures against any 
entity alleged to have violated the rules and regulations adopted by its 
organs, like termination or suspension of contracts to guarantee the 
complaisance with the Convention's provisions concerning the controlling 
functions.11
As far as the conduct of activities is concerned, the Authority will be 
engaged in carrying out such activities under an arrangement called the 
"parallel system." According to this system, the Authority may conduct 
activities directly through the Enterprise and in association with state 
parties, natural and juridical persons by entering into contracts12 on the 
condition that, the Authority retains an effective control over such 
activities conducted by the entities. Thus, this system eliminates the notion 
that the Area shall be exploited exclusively either by the Authority or by 
entity.
4-The Authority performs another significant task in the world 
economy. The role of the Authority in this context is to serve and protect 
the land-based mineral producers, countries which are highly dependent
10 Ibid, art. 165 (2) (m).
Hlbid, Annex HI, art. 18; art. 153 (5).
12 Ibid, art. 153 (2).
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upon export of minerals as a gainful source to their balance of 
international trade. Therefore, to protect these countries, the Authority 
shall have adequate powers to prevent unlimited utilization of the 
minerals derived from the Area, in order to avoid any economic collapse 
in the producing countries. Accordingly, the Authority will be alloted the 
power of controlling the production quotas; avoiding the alternation in 
the prices by fixing them in the market for the relevant minerals and 
participating in any commodity conferences and arrangements.13
5- Last function,but not least, of the Authority's functions is the 
protection of the marine environment. The International Authority is 
empowered to adopt rules and regulations for an effective prevention of 
natural resources, flaura and fauna of the marine environment from 
damage and harmful effects caused by the conduct of activities in the 
A rea .14 It has the responsibility to issue emergency orders for the 
suspension or adjustment of operations or disapprove the contracts for 
exploitation where serious harm to the marine environment might 
happen.
It can be concluded that the Authority will act on behalf of mankind 
to regulate, supervise, organize and control the sea bed activities for the 
benefit of all mankind including state parties to the Convention, states not 
parties to the Convention, peoples who have not yet attained full 
independence and other self governing status recognized by the United 
Nations. Besides, the Authority has an enormous duty to establish the 
international regime governing the sea bed area set forth in the 
Convention.
13 Ibid, art. 151(b).
14 Ibid, art. 145.
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Section 2. Principal Organs of the Authority
The International Sea-Bed Authority discharge its functions through 
various organs. It consists of: first, administrative organs including a 
plenary organ, that is the Assembly; an executive organ, that is the 
Council; and a Secretariat.15 The Council is composed of two specialised 
subsidiary organs, the Economic Planning Commission and the Legal and 
Technical Commission. Second, an operational organ, that is the 
Enterprise, which is charged with the conduct of activities in the Area. 
However, with respect to the administrative structure of the Authority, 
this section focuses only on the Council and the Assembly because of the 
significant role they play in the decision-making and their huge 
responsibility to implement the international regime.
In this section, an evaluation of the these organs and their 
institutional structure, functions, powers and voting system will be 
discussed. It is important to note that one of the most controversial issues 
in the Sea-Bed Committee negotiations was the relationship between the 
Assembly and the Council. In other words, the character of supremacy of 
one over the other.
Almost all participants in the debates of the First Committee 
supported the supremacy of the Assembly except a few industrialised 
states which opposed this position. According to the developed states, the 
great number of developing states represented in the Assembly present a
15 The Secretariat comprises a Secretary General and his staff. The Secretary 
General would be elected by the Assembly upon recommendation by the Council. The 
Secretary General would be the chief administrative officer of the Authority. Ibid, arts. 
166, 167, 168.
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huge power to control the policy making of decisions that can easily affect 
their interests in sea bed exploitation. Hence, the industrialised states 
considered the Council as the supreme organ which will play the most 
important role in sea bed exploitation.
At the Caracas Sessions, different proposals were submitted to the 
Sea-Bed Committee reflecting the supremacy of the Assembly. The 
delegation of Romania proposed that,
The Assembly, in which all states would be represented, should 
have wide powers, but the Council and other executive organs 
should have only limited powers which they would exercise 
under the control of the plenary organ.16
The delegation of Kuwait stated that,
The Assembly should be the main legislative body and supreme 
policy-making organ" and that, "the Council would be the 
executive body and would act under the control and guidance of 
the Assembly.17
Following the same pattern, the delegation of Portugal suggested
that,
...it should consist of an Assembly comprising representatives of 
all the contracting states, which would be the supreme organ", 
and a "Council with a more restricted membership which should 
formulate policies and submit them to the Assembly.18
The issue of the supremacy between the Council and the Assembly 
was a battlefield of dissension between developing and developed 
countries. The developed countries maintained that the Council should be
UNCLOS in, Off. Rec., Vol.II, p.30 (7).
17 Ibid, p.32 (31).
Ibid, p.30 (7).
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endowed with the discretionary power, since the Assembly will be totally 
controlled by developing countries because of their great number in 
contrast with the small number of developed states represented in the 
Assembly. On the other hand, developing countries insisted that the 
Assembly should be the supreme policy-making organ. The stand of the 
developing countries was contemplated in the ISNT19 of which the 
Assembly would be "the supreme policy-m aking organ of the 
Authority",20 but the Council would "act in a manner consistent with the 
general guidelines and policy directions laid down by the Assembly."21
However, a significant change was made in the RSNT22 giving more 
power to the Council. Accordingly, instead of acting "in a manner 
consistent with the general guidelines and policy directions laid down by 
the Assembly", the Council was vested with the right "to prescribe the 
specific policies to be pursued by the Authority."23 Further, the RSNT 
stipulated that the Assembly must "avoid taking any actions which may 
impede the exercise of specific powers and functions entrusted to another 
organ."24
Doc. A.Conf.62.WP.8. Part 1, 2, 3, 1975 [hereinafter cited as "ISNT"], 
UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.IV, pp.137-181.
20 Ibid, parti, art. 26(1).
21 Ibid, art. 28.
22 UN. Doc.A.Conf.62.WP.8.Rev.l. Part 1, 2, 3, 1976 [hereinafter cited as 
"RSNT], UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.V, pp.125-185.
23 Ibid, art. 28 (1).
24 Ibid, art. 24 (4); and art. 26 (3). These modifications were incorporated in 
the subsequent texts, Informal Composite Negotiating Text [ICNT], UN. Doc. 
62.WP.10, 1977, art. 156 (4); Informal Composite Negotiating Text. R ev.l, [ICNT. 
Rev.l]. UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.WP.10.Rev.l, 1979, art. 158 (4); Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text. Rev.2, [ICNT. Rev.2]. UN. Doc. A. Conf.62.WP.10.Rev.2, 1980, 
art. 158 (4); Draft Convention, UN. Doc. A. Conf.62.WP.10.Rev.3, 1980, 
[hereinafter cited as " DCLOS/ST"].
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2.1. The Assembly (Plenary Organ)
The Authority's plenary organ consists of all state parties to the 
Convention on the basis of sovereign equality of states. The Assembly as a 
supreme organ has a broad scope of powers and functions which are 
almost based on the Council's recommendations. It is authorised to 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over various issues. It establishes the 
general policies; elects the members of the Council, the Secretary General 
and the members of the Governing Board and Director General of the 
Enterprise; establishes subsidiary organs; assesses the member 
contributions and approves the budget of the Authority; approves the 
rules and regulations of operations governing the exploration and 
exploitation of the Area; adopts decisions upon the equitable sharing 
of benefits derived from the activities in the Area and establishes a system 
of compensation for land-based mineral producers whose export earnings 
suffer as a result of sea bed mineral production.25 In addition, the 
Assembly is assigned other functions, such as the general systematic 
review of the application of the international regime which must be 
undertaken every five years from the entry into force of the 
Convention;26 and the approval of amendments proposed by states 
parties to the same provision.27
As far as the voting system is concerned, it is not as complicated as 
the one in the Council. The system of the decision-making is based on one 
state one vote.28 Decisions on questions of substance demand a two thirds
25 LOSC, art. 160.
26 Ibid, art. 154.
27 Ibid, art. 314 (1).
28 ibid, art. 159 (6).
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majority of the members participating in the session of the Assembly, and 
questions are supposed to be of substance unless a two thirds majority 
resolves otherwise.29 However, decisions on procedural questions 
require only a simple majority of the members present and voting.30 
Decision-making includes another type of vote, that is "consensus.” It 
is required only when the contributions of state parties for financing the 
initial operation of the Enterprise were insufficient.
2.2. The Council (Executive Organ)
Since the Council is an executive body and a powerful organ which 
makes decisions3 ! and adopts rules on most important matters, 
considerable concern has been given to its composition, jurisdiction and in 
particular to its voting system during the negotiations of the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea.
As far as the crucial issue of voting system is concerned, several 
kinds of votes were proposed by the negotiators reflecting their objectives 
to safeguard their interests. Among the votes which were discussed are: 
veto, consensus, simple majority, two thirds majority, quarters majority, 
weighted vote, three-fourths majority.32 During the Conference, the 
developed states advocated the veto system in order to protect their 
interests and the interests of their consortia, which have invested billions 
of dollars in sea bed mining. In order to achieve this aim, developed 
countries must use such blocking power against Council's decisions 
affecting their interests.33
29 Ibid, art. 159 (7).
30 Ibid, art. 159 (8).
3 ! It has been said that even though, the Assembly is still described as the 
"supreme organ" of the Authority, the functions of the Council would disprove this in 
practice. See C. Ogley, (July 1981) Marine Policy., p.248.
32 UNCLOS ID, Off. Rec., VoLXEI, p. 133.
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The composition, jurisdiction, voting system of the Council and its 
subsidiary organs will be examined below.
Composition of the Council34
Several proposals and working papers were submitted to the Sea-Bed 
Committee suggesting the number of members of which the Council 
should be composed. The proposals varied between twenty four to thirty 
six throwing back a disagreement on a fixed number which will form the 
Council. Moreover, their incompatibility extended to the question of 
which principle shall be applicable to the representation in the Council, 
since the membership of the Council was an eminently significant 
component with respect to its effective role in the functioning of the 
Authority. Shall the representation be based on the equitable geographical 
representation or on the special interests. The developing countries 
pressed for the principle of equitable geographical representation.35 In 
order to avoid the dominance of the developing states in the Council, the 
developed countries sustained the criterion of special interests.36 
Developed states protested against the geographical basis as an 
unacceptable norm because of the fear of being a small number in the 
Council as in the Assembly. In other words, under the special interests
33 UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., VoLXIV, p. 170.
34 For a discussion on the composition and competence of the Council, see the 
Report on Negotiations held by the Chaimman and the Coordinators of the Working 
Group of 21 to the First Committee. Doc. A.Conf.62.C.l.L.27, part. IV, pp. 132-135, 
UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., VoLXIII, 28 March 1980; Report of the Co-ordinators of the 
Working Group of 21 to the First Committee , Doc. A.Conf.62.C.l.L.28, part.IV, 
pp. 169-172, UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.XIV, 23 August 1980.
35 UN. Doc. A.AC. 138.49, art. 27, 4 August 1971, working paper on the 
regime for the sea bed and ocean floor and its subsoil beyond the limits o f national 
jurisdiction submitted by Chili, Columbia, Ecuador, Elsalvador, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Panama, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
36 See e.g., (UK) proposal, Doc. A.AC.138.46, para.19.
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criterion, the industrialised states will be sufficiently represented and 
therefore offer adequate protection for their interests.
However, a compromise formula has been reached since 197737 
bringing together both criteria, special interests and equitable 
geographical representation and the number of members was fixed at 
thirty six.
The Council will be composed of thirty six members after being 
elected by the Assembly for four years and is eligible for re-election.38
Eighteen members elected by geographical representation from 
different regions and eighteen representing special interests, these are 
considered in turn.
1. Four from eight states which have the largest investments in the 
area, including at least one state from the Eastern Europe.
2. Four from states which during the last five years have either 
consumed more than 2 percent of world consumption or imported more 
than 2 percent of total world imports of the commodities produced from 
the categories found in the Area, but at least one from Eastern Europe.
3. Four from states which are major exporters of the categories of 
minerals found in the Area, including at least two developing countries 
which are exporters of such minerals.
4. Six members from developing nations with "special interests", the 
states with special interests are Land Locked and states which are major 
importers of the minerals derived from the Area.
5. Eighteen members elected on the basis of equitable geographical 
distribution, the geographical regions shall be Africa, Eastern Europe, 
Latin American, Western Europe and others.39
3 7 ICNT, art. 159.
3 8 LOSC, art. 161 (3).
39 Ibid, art. 161 (1). The number of seats alloted to each region will be
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In order to give an opportunity to those who are not members in the 
Council to be represented during the adoption of rules and regulations, 
due regard was paid to the rotation of membership.40 Moreover, any 
party of the Authority may send a representative to be present, but not 
eligible for voting in a meeting of the Council when a matter which
affects it is under consideration.41
The industrialised states were displeased with the representation in
the Council. Because under the procedure of seats distributions, the 
industrialised states will be able to control only eight seats of the thirty six 
seats, the Eastern bloc countries between three to four seats, and 
developing countries between twenty four to twenty five seats.42
Jurisdiction of the Council
In the light of Part XI of the Convention, the Council has significant 
functions towards implementing the international regime of sea bed 
exploitation. It supervises and co-ordinates the implementation of rules, 
regulations of the Authority and provisions o f the Convention; 
recommends to the Assembly the candidates of the Secretary General, 
Governing Board of the Enterprise and its Director General; endorses 
recommendations for economic adjustments to benefit competing land- 
based producers; directs and controls the activities of the Enterprise; 
approves plans of work submitted by the Enterprise or other applicants; 
negotiates and enters into agreements with the United Nations or other 
international organizations on behalf of the Authority; disapproves parts 
of the Area for exploitation activities in order to ensure that the marine
contingent on how the principle of equitable geographical distribution is determined.
40 Ibid, art. 161 (4).
41 Ibid, art. 161 (9).
42 W. Hauser, The Legal Regime for Deep Sea bed Mining under the Law of 
the Sea Convention, (1982) p.41.
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environment is not damaged; takes appropriate measures for the 
protection of the developing countries from adverse economic effects 
caused by activities in the Area and submits the annual budget of the 
Authority to the Assembly for its approval.43
Although the Convention states that the Assembly is the supreme 
organ of the Authority because of its broad policy-making functions, 
however. In practice, it seems that the Council is the most powerful organ 
in which the real weight and power of the Authority resides. Owing to its 
responsibility to implement the policies laid down in Part XI of the 
Convention and its significant role in the regulatory functions of the 
Authority, the supremacy assigned to the Assembly by the Convention is 
in reality a formal one. The Chairman of the First Committee believed 
that the term "supremacy" is "employed merely to describe the organ 
most representative of the membership of mankind" and that a "system 
based on the supremacy of one or another organ, or on the strict division 
of the functions and powers of the two principal organs, could not 
constitute a compromise solution."44
However, almost all functions accorded to the Assembly are shared 
with the Council. For example, the adoption of rules, regulations and 
procedures for the Authority; elections of the Secretary General, the 
members of the Governing Board and the Director General of the 
Enterprise; approval of the annual budget of the Authority; the suspension 
of rights and privileges of members; the establishment of a compensation 
system and the adoption of other measures of economic adjustment 
assistance to protect the developing countries.
The Convention makes it clear that each organ in exercising its 
powers and functions shall avoid taking any action which may derogate
43 LOSC, art. 162.
44 UNCLOS m , Off. Rec., Vol.V, p. 127.
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from or impede the exercise of specific powers and functions conferred 
upon another organ.45
Voting System in the Council
A compromise to the impasse with regard to decision-making in the 
Council was reached at the Geneva Session in 1980. The formula reached 
specified four different categories of issues.
In the manner of Article 161 (8) (a),(b),(c),(d), four primary 
categories are differentiated and classified depending on their degree of 
importance. Questions of procedure are decided by a simple majority of 
members present and voting; questions of substance are decided by a two- 
thirds majority, a three-fourths majority and a consensus.
The questions of substance which require a vote of two-thirds are:
1. Approval of plans of work submitted either by entities or 
Authority's Enterprise; the procedure of approval is the same, mutatis 
mutandis , as for other applicants.
2. Agreements concluded with the United Nations or other 
international organizations.
3. Reports and observations on the Enterprise for transmission to the 
Assembly.
4. The recommendations to the Assembly, on the basis of advice 
from the Economic Planning Commission of a system of compensation to 
stifle developing land-based mineral producing states against adverse 
economic effects of sea bed mining.
5. The request of advisory opinions from the Sea-Bed Disputes 
Chamber.
6. And the issue of specific instructions and regulations to the
45 LOSC, art. 158 (4).
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Enterprise within the "core" of the Convention and rules adopted by the 
Council and the Assembly 46
The matters of substance which require a three-quarters majority of 
members present and voting are:
1. The establishment of specific policies for the Authority in 
conformity with the general policies lay down by the Assembly.
2. The supervision and co-ordination of the implementation of 
provisions of Part XI of the Convention.
3. The election of members of both the Legal and Technical and the 
Economic Planning Commissions.
4. The exercise of control over activities in the Area.
5. The selection from among applicants fo r production 
authorisations.
6. Arrangements concerning the budget of the Authority.
7. Institution of proceedings before the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber 
for non-compliance with the rules of the Authority by contractors.47
Questions of great importance would be adopted by consensus, 
defined as the absence of formal objection. Accordingly, any member of 
the Council is permitted to exercise a formal objection on matters 
requiring approval by consensus. These matters are:
1. Adoption, upon the recommendation of the Economic Planning 
Commission of measures to cushion the economies of developing 
countries from adverse effects of sea bed mining.
2. Recommendations to the Assembly on the equitable sharing of 
benefits extracted from the Area.
3. Adoption of rules and regulations for the Authority pending 
approval by the Assembly relate to prospecting, exploration and
46 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (n), (p), (v).
47 Ibid, art. (2) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (i), (q), (r), (s), (t), (u).
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exploitation in the Area, and financial arrangement of the Authority.48
The consensus sine qua non looks to admit all aspirations and 
interests of all Council members. Under the consensus formula, any 
member can overthrow any decision which is contrary to its interests.
Subsidiary Organs of the Council
The Council is empowered to establish an Economic Planning and a 
Legal and Technical Commissions. Both have the responsibility to assist 
the Council with advice and recommendations. In addition they have a 
considerable task in the enforcement and implementation of the 
regulations and decisions of the Authority. Each Commission shall have 
fifteen members elected by the Council49 for a five year-term and 
eligible for re-election.50 Members are required to be of the highest 
standards of competence and to have appropriate qualifications in the 
appropriate field of the Commission so as to safeguard the effective 
exercise of the functions within the framework of the Commission.51 
The Council's aim is to secure that the Commissions encompass all 
necessary skills. Due regard shall be paid to the need for equitable 
geographical distribution and representation of special interests during 
the elections of the members of the Commissions.
48 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (m), (o).
49 Ibid, art. 163 (3).
50 Ibid, art. 163 (6). The five year term and requirement o f the abscence of 
conflicting financial interests of the members (art. 163 (7),(8)) offers or assist to insure 
the independence of the Commission. These provisions represent a strengthening of the 
status of Commission members in comparison with what was included in the previous 
texts. In the ICNT.Rev.2 (1979), the term was only three years (art. 163 (7)). The 
entire paragraph was newly added in order to ensure the neutrality and the 
independence of the Commission members. See, Report of the Co-ordinators of the 
Working Group o f 21. Doc.A.Conf.62.C.l.L.28, 23 August 1980, p.6.
51 LOSC, art. 163 (3).
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The task of the Economic Planning Commission is to advise the 
Council on the review of trends and factors affecting supply; demands and 
prices of raw materials; and to examine any situation likely to lead to 
adverse effects on the economies of developing states. It also makes 
recommendations to the Council on sea bed exploitation and on land-based 
producers; proposes a system of compensation for developing states 
producers. The most important function is to propose to the Council 
measures to implement decisions relating to activities in the Area.52
On the other hand, the Legal and Technical Commission is alloted 
with an extensive competence. It is required to make recommendations to 
the Council on plans of work for sea bed activities; to supervise upon the 
request of the Council activities in the Area and prepares assessment of 
the environmental impact of activities in the Area; to calculate the 
production ceiling and recommends production authorisations for 
contracts, to make recommendations with regard to emergency orders 
like the suspension or adjustment of operations to prevent marine 
environment from harmful activities carried out in the Area.53
23. The Enterprise (Operational Organ)
The first proposal concerning the creation of an operative organ 
came from the Group of Latin American states in a working paper of 
forty five Articles on the "Regime for the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the 
Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction" submitted to 
the Sea-Bed Committee in 1971 by Chile, Columbia, Ecuador,
52 Ibid, art. 164.
33 Ibid, art. 165. Because of the Commission’s significant responsibility, 
members are required to perform qualifications in relation with the technical aspects of 
deep sea bed mining oceanology, protection of the marine environment and relevant 
economic and legal issues, art. 165 (1).
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Elsalvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. According to this 
working paper, it was proposed that the Enterprise is empowered to 
undertake all technical, industrial and commercial activities connected 
with the exploration of the Area and exploitation of its resources. In 
addition, the Enterprise shall have an independent legal personality and 
such legal capacity as may be necessary to fulfil its purposes.54
Few years later, in 1976 the American Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger declared that his government would support the creation of 
such Enterprise and would be prepared to assist it financially so as it could 
begin mining operations.55 Since then, the participants have agreed to 
consider the Enterprise as an organ of the Authority through which 
activities of exploration and exploitation of deep sea bed and its resources 
are carried out.
Operationnally, the Enterprise might be deemed as the first 
foundation of an international commercial organization. It is an 
operational arm of the Authority,56 responsible for developing the 
resources of sea bed and for carrying out activities in the Area, either 
directly or through joint arrangements with other entities on behalf of 
mankind. During the initial period of ten years, the Enterprise is 
exempted from taxes in order to secure its self-sufficiency and to be able 
to compete with the other entities.57 During the negotiations, 
industrialised states opposed the privilege given to the Enterprise, they 
affirmed that their private companies will suffer a competitive 
disadvantage, because the Enterprise would have to operate free of taxes 
in the initial period. They thought that since the Enterprise is regarded as
54 Doc. A.AC. 138.49, arts. 33-34.
55 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., Vol.VI, p.132.
56 LOSC, arts. 158 (2); 170 (1); Annex IV, art. 1 (1).
67 ibid, Annex III, art. 13.
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a competitor for other companies, it should not be privileged or enjoy 
more special advantages than the other entities. Therefore, the Enterprise 
should be placed on an equal footing with consortia.
The Enterprise performs functions similar to those of the private 
mining companies including: transport, processing and marketing of the 
minerals nodules recovered from the Area.58
Being an organ of the Authority, the Enterprise is granted a 
fundamental autonomy59 to perform its functions. But this autonomy is 
limited and subject to the rules, regulations and general policy of the 
Assembly and to the directives of the Council.60 In other words, the 
Enterprise's acts must be exercised in compliance with the provisions of 
the Convention.
The Enterprise will get access to conduct activities in the Area after 
the Council approves its plans of work, which will cover either reserved 
areas or non-reserved areas provided that these non-reserved areas are 
not covered by plans of work previously approved by the Authority.61 
As far as the reserved site is concerned, the Enterprise has to decide 
whether it intends to carry out activities in each reserved site. It may 
adjudicate to exploit such site on its own or may enter into joint ventures 
with other entities. However, if the Enterprise choose not to exploit the 
reserved site, it might be given to state parties, in particular developing 
countries and their nationals.62
The Enterprise will be composed of a Governing Board and a 
Director General elected by the Assembly63 on the recommendation of
58 ibid, Annex IV, art. 1 (1); art. 170.
59 ibid, Annex IV, art. 2 (2).
60 Ibid, art. 170; Annex IV, arts. 1 (2), 2 (1).
6 1 Ibid, Annex HI, arts. 3, 8.
6  ^Ibid, Annex ID, art. 9 (1), (2); and art. 2.
63 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 5 (1).
176
the Council.64 The members of the Governing Board would be elected 
for four years and the Director General for a five-year term with the 
possiblity of re-election so as to ensure membership stability.
The Governing Board is to be composed of fifteen members elected 
by the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. It is 
required that the members should be among those of the highest standards 
of competence and qualifications in the relevant fields. The members shall 
act in their personal capacity without receiving any instructions from any 
government in order to enable the Enterprise to operate with a high 
degree of autonomy and to ensure its viability. Therefore, state parties 
are required to respect the independence of the members and to refrain 
from any attempt to influence them in performing their duties.65 The 
independence of the members is reinforced by getting their 
remuneration outside the Enterprise’s funds, that is they are paid out of 
the funds of the Enterprise.
The Governing Board is empowered to exercise all the necessary 
powers in order to conduct commercial operations of the Enterprise.66 
It fulfils many functions. It submits formal written plans of work to the 
Council, develops specific programmes and plans of work for sea bed 
exploitation; authorises negotiations on the acquisition of technology; 
establishes terms for joint ventures; borrows funds after being approved 
by the Council; approves the annual budget of the Enterprise and submits 
to the Council applications for production authorisations.67
The Director General and the Governing Board are elected by the 
Assembly upon recommendation from the Council with the possiblity of
64 Ibid, art. 162 (2) (i).
65 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 5.
66 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 6.
67 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 6 (c), (d), (f), (g), (m), (i), (e).
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re-election.68 He and his staff shall act independently without any 
interference by any government, and state parties shall refrain from any 
attempt to influence him.69
As chief executive and legal representative of the Enterprise, the 
Director General will be engaged in a heavy responsibility with regard to 
the success or the collapse of the Enterprise. He is responsible for the 
organization and management of the Enterprise, appointment and 
dismissal of the staff in compliance with the rules and regulations 
approved by the Authority.70
The Enterprise is designed to become financially and technologically 
viable so as to enable it to compete with the private mining consortia in sea 
bed exploitation. Hence, to ensure its success and efficiency, two 
fundamental elements should necessarily be available to the Enterprise, 
that is the transfer of technology and availability of funds. These two 
means are very important, especially in the initial period of ten years in 
order to enable it to begin operations with competitiveness and feasibility 
at about the same time as the private entities. These innovative 
characteristics are considered in turn.
Transfer of Technology:71
The transfer of technology is a significant factor for the development 
of the sea bed industry, and an effective element for the success or failure 
of the Enterprise in mining the sea bed competitively with the other 
entities.
The provisions of the Convention concerning the transfer of 
technology are regarded as an important insurance for a viable role and
68 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 7 (1).
69 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 7 (4).
70 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 7 (2).
7 1 For more details on transfer of technology see Section 3 of Chapter 2.
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sufficient preparation to accomplish mining operations by the Enterprise. 
According to the Convention, an applicant for a mining contract is 
required upon request to provide the Authority with a general description 
of the equipment and methods to be used.72 Furthermore, the applicant 
will supply to the Authority information about the source from which 
such technology is available; and any substantial technological changes 
must also be communicated to the Authority by the contractor.73
Transfer of technology is not a sine qua non to acquire a contract 
for the following reasons. Firstly because the applicant is required to 
make the technology available to the Enterprise only when requested. 
Secondly, if the requested technology is not available on the open market, 
for fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. Accordingly, 
the transfer of technology is however, subject to certain conditions:
1. If it is not available on the open market. 2. The transfer is to be 
made on fair and reasonable commercial terms. 3. If requested by the 
Authority. 4. The technology transfer is subject to a limit time of ten 
years after starting the commercial production of the Enterprise.
The acquisition of technology is to be done by licenses or other 
arrangements. And negotiations would be between the Enterprise and the 
contractor set forth in a specific agreements supplementary to the 
contracts.74 These agreements will, however, cease ten years after the 
Enterprise begins commercial production of minerals 75
If it happen the contractor is not legally entitled to transfer the 
technology and which is not available on the market, he will gain a 
possible and at reasonable cost from the owner a legally binding right to
72 LOSC, Annex IV, art. 5 (1).
73 Ibid, Annex III, art. 5 (1), (2).
74 Ibid, Annex HI, art. 5 (3) (a).
73 Ibid, Annex El, art. 5 (7).
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transfer technology to the Enterprise.76 He is also recommended to assist 
the Enterprise in its negotiations with the owner, if the Enterprise chooses 
to negotiate directly with the owner for the acquisition of the relevant 
technology 77
It is clear that the Enterprise will always have access to the 
technology available.
Financial Arrangements
The problem of financing the Enterprise was one of the most 
complex issues which faced the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
However, a compromise formula ultimately included in the Convention.
The Enterprise needs to be provided with the necessary funds so that, 
first, it can begin operations through different stages of mining including: 
transport, processing and marketing the minerals recovered from the 
Area. Second to meet its initial administrative expenses 78
Financing the Enterprise to conduct its first mining operations or its 
initial mine site will be in the form of loans. Half of these loans take the 
form of long-term interest-free funds provided by the members of the 
Authority proportioned according to their scale of assessments for the
United Nations budget. The rest half would be borrowed from different
lending institutions with loans guaranteed by the members of the 
Authority.79 The interest-free loans will be made available immediately 
either within sixty days after the entry into force of the Convention, or 
within thirty days after the deposit of state party instrument of ratification 
or accession.80
76 Ibid, Annex III, art. 5 (3) (c).
77 Ibid, Annex ID, art. 5 (3) (d).
7& Ibid, Annex IV, art. 11 (3).
79 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 11(3) (b).
8° Ibid, Annex IV, art. 11 (3) (d) (i).
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There are many sources from where the Enterprise can finance 
itself.
Initially, the main source is the amounts received from the 
Authority's funds after the Authority’s administrative expenses have been 
recovered; voluntary contributions made by state parties; amounts 
borrowed by the Enterprise and incomes of the Enterprise through its 
operations.81
In the event that the financial contributions by state parties do not 
cover the necessary bestowal to the Enterprise for carrying out activities, 
however. The Assembly will adopt by consensus at its first session, 
measures to meet the short fall.82 In other words, if sufficient funds is 
not raised through states obligations, the Assembly may adopt measures to 
deal with the short fall.
The Enterprise is required to act in conformity with rules, 
regulations of the Assembly and the directives of the Council. The 
Enterprise is placed in an advantageous position with regard access to 
mine sites, financial arrangements and acquisition of mining technology 
in particular, during the initial period. Thus, if these factors are 
adequately employed, this will participate eloquently to the success of the 
Enterprise.
Section 3.The Settlement System of Deep Sea Bed Disputes.
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber as a Special Chamber of the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea is no longer an organ of the Authority. 
However, it is of concern to note that there is a relationship between the
81 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 11 (1).
87 Ibid, Annex IV, art. 11 (3) (c).
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Sea-Bed Chamber and the Authority. This relationship lies in the field of 
legal norms by which the Sea-Bed Chamber will have to base its verdicts 
and advisory opinions. Therefore, the Sea-Bed Chamber is bound to apply 
when settling disputes the rules and regulations adopted by the 
Authority.83 Moreover, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber gives advisory 
opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council on legal questions 
arising out of activities.
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber will be the first judicial body 
originated from a larger one, the International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea. The Chamber will have a competence of higher judicial status than 
the mother institution. It is a competent and a principal forum by which 
disputes between the International Sea-Bed Authority, state parties, 
natural and juridical persons concerning the interpretation of Part XI of 
the Convention should be settled. The Chamber is designed to have 
exclusive jurisdictions over all disputes in relation to the sea bed mining. 
These disputes which will emerge in connection with the implementation 
of Part XI of the Convention are varied in nature. For example, disputes 
concerning acts or omissions of the Authority and disputes concerning 
conditions of contracts, plans of work and transfer of technology.
Since the Convention devotes and provides a special system for the 
settlement procedures of various disputes in relation to activities in the 
Area;84 the general system of disputes settlement set up in Part XV of the 
Convention need not to be considered in this section.
The provisions of the Convention establish a comprehensive 
compulsory dispute settlement system for matters arising out of activities 
in the Area, in particular acts of violations of the regime of the deep sea 
bed. However, before citing the various disputes and their means of
83 Ibid, Annex VI, art. 38.
84 Ibid, Part XI, Sec. 5, arts. 186-191.
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settlement, it will be somewhat necessary to look at some aspects of the 
system in relation to the composition of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber 
and its jurisdictions.
The Chamber will be composed of eleven members, selected by a 
majority of the members of the Tribunal from among them, for a three- 
year term. The equitable legal participation and geographical distribution 
should be assured in selecting the members.85 An Ad-Hoc Chamber of 
three members might be formed with the approval of the parties86 by the 
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber to deal with particular disputes, that is 
disputes between state parties on the interpretation or application of 
provisions of Part XI.
As far as the verdicts of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber are 
concerned, the Chamber is required when settling a case of dispute to 
apply legal norms of different sources, these sources are:
1) The Convention; 2) rules of international law not incompatible 
with this Convention;87 3) rules, regulations and procedures adopted by 
the organs of the Authority, that is the Council and the Assembly, in
compliance with this Convention; 4) terms of any contract in relation to
activities in the Area.88 Accordingly, it is evident that the legal position 
of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber differs from the one of the Tribunal. 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to apply in the settlement of 
disputes^ the Convention and international law not incompatible with this 
Convention. In contrast, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber is allowed to 
implement, in addition, the rules and regulations of the Authority as well 
as the provisions of contracts.
85 Ibid, Annex in, art. 35 (1), (2), (3).
86 Ibid, Annex VI, art. 36 (1).
87 Ibid, art. 293.
88 ibid, Annex VI, art. 38.
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Equally important is to consider the jurisdiction and competence of 
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. The Chamber enjoys a mandatory 
jurisdiction over all disputes arising in connection with activities in the 
Area. Nevertheless, this jurisdiction is not exclusive, because there are 
disputes such as disputes between states parties regarding the 
interpretation of provisions of Part XI, which might be transmitted either 
to a special chamber of the Tribunal or to an Ad-Hoc Chamber of the Sea- 
Bed Disputes Chamber, at the request of any party. In addition, disputes 
of technical character might be submitted to a binding commercial 
arbitration at the request of any party to the dispute.89 The commercial 
arbitral tribunal should conduct its arbitration in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and would not have the competence to 
determine any issue of the interpretation of the Convention. On the 
contrary, it would be obliged to refer the question of the interpretation of 
the Convention to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber for a mling, and the 
award of the Tribunal would be rendered in conformity with the ruling of 
the Chamber.
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has jurisdiction over the following 
disputes:
Disputes between states parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of Part XI and Annexes in  and IV; disputes between a state 
party and the Authority concerning acts or omissions which are alleged to 
be in violation of Part XI of the Convention and the Annexes related 
thereto, or of rules and regulations and procedures of the Authority; 
disputes between parties to a contract concerning: (i) the interpretation or 
application of a relevant contract or a plan of work, or (ii) acts or 
omissions of a party to the contract; disputes between the Authority and a 
prospective contractor concerning the rejection of a contract or a legal
89 Ibid, art. 188.
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issue arising in the negotiation of the contract; And disputes between the 
Authority and a state party, a state enterprise, or a natural and juridical 
person sponsored by a state party where it is alleged that the Authority has 
incurred liability.90 Therefore, access to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber 
is guaranteed to states, states entities, the Authority and natural or 
juridical persons.
It is argued that Article 189 of the Convention limits the efficacy of 
the dispute settlement system. This Article confines the Chamber to 
refrain from questioning the manner by which the Authority has 
exercised its discretionary powers. Thus, it should not pronounce such 
rules and regulations of the Authority as invalid or illegal. 
Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the Chamber on the discretionary 
powers of the Authority shall be imprisoned in three claims. First, the 
Chamber is entitled to determine whether the application of any rules, 
regulations, and procedures to individual cases would be in conflict with 
the contractual and conventional obligations of the parties to the dispute. 
Second, claims concerning excess of damages to be paid or other remedy 
to be given to the party concerned for the failure of the other party to 
comply with its contractual or conventional obligations.91
It is important to note that it is quite difficult to define the exact 
meaning of the term "discretionary powers" which was a controversial 
issue during the negotiations on the Third Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, especially the question of judicial reassessment of actions of the 
Authority, that is the competence of the Chamber to declare rules and 
regulations of the Authority as invalid.92 Even the Convention does not
90 Ibid, Part XI, art. 187.
91 Ibid, Part XI, art. 189.
92 The question of whether the Chamber be qualified to review the rules 
regulations and procedures issued by the Authority for compliance with the Convention 
has seen long disputed. The industrialised states beheld that such juridical review is
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provide any definition of the said term or define its scope.
The conclusion which can be drawn from the foregoing discussion, it 
is very complicated to evaluate a dispute settlement system which has not 
been examined in application. Nonetheless, in the light of the framework 
of the disputes settlement system being examined, it appears that disputes 
arising out of activities in the Area pertain to the category of disputes with 
regard to which mandatory procedures are established. With regard to 
disputes of technical nature such as contracts and transfer of technology, 
they might be submitted to a binding commercial arbitration at the request 
of any party to the dispute.
The different kinds of disputes covered by Part XI of the Convention 
have got divers means for their settlement. These disputes are classified as 
follow:^3
Tvpe of the dispute Forum U.N. Convention
Disputes between states parties concerning
the interpretation or application of Part XI. SBDC Art 187 (a).
Special Chamber
of Tribunal Art 188 (1) (b).
Ad-Hoc Chamber
of SBDC Art 188 (1) (b).
necessary if the decisions adopted by the Authority suipass the power or defeat the 
Convention.
93 Chart adapted from E.D. Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals Resources 
and the Law of the Sea, Vol.II: The Area Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 
(1986) p.n.68.
Disputes between a state party and the Authority 
concerning acts or omissions of a state party alleged 
to be in violation of Part XI or related Annexes or
rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority SBDC Art 187 (b).
Disputes between parties to a contract concerning 
the interpretation or application of a relevant
contract or a plan of work SBDC Art 187 (c) (i).
Commercial 
Arbitral unless 
the parties otherwise 
agree Art 188 (2).
Disputes between parties to a contract concerning 
acts or omissions of a party to the contract relevant 
to activities in the Area and directed to the other
party or directly affecting its legitimate interests SBDC Art 187 (c) (ii).
Disputes between Authority and a prospective 
contractor concerning the refusal of a contract or a
legal issue arising in the negotiation of the contract SBDC Art 187 (d).
Disputes concerning contractual obligations on 
transfer of technology including fairness and
reasonableness of contractor's offer SBDC Art 187 (c) (i),
and 188 (2).
Commercial 
Arbitral Tribunal Annex ID, Art 5 (4).
Disputes between the Authority and a state 
party, state enterprise or natural or juridical 
person where alleged that Authority is liable 
for damage arising out of wrongful acts including 
disclosure of industrial secrets etc. SBDC Art 187 (e) and (c)7,
Annex III, Art 22, and 
Art 168 (2).
Disputes over allegations that a state party
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has grossly and persistently violated Part XI SBDC Art 185 (2).
Disputes between a state party and the 
Authority concerning conformity with
Convention of proposal before Assembly SBDC Art 159 (10).
The International Sea-Bed Authority appears to have broad 
discretionary powers of organizing, controlling and conducting activities 
of deep sea bed mining. As the only entity acting on behalf of mankind, it 
shall have exclusive rights to control and manage the resources of the 
Area. The Authority will not only adopt rules and regulations to regulate 
mining in the Area, but will also effectively takes part in carrying out 
commercial activity in exploiting the resources of the deep sea bed, 
processing and marketing the minerals recovered on behalf and for the 
benefit of mankind as a whole irrespective of the geographical location of 
states.
The International Authority plays a significant role in implementing 
the general policy of activities of exploration and exploitation of deep sea 
bed and its resources.
Different kinds of disputes will surely rise because of the conduct of 
deep sea bed mining activities by the Enterprise and private entities. 
Therefore, a flexible and workable system of disputes settlement, which 
covers all kinds of sea bed disputes is embodied in the Convention.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE UNILATERAL LEGISLATION SYSTEM
Because of the commercial importance of manganese nodules for the 
economy of the developed states and as result of not being pleased1 with 
the provisions of Part XI of the Convention, namely the provisions on 
production control, transfer of technology, banking-system...etc; many of 
the industrialised states promulgated domestic legislation in order to 
satisfy their interests by guaranteeing a free access to the resources of the 
deep sea bed.
After the United States had enacted its Act (1980),2 many developed 
countries followed suit. These countries are: the Federal Republic of
1 On 29 April 1981, James L. Malone, assistant secretary of state outlined 
some features of the Draft Convention which were objected by the Reagan 
administration, among these features, were:
-  Through its transfer of technology provisions, the Draft Convention compels 
the sale of proprietary information and technology now largely in U.S. hands....
-  The Draft Convention limits the annual production of manganese nodules from 
the deep seabed, as well as the amount which any one company can mine for the first 
twenty years of production....
-  The Draft Convention imposes revenue-sharing obligations on seabed mining 
coiporations which would significantly increase the costs of seabed mining.
-  The Draft Convention lacks any provisions for protecting investments made 
prior to entry into force of the Convention. Quoted in D. Larson, The Reagan 
Administration and the Law of the Sea, (1982) 11 O.D.I.L.A., pp.04-05.
2 U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 28 June 1980, in (1980) 19 
I.L.M., pp. 1003-20. For a discussion of the development of the United States Act, see 
E. Goldie, A General International Law Doctrine for Seabed Regimes, 7 Int'l.Law., 
pp.804-08, and pp.812-15; see also D. Caron, Municipal Legislation for Exploitation 
of the Deep Seabed, (1980) 8 O.D.I.L.A., pp.259-96.
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Germany (1980),3 United Kingdom (1981)4 France (1981),^ Soviet 
Union (1982),6 Japan (1982)7 and Italy (1985).^ It has been said that 
Belgium and Netherlands are considering the matter of enacting
legislation.^
In spite of differences in the detailed provisions, the municipal 
legislation have the same regulatory method. Accordingly, the 
legislation declared that the enacting states disclaim any sovereignty or 
sovereign rights or ownership or individual rights on any part of the Area 
and its resources.^  They assert that exploitation of deep sea bed is the 
freedom of high seas .^  They affirmed that their legislation are of interim 
nature to be superseded by entering into force o f the Convention. 12
3 West German Act of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, in (1981) 
20 I.L.M., 393-398. The Act was amended 12 February 1982, in (1982) 21 I.L.M., 
pp.832-33.
4 Deep Seabed Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, in (1981) 20 
I.L.M., pp. 1217-27.
5 Law on the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources on the Deep 
Seabed, 23 December 1981, in (1982) 2 1 1.L.M., pp.808-14.
6 Edict on Provisional Measures to regulate the activity of Soviet Enterprises 
relating to the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources of Seabed areas beyond 
the limits of the Continental Shelf, in (1982) 2 1 1.L.M., pp.551-53.
2 Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining enacted July 20, 1982, in 
(1983) 22 I.L.M., pp. 102-22.
8 Regulations on the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of 
the Deep Seabed, in (1985) 2 4 1.L.M., pp.983-96.
9 E. D. Brown, Sea-bed Energy and Mineral Resources and the Law of the 
Sea, Vol.n, The Area Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, (1986) pp.83-84.
10 See e.g., Soviet Edict, art. 2; American Act, sec. 3 (2); French Act, art. 1.
11 See e.g., British Act, sec. 7; American Act, sec. 2 (12); German Act, sec. 1 
(1); French Act, art. 1.
1  ^ See e.g., French Act, art. 1; British Act, sec. 18 (3), Soviet Edict, art. 20; 
Japanese Act, art. 43; American Act, sec. 2 (b); German Act, arts. 1-5. However, it is 
worth noting that these legislation may become in the future permanent alternative to the 
Convention regime, in case the Convention will not enter into force or if  it enters into 
force only in respect to other states than the enacting states. See Guy de Lacharriere, La 
Loi Francaise sur l'Exploration et l'Exploitation des Resources Minerals des Grands 
Fonds Marins, (1981) XXII A.F.D.I., p.670.
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Moreover, in order to give sufficient time for the Convention to enter into 
force, these legislation prohibited the issuance of licenses before the 
January 1, 1988.13 All legislation provide for reciprocity system through 
reciprocal recognition of claims and licenses so as to assure the exclusivity 
of the permit and to protect the permittee from competing claims. 14
To enforce the reciprocating regime, the enacting states concluded two 
Agreements in 1982 and 1984.13 The 1982 Agreement was designed to 
facilitate the identification and resolution of conflicts 3S to overlapping sea 
bed claims which may occur over areas for which Pre-Enactment 
Explorers filled applications for sea bed mining authorisations on or 
before 12 March 1982.16 The aim of the 1984 Agreement was to co­
ordinate the granting of authorisations in respect of applications for deep 
sea bed activities among all potential deep sea mining states, and to 
guarantee the recognition of the agreements reached by the major 
consortia in 1983 concerning the coordinates of the areas claimed by each
of them.
The potential mineral resources of nickel, manganese, copper and 
cobalt are vital for the industry and have an economic and strategic
13 See e.g., German Act, sec. 4 (3); French Act, art. 7; British Act, sec. 2 (4); 
Soviet Edict, art. 6.
14 American Act, sec. 118; German Act, sec. 14 (2); Britich Act, sec. 3 (1); 
French Act, art. 13; Soviet Edict, art. 3; Japanese Act, art. 29; Italian Act, art. 16. 
According to Mr Bergman, "the object of reciprocity is to restrain states from issuing 
licences and prmits that conflict with authorisation that have already been granted or are 
under consideration by another state." See S. Bergman, The Regulation of Seabed 
Mining under the Reciprocating States Regime, (1981) 30 Am.U.L.Rev., p.495.
13 The 1982 Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements to Polymetallic 
Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed. This Agreement was signed by U.S.A.; F.R.G.; U.K.; 
and France on 2 September, 1982, in (1982) 20 I.L.M., pp.950-62. The 1984 
Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Sea Bed Matters, 3 August 1984, in (1984) 
23 I.L.M., pp. 1354-65. For further details see Section 5 o f Chapter 4.
1  ^The 1982 Agreement, para. 1.
17 The 1984 Provisional Understanding, para. 1.
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significance to the industrialised countries. Moreover, metals extracted 
from the deep sea bed represent a viable alternative source to the land- 
based minerals. Therefore, their necessity for the economic progress of 
the industry of the developed countries are of great concern.
The potential value of manganese nodules is very considerable. As 
estimated, there are 22 billion tons of the nodules which contain fine­
grained oxides of copper, nickel, cobalt and m anganese.^  Indeed, a 
single mining site recovering 3 million tons of nodules could produce 
750.000 tons of manganese, 4.000 tons of cobalt, 37.000 tons of copper 
and 42.000 tons of n i c k e l . It has been estimated that the cumulative 
economic value of the nodules is at $3 to 4 trillion.^®
Manganese is used in the production of steel; nickel is a vital ingredient 
in the production of stainless steel and high performance alloys; cobalt is 
used in the production of sophisticated electromagnetic devices that are 
used in communications and control systems^! and copper is used in 
electrical and military g o o d s . 2 2
Developed states regard the manganese nodules as economically 
important to their industry in the long-term. For example, the United 
States is heavily dependent on foreign supplies of the mineral resources 
(manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt). The United States imports 98 
percent to satisfy its needs from cobalt and manganese, 77 percent of nickel 
and 19 percent of copper.^3 Therefore, the potentially vast resources of
18 "A Rendez Vous With History, UN. Monthly Chron., (June 1982) 19, p.6.
19 W. Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep 
Seabed Mineral Resources by the United States, (1980) 21 Harvard I.L.J., p.343.
20 Ibid, pp.337-38 at note (4).
21 Bergman, op.cit,, p.484.
22 Arrow, op.cit., p.343.
23 h . Oxman, La Legislation Americane sur les Resources Minerals Solides des 
Fonds Oceaniques, (1980) A.F.D.I., p.702.
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the sea bed will enable the United States to reduce its dependence on 
foreign minerals imports, and diminish its vulnerability to OPEC-Type 
C a r t e l s .^4 The United States considers that the availability of minerals 
will be ensured by unilateral legislation when n e e d e d . 2 5
This chapter analyses and discusses the municipal legislation in a 
comparative study. Thus, the essential common characteristic of the 
legislation are examined as well as the area of the application and 
liabilities. Before turning to consider the Reciprocating States Agreements 
as important steps to enforce unilateral legislation, the question of the 
compatibility of the legislation with the Convention and international law 
is discussed.
Section 1. Common Characteristics of the Domestic
Legislation
1.1 Definitions of the Deep Sea-Bed and its Resources
Each legislation stipulates its own definition of the deep sea bed and its 
resources.
In the light of the American Act, deep sea bed area is defined as the sea 
bed and the subsoil thereof to a "depth of ten meters, lying seaward of and 
outside, the Continental Shelf any nation, and any area of national 
resource jurisdiction of any nation, if such area extends beyond the 
Continental Shelf of such nation and such jurisdiction is recognized by the
24 B. Ott, An Analysis of Deep Seabed Mining Legislation, (1977) 10 N.R.L., 
p.593.
25 D. Caron, Municipal Legislation for Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, (1980)
8 O.D.I.L.A., p.282. He believes that the key aspect that led to enactment of the Deep 
Seabed Hard Minerals Act was the perception of the U.S. congress that the sea bed 
proposals of UNCLOS III set a precedent regarding systems of governance that is 
contrary to basic American interests and beliefs. Ibid, p.286.
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United S t a t e s ."^6 With regard to the resources, the American Act
determines them as nodules which include one or more minerals" at least
one of which contains manganese, nickel, cobalt, or c o p p e r .  "27
In relation to the British Act, deep sea bed is defined as that part of the
bed of the high seas in respect of which sovereign rights "in relation to the
natural resources of the sea bed are neither exercisable by the United
Kingdom nor by any other sovereign pow er. "^8 In like manner to
American Act, the British Act defines the resources as nodules contained at
least one of the following elements: manganese, nickel, cobalt and 
29copper. 7
Unlike the British and American Acts, the German Act stipulates a 
different definition. Accordingly, deep sea bed is the sea bed and its subsoil 
outside areas over which the Federal Republic of Germany claims 
sovereign rights or recognizes the sovereign rights of other states.^®
Similar to the American and British Acts, the German Act defines the 
resources as nodules comprising manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper. 31
Like the American Act, the Soviet Edict specifies the same definition 
of the deep sea bed as sea bed areas beyond the limits of the Continental 
S h e l f . 3 2  However, the Soviet Edict does not provide any definition of the 
resources.
Corresponding to the British Act, the Japanese Act defines the deep sea 
bed as the sea bed and subsoil of the high seas of which no state has 
jurisdiction for exploration or recovery of mineral r e s o u r c e s .  ^  3 Much
26 American Act, sec. 4 (4).
27 ibid, sec. 4 (6).
28 British Act, sec. 1 (6).
29 ibid. However, the British Act adds two other minerals which are 
phosphorus and molybdenum. See ibid.
30 German Act, sec. 2 (4).
31 Ibid, sec. 2 (5).
32 Soviet Edict, art. 1.
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the same as the German, British and American Acts, the Japanese Act 
specifies that the deep sea bed mineral resources are nodules including one 
or more minerals o f copper, manganese, nickel and cobalt.^
According to the French Act, deep sea bed is the soil and subsoil 
beyond the areas of national jurisdiction of the coastal states in accordance 
with international l a w .35 Like the Soviet Edict, the French Act does not
include any definition o f the resources.36
The Italian Act, like the French Act, provides the same definition of 
the deep sea bed as the sea bed and the subsoil beyond the areas which are 
subject to the national jurisdiction of coastal state according to 
international l a w .3 7  Uniformly with the Soviet Edict and French Act, the 
Italian Act does not contain any statement of meaning of the resources.
1.2. Purposes of the Domestic Legislation
The announced purposes in the legislation are entirely different from 
each other.
As set forth in the American Act's findings and purposes clause, the 
purposes are: 1) to encourage the successful completion of a 
comprehensive law of the sea treaty; 2) to provide for the establishment of 
an international revenue-sharing fund to be used for sharing with the 
international community; 3) to establish an interim program to regulate
33 Japanese Act, Chapter 1, art 2 (2).
34 Ibid, art. 2.
35 French Act, art. 2.
36 The French Minister of the Sea stated in the senatorial debate, that mineral 
resources is to include Hydrocarbons too. T. Luoma, A Comparative Study of National 
Legislation Concerning the Deep Sea Mining of Manganese Nodules, (April 1983) 14 
J.Mar.Law & Com., p.261.
32 Italian Act, art. 2.
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the exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources of the deep sea 
bed by United States citizens pending the entry into force of the law of the 
sea treaty for the United States; 4) to protect the environment by virtue of 
assuring that such exploration and exploitation activities are conducted in a 
manner which will encourage the conservation of the resources, protect 
the quality of the environment and promote the safety of life and property 
at sea and 5) to encourage the continued development technology of deep
sea bed mining. 3 8
Like the American Act, the purposes of the German Act are expressly 
declared. Correspondingly, the purposes of the German Act are: 1) to 
regulate provisionally and to promote the exploration for and the recovery 
of the deep sea bed mineral resources until the entry into force of an 
international agreement for the Federal Republic of Germany; 2) to assure 
regard for the interests of others engaged in the exploration activity; 3) to 
protect the marine environment; 4) to protect life, health and property 
against dangers arising from deep sea bed mining; and lastly to contribute
to the development of the deep sea bed mineral r e s o u r c e s . ^
Although the British Act does not expressly state the purpose, it would 
appear that the objective of the Act is to interdict persons subject to the 
provisions of the Act from exploring for and exploiting the hard mineral 
resources of any part of the deep sea bed, unless they hold licenses of 
exploration or permits of exploitation granted according to the provisions
38 American Act, art. 2 (b) (1-5). It is argued that the United States was 
intended "to assure American access on reasonable terms to the manganese nodules; to 
provide a reasonable stable legal framework pending the Conclusion and senate 
ratification of the UNCLOS III treaty; to assure the protection of the marine 
environment; to preserve American interests in the maintenance of the traditional 
freedom of the high seas; and to enable the United States to gain some measure of 
mineral independence from its current politically unstable suppliers of crucial strategic 
minerals. See Wilson, Mining the Deep Seabed: Domestic Regulation, International 
Law and UNCLOS III, (1982) 18 Tulsa L.J., p.231.
39 German Act, sec. 1 (1), (2), (3).
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of the A ct.^
Brown believes that the common objective of the American, British 
and German Acts is to guarantee non-discriminatory access "for their 
nationals to sea bed resources, thus providing secure access to supplies of 
minerals in the national interest."^
The Soviet Union felt obliged to take measures to protect its interests 
with respect to the exploration and exploitation of the r e s o u r c e s . 4 2  The 
reason was that many western countries have promulgated municipal 
legislation to explore and exploit deep sea bed resources.
The Japanese Act declares its purpose as setting up interim measures to 
regulate business activity in deep sea bed mining in order to contribute to 
the promotion of the public welfare by virtue of the rational development 
of "deep sea bed mineral resources and in keeping with the recent rapid 
strides of international society toward a new order of the sea and other 
significant changes in the international environment surrounding deep sea
bed mining. "43
The French Act does not explicitly assert its purpose. However, it 
would be apparent that the objective of the Act is to set out conditions 
under which, the French Republic grants authorisations for the exploration 
and exploitation of deep sea bed resources to natural persons and corporate 
bodies of French nationality, pending the entry into force of the Law of the 
Sea Treaty to which the French Republic would be a party.44
40 British Act, sec. 1 (1), (2). According to Luoma, the objectives of the British 
Act is: 1) to encourage the development of an international regime governing seabed 
mining, and 2) to protect British mining interests in the event UNCLOS HI fails to 
develop a comprehensive regime therefore. Luoma, op.cit., p.259.
41 E. D. Brown, The Impact o f Unilateral Legislation on the Future Legal 
Regime of Deep-Sea Mining, (1982) 20 ARCHIV DES VLKERRECHTS., p.149.
42 Soviet Edict, Preambular Paragraph.
43 Japanese Act, Chapter. 1, art. 1.
44 French Act, art. 1.
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The objective of the Italian Act, is to regulate the exploration and
exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep sea bed by Italian
nationals and assure the rational utilization of the deep sea bed mineral 
45resources.
Regardless of what was stipulated as purposes in these legislation, the 
objectives of the six legislation of United States, Federal Republic of 
Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and France were intended mainly 
"to guarantee non-discriminatory access to supplies of minerals in the 
national interests, to foster and strengthen research and development, and 
lastly, to assure that their nationals should not be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage in relation to nationals of other countries which had adopted
interim legislation. "46
1.3. Legal Basis of the Domestic Legislation.
The enacting states contended that their unilateral legislation are 
committed to the "common heritage of mankind" principle. The enacting 
states maintain that the conduct of exploration and exploitation activities 
will be carried out under the "freedom of high seas" principle with due 
regard to the interests of other states, and they do not claim sovereignty or 
sovereign rights over the deep sea bed and its mineral resources. The 
enacting states assert that their legislation are of interim nature pending the 
entry into force of the Convention for these states. Moreover, they insist 
that their legislation are consistent with the United Nations Convention 
regime and international law.
The interim natu re^  0f  the legislation is designed to regulate deep sea
45 Italian Act, art 1.
46 E. D. Brown, supra note 9, p.II.86.
47 British Act, sec. 18 (3); Soviet Edict, art. 20; American Act, sec. 2 (b); 
French Act, art. 1; German Act, sec. 5 (1); Japanese Act, Chapter. 5, art. 43.
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bed exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources and to promote 
the technology of deep sea bed mining, until the entry into force of the Law 
of the Sea Treaty in respect to the state concerned and therefore, to avoid 
any version that the national legislation are of permanent nature.^
The enacting states affirmed that their legislation are compatible with 
the United Nations Convention. They argue that their legislation do not 
contain any provisions which claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over 
the deep sea bed and its resources, and that is consistent with Article 137 
(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention.
The American Act contains provision which asserts that the United 
States does not claim sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or 
jurisdiction over, or the ownership of any areas or resources in the deep 
sea bed.49 in line with the American Act, the Soviet Edict provides that 
the Soviet Union does not claim sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive 
rights, or the ownership of deep sea bed areas and its r e s o u r c e s . T h e  
German Act followed the same expression as the American Act and the 
Soviet Edict in disclaiming sovereign rights over the deep sea bed and its 
mineral resources.^!
French, Japanese and Italian Acts indicate that the enacting states do 
not claim sovereignty over any part of the deep sea bed. However, the 
British Act does not provide any indication about disclaiming sovereignty 
over deep sea bed areas and its resources.
All legislation, directly or indirectly, confirm that the deep sea bed 
activities of exploration and exploitation shall be conducted on the basis of
48 It is worth noting that these legislation do not include any sign of the precise 
time of the interim period. Therefore, it is likely that these legislation may in the future 
become permanent if the Convention does not enter into force.
49 American Act, sec. 3 (2).
50 Soviet Edict, art. 2.
51 German Act, sec. 1 (1).
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"freedom of high seas" principle. The American Act, specifically, states 
that "it is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and 
commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep sea bed are 
freedoms of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the 
interests of other states in their exercise of these and other freedoms 
recognized by general principles of international l a w . " 5 2
The Soviet Edict specifies that activities of exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources of sea bed areas should not create 
unjustified obstacles "to the realization of the principle of freedom of the
seas or lawful activity on the world o c e a n . . . . "53
The French Act does implicitly provide reference to the freedom of 
the high seas by declaring that the activities of exploration and exploitation 
of deep sea bed resources do not prejudice the exercise of the freedoms of 
the high seas "in conformity with international law, in particular with
regard to navigation, fisheries and scientific r e s e a r c h . " ^
The Italian Act, almost states the same definition as the French Act. 
According to the Italian Act, deep sea bed mining activities shall be 
governed by the principles of "international law and conventions relating 
to the use of the high seas, particularly as regards the freedoms of 
navigation, scientific research, and f i s h i n g .  "55
Similar to the French, Italian and Soviet Acts, the British Act 
implicitly asserts the principle of the freedom of the high seas by 
stipulating that the licensee exercise his rights under the license "with
52 American Act, sec. 2(12).
53 Soviet Edict, art 9. On the basis of the doctrine of "relativity" of the freedom 
of the seas, Mr McDade concludes that "the Soviet legislation might therefore be taken 
to imply that the USSR regards sea bed mining as a freedom of the high seas. McDade, 
The Interim Obligation Between Signature and Ratification of a Treaty, (1985) 32 
Netherlands I.L.R., p.34.
54 French Act, art. 1.
55 Italian Act, art 3.
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reasonable regard to the interests of other persons in their exercise of the 
freedom of the high seas."^
The German Act, like the American Act, explicitly provides that the 
contribution to the development of the deep sea bed mineral resources 
should be on the basis of the "freedom of the high seas. "57 However, 
although the Japanese Act did not provide any specific provision referring 
to the freedom of the high seas, it would appear that Japan considers 
activities of exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the deep 
sea bed as freedom of high seas. Appropriately, the Act states that none of 
the provisions of the Japanese Act are "meant to infringe upon the interests 
of other states in their exercise of the freedom of high s e a s .  "58
The freedom of high seas principle cannot resist and survive in line 
with the United Nations Convention, which was adopted by a majority of 
states participants in UNCLOS HI, and the Declaration of Principles, 
adopted without any negative vote. Both contended that deep sea bed 
activities should be governed by the "common heritage of mankind" 
principle and not by the principle of freedom of high seas.
One can argue that the legislation are not compatible with the 
Convention. With reference to Article 137 (3) of the Convention, it is 
affirmed that "no state or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire 
or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area 
except in accordance with this part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition 
or exercise of such rights shall be recognized."
Correspondingly, it is clear that the issuance of licenses and permits 
conferring exclusive rights to the holders to explore and exploit the deep 
sea bed resources is totally inconsistent with Article 137 (3), especially
56 British Act, sec. 7.
57 German Act, sec. 1 (1).
58 Japanese Act, Chapter. 1 (2).
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with regard to the aspect of disclaiming sovereignty and sovereign rights. 
As Brown said, "there is a nod rather than a bow to the common heritage 
regime. Because the reciprocating states regime include only a selection of 
features suggested by the Convention, chosen and substantially modified by
the states concerned."^
1.4. Temporal Scope
Under the American and British Acts, exploration licensesshall not be 
issued before July 1, 1981.60 Hence, French, German, Soviet and Italian 
Acts do not precise any time for the granting of exploration licenses.
With regard to exploitation permits all legislation except the Japanese 
Act stipulate that permits shall not be granted before January 1, 1988.61 
The duration of the licenses and permits is much more expressed in the 
American and the German Acts than the rest of legislation. The American 
and the German Acts specify the same period of validity for licenses and 
permits, that is ten years time for exploration licenses, and twenty years
for exploitation permits with the possibility of e x t e n s i o n . 6 2
According to the British Act, which does not specify any exact time, 
leaves the question of the duration of the licenses and permits to the 
discretion of the Secretary of State as he thinks fit.63 The Italian Act does
69 E. D. Brown, supra note 9, p.II.88.
60 British Act, sec. 2 (4); American Act, sec. 102 (c), (1), (d).
61 British Act, sec. 2 (4); Soviet Edict, art. 6; American Act, sec. 102 (c) (1) 
(d); German Act, sec. 4 (3); French Act, art. 7; Italian Act, art. 20.
62 German Act, sec. 10(1), "..., a license may be extended...for periods o f up 
to five years, and a permit for periods of up to ten years." American Act, sec. 107 (a), 
(b) "...the administrator may extend the license for periods of not more than 5 years 
each." Each permit "for commercial recovery shall be issued for a term of 20 years and 
for so long thereafter...."
63 British Act, sec. 2 (3).
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not provide any specific time for the permits. But, the Act states that the 
duration of the exploitation permit cannot exceed twenty five years.^  
Nonetheless, Japanese, French and Soviet Acts do not indicate any precise 
time for exploration licenses and exploitation permits.
Section 2. The Area of Application of Domestic Legislation
2.1. Personnel Scope
Each legislation lays down provisions to regulate its own nationals 
through assuring them exclusive rights to operate under permits granted 
not only by the state, but also by a reciprocating sta ted
Under the American Act, exploration and exploitation activities are to 
be conducted and regulated by United States citizens. United States citizens 
are: A) any individual who is a citizen of the United States; B) any 
corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or other entity 
(whether organized or existing under the laws of any of the United States 
or a foreign nation) if the controlling interests in such entity is held by an 
individual or entity described in sub-paragraph (A) or (B)66
Brown viewed that "sub-paragraph (c) enables the United States to 
pierce the corporate veil of any entity organized or existing under the laws 
of any other state, reciprocating or non-reciprocating in order to 
determine the existence of an American controlling interests...."^
64 Italian Act, art. 9.
65 e.g., American Act, sec. 101 (a) (1) (A) (B), permits United States citizens to 
mine under authorisations granted by either the United States or a reciprocating state.
66 American Act, sec. 4 (14). The controlling interest is defined in section 4 (3) 
as "direct or indirect legal or beneficial interest in or influence over another person 
arising through ownership of capital stock, interlocking directorates or officers, 
contractual relations, or other similar means, which substantially affect the independent 
business behavior of such person."
67 E. D. Brown, supra note 41, p. 154.
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The British Act is applied to any person who is: A) a citizen of the 
United Kingdom and colonies, Scottish firm or a body incorporated under 
the law of any part of the United Kingdom, B) is resident in any part of the 
United K i n g d o m .68 Moreover, the application of the Act may be 
extended, by order in Council, to A) all citizens of the United Kingdom 
and colonies, Scottish firms and bodies incorporated under the law of any 
part of the United Kingdom who are resident outside the United Kingdom 
or to such citizens, firms and bodies who are resident in any country 
specified in the order; B) to bodies incorporated under the law of any of 
the Channel Islands, the Isle of man, any colony or an associated sta ted
Under the German Act, persons who may engage in deep sea bed 
activities are "residents" of the Federal Republic of Germany who have 
been granted authorisation either under the German Act or by a 
reciprocating s t a t e d  According to Japanese Act, which is confined only 
to the nationals or corporations of Japan, persons who are not nationals or 
corporations of Japan may not obtain permission to engage in deep sea 
m in in g .71 Furthermore, the Act admits the rights of the Japanese 
nationals who have entered into a partnership relation by the Ministry of 
International T r a d e d  The French Act asserts that authorisations are 
granted to natural persons and corporate bodies of French n a t i o n a l i t y . ^
The Act, further emphasizes that no natural person or corporate body of 
French nationality can undertake exploration and exploitation activities 
without a u t h o r i s a t i o n s . ^  i n  respect of the Italian Act, licenses of
68 British Act, sec. 1 (4).
69 British Act, sec. 1 (5).
70 German Act, sec. 3(1).
71 Japanese Act, art. 11 (1).
72 Ibid, art. 40.
73 french Act, art. 1.
74 Ibid, art. 3.
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exploration and permits of exploitation are to be issued to italian 
nationals.75
The Soviet Edict includes provisions regulating its own nationals in 
conducting exploration and exploitation activities. Thus, exploration 
license and exploitation permit may be issued to Soviet enterprises.^ In 
addition, the Soviet Union exercises jurisdiction over Soviet legal and 
natural persons conducting deep sea bed mining operations .77 Further, 
the Edict arranges for the Soviet Union to perform cooperation "in regard 
to questions of the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources of sea 
bed areas", on the basis of reciprocity, with those "states which recognize 
the permits issued to Soviet enterprises in accordance with the present 
E d ic t."78 Such reciprocating states shall be informed about applications 
received from Soviet enterprises as well as about permits issued.79 On the 
basis of treaties with states, foreign natural and legal persons will be able to 
participate in exploration and exploitation operations conducted by Soviet 
enterprises. Contrariwise, the Soviet enterprises, on the basis of a treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the interested foreign state, may engage in 
deep sea bed mining activities carried out by foreign entities which are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the interested foreign state.80
It can be said that the main objective of the legislation behind the 
regulation of their own nationals is to provide a convenient legal 
framework to ensure legal security for their own nationals.
75 Italian Act, sec. 3. "Italian nationals include, italian citizens or organizations, 
or by companies headquartered in Italy." Ibid, sec. 1.
7b Soviet Edict, art. 1.
77 ibid, art. 2.
78 ibid, art. 3.
79 ibid.
80 Ibid, art. 7.
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2.2. Scope of Activities
Deep sea bed mining activities are regulated through two phases, 
exploration and exploitation.
The exploitation definition differs from one legislation to another. The 
American Act refers to "commercial recovery" instead of exploitation, 
and define "commercial recovery" as A) any activity which recover any 
hard mineral resource, B) processing such hard mineral resource at sea, C) 
and disposing any waste of such activity to recover any hard mineral 
resource or such processing. 8 1
The French Act defines the term "exploitation" as extraction of 
mineral resources for commercial p u r p o s e s . 82 The Italian Act, almost 
follows the same definition as the French Act. Accordingly, exploitation 
means "the recovery of mineral resources for economic p u r p o s e s . "85
The German Act uses the phrase "recovery” to exploitation, and the 
Act indicates that recovery means "the dislodging or removal of substantial 
quantities of mineral resources for commercial use, including the 
processing thereof, if carried out at s e a .  "84
The British Act provides a different stipulation of the definition of 
exploitation. Accordingly, the Secretary of State may include, as he thinks 
fit, terms and conditions "a) relating to the processing or other treatment 
of any hard mineral resources..., b) and relating to the disposal of any 
waste material resulting from such processing and other treatment."85
Like the German and American Acts, the Japanese Act uses the term 
"recovery" to exploitation. The Act, generally, stipulates that deep sea bed
81 American Act, sec. 4 (1).
82 French Act, art. 2.
83 Italian Act, art 2.
84 German Act, sec. 2 (2).
85 British Act, sec. 2 (3) (b) (c).
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mining means "the exploration and recovery activities [including sorting, 
refining, and other activities subsidiary to this...in the deep sea b e d . " 8 b
Licenses and permits holders enjoy exclusive rights against any 
applicant subject to the legislation of the state concerned or subject to a 
legislation of reciprocating states. Therefore, according to the American 
Act, any license or permit issued "under this title shall be exclusive with 
respect to the holder thereof as against any other United States citizen or 
any citizen, national or governmental agency of, or any legal entity 
organized or existing under the laws of, any reciprocating s t a t e . " 8 7  The 
German Act puts into words that any license or permit shall grant the 
exclusive right to conduct exploration and carry out recovery a c t i v i t i e s . 8 8
The Italian Act specifies the same formulation, that the permit granted 
gives holder the exclusive right to carry out exploration or exploitation of 
a certain area of the deep sea b e d . 89 Similarly, the French Act stipulates 
that the license and the permit confer the holder the exclusive right to 
undertake deep sea bed mining activities.90 The Soviet Edict follows the 
same pattern of giving the permit holders exclusive right to the exploration 
and exploitation of deep sea bed mineral resources.91 In like manner, the 
British Act provides that where the Secretary of State has granted an 
exploration license he shall not grants "an exploitation license in respect of 
any part of the licensed area otherwise than to the licensee except with the
licensee's written c o n s e n t .  "92
It is interesting to summaries the common features which the domestic 
legislation share.
8b Japanese Act, Chapter. 1, art. 2 (2).
87 American Act, sec. 102 (b) (2).
88 German Act, sec. 4 (1), (2).
89 Italian Act, art. 3.
90 French Act, art. 5.
91 Soviet Edict, art. 5.
92 British Act, sec. 2 (5).
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The Acts declare either explicitly or implicitly that deep sea bed 
exploitation is a freedom of high seas with due regard to the interests of 
other states in their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas; they affirm 
that the enacting states disclaim any sovereignty or sovereign rights over 
the deep sea bed and its resources; they do recognize the reciprocity 
regime. Accordingly, each Act provides for a mechanism ofereciprocity 
regime with other states that have a compatible^ or similar, regulatory 
system of deep sea bed activities, through which mutual of licenses and 
permits is protected; they stipulate that the licensees and permittees have 
exclusive rights according to their licenses exploration and exploitation 
permits, vis-a-vis their own nationals and the nationals of the reciprocating 
states; they prohibit the granting of exploitation permits before January 
1,1988.
Section 3. Liabilities under Domestic Legislation
3.1. Financial Terms and the Fund
The financial obligations imposed on miners under the domestic 
legislation differ radically from those prescribed in the United Nations 
Convention. While the Convention was designed to protect the interests of 
the whole mankind, municipal legislation was schemed exclusively to 
secure the national interests. Accordingly, the legislation charge miners 
with very low taxes, compared with taxes of the Convention, in order to 
attract investment capital and generate reasonable profit. It has been 
generally accepted that the levies under the Acts would generate 
approximately half of the revenue which would be produced under the 
Convention regim e.^
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One of the arguments of the enacting states about their commitment to 
the ’’common heritage of mankind" principle is that the legislation imposes 
levies on miners, and setsup a Revenue-Sharing Fund into which levies 
would be paid. The amounts of the fund will be transferred to the 
international sea bed authority when the Law of the Sea Treaty enters into 
force for the state concerned.
Although the levies are expressed in different forms, almost all the 
Acts adopt the same rate of l e v y  .94
The American Act sets up a tax of 3.75 percent of the imputed value of 
mineral resources mined from the deep sea b e d . 9 5
The imputed value is defined as "20 percent of the fair market value of 
the commercially recoverable metals and minerals contained in such 
resource as of the date of the removal of hard mineral resources from the 
deep sea bed and as if the metals and minerals in such resource were 
separated from the resource and were in the most basic form for which 
there is a readily ascertainable market price. "96
The permit holder may elect to have the application of the tax 
suspended with respect to the minerals which the permittee does not intend 
to process within one year of the date of extraction.97 Liability of paying 
taxes will terminate after, first, an international deep sea bed treaty enters 
into force with respect to the United States or, second, ten years after the 
date of the enactment of the "Sub-chapter" on taxes.98 As one of the 
purposes declared in the American Act is the establishment of a Revenue-
93 E. D. Brown, supra note 41, p. 165.
94 See e.g., French Act; British Act; American Act; German Act and Italian Act
95 American Act, Title IV-Tax, " Subchapter F"-Tax on removal of Hard 
Mineral Resources from deep sea bed, sec. 4495 (b).
96 ibid, sec. 4497 (a).
97 ibid, sec. 4497 (c) (1).
98 ibid, sec. 4498 (a).
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Sharing F u n d ."  The American Act creates a Trust Fund in the Treasury 
to be known as the "Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust Fund", into which 
the levies described above are to be paid. *00 Taxes are imposed on "any 
removal of a hard mineral resource from the deep sea bed pursuant to a 
deep sea bed permit."101
If an international deep sea bed treaty is ratified and entered in effect 
with respect to the United States within ten years (by 1990) after the date of 
the enactment of the Act, amounts of the Fund shall be available "for 
purposes of the sharing among nations of the revenues from deep sea bed 
mining. ul°2 However, if such international deep sea bed mining treaty 
does not enter into force for the United States within ten years (by 1990) 
after the date of the enactment of the Act, amounts of the Fund shall be 
available "for such purposes as Congress may hereafter provide by 
law."103
The Soviet Edict does not mention any specific form of levy. But, the 
Edict refers to the taxes indirectly as part of the assets received from the 
exploitation of mineral resources of sea bed areas by Soviet enterprises. 
Moreover, the Edict sets up a special fund in conformity with the 
procedure and amounts established by the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR.104
Under the Japanese Act, no such financial provisions are provided for. 
However, the Act leavesthe determination of such financial terms to the 
Cabinet Order. No reference is included in the Act for the creation of a 
fund or arrangement for sharing the revenue with the international
99 Ibid, sec. 2 (b) (2).
100 Ibid, sec. 403 (a) (b).
101 Ibid, sec. 4495 (a).
102 Ibid, sec. 403 (d).
103 Ibid, sec. 403 (e).
104 Soviet Edict, art. 18.
105 Japanese Act, Chapter. 5, art. 34.
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community. Like the American Act, the French Act specifies the same rate 
of levy 3.75 p e r c e n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  the Act does not contain any 
provision for the establishment of a fund. The reason of not including 
provisions for the establishment of such fund according to G. de 
Lacharriere is that, Article 18 of January 2, 1959 Order on Organic Law 
relative to Financial Laws interdict to proceed the allotment of the 3.75 
percent tax to such Funds in an Ordinary Law, and the result was the 
formulation of Article 12. ^  This Article states that "the proceeds of the 
tax shall be utilized in accordance with the conditions defined in the 
financial laws." It has been maintained that the French government 
intended to create fund for aid purposes to developing countries. *08
Similar to the American and French Acts, the Italian Act imposes a tax 
of 3.75 percent of the median market value of the minerals recovered from 
the deep sea b e d .  Even though the Act does not provide for the 
establishment of a fund, it has been stated that the amounts of taxes 
received from the permit holder will be used for the purposes of italian aid 
to the developing states. ^ 0
Under the German Act, the permit holder pays fee of 0.75 percent of 
the average market price in that particular year for the metals and minerals 
in their simples commercial processing forms, which are recovered from 
the mineral resources mined, m  It has been asserted that the German levy 
of 0.75 percent is of the same level of 3.75 percent prescribed in the
106 French Act, art. 12.
107 (}Uy de Lacharriere, op.cit., p.669.
108 xhe French Minister of the Sea, Mr le Pensec declared that the adoption of 
the Act envisage the creation of a fund for aid puiposes to the developing countries. See 
Report of Mr le Pensec, Ministre de la Mer in (24 September 1981) Journal de la 
Marine Marchande., p.2278.
109 Italian Act, art. 15.
U 0  Ibid.
I l l  German Act, art 12 (2).
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American, Italian and French A c ts .^ ^  With respect to the Revenue- 
Sharing Fund, the German Act is more favourable than the rest of 
legislation. Because unlike the other legislation, the German Act provides 
for the tum-over of the fund to an international authority, and the interim 
use of the trust for foreign aid purposes. 113
According to British Act, the miner is subject to a mining levy. If 
minerals recovered within a given period exceed a prescribed minimum 
amount, the licensee must pay to the Secretary of State a production charge 
equal to A) 3.75 percent of the value of the unprocessed nodules recovered 
under the license, or B) 0.75 percent of the value of the (recovered 
products) any manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, phosphorus or 
molybdenum found in the nodules if the value of the unprocessed nodules 
cannot be ascertained under ( a ) . ^ ^  The Act also provides for the 
establishment of a "Deep Sea-Bed Mining Fund" in the Treasury under the 
control and management of the Treasury, to which the levies are to be
112 According to Mr Caron, the 3,75 percent of 20 percent of the fair market 
value "is equal to 0,75% of the market price, thus the only effective difference between 
the tax schemes of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the United States of 
America is that the United States utilizes the fair market price as of the day of removal 
whilst Germany uses the yearly average market price. See D. Caron, Deep Sea Mining: 
A Comparative Study of U.S and West Germany Mining Legislation, (January 1981) 
Marine Policy., p. 11.
11^ German Act, sec. 13. The Act provides that "the Federal government shall be 
authorised to transfer the Trust Fund to the International Sea-Bed Authority after entry 
into force of an international agreement on deep sea bed mining for the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Up to that time the Trust Fund shall be invested for foreign aid 
purposes."
11^ British Act, sec. 9 (1). It has been stated that "clause 9 sets out two different 
ways under which a company can calculate the amount of levy it has to pay on its 
operations : one on the value, agreed or estimated or deemed value, of the nodules as 
such, and the other on the value of the actual minerals obtained by refinement o f the 
nodules.... there are all kinds of advantages of convenience and indeed of justice in 
having both systems available." Pari. Deb, H.L, Vol. 416 (5th ser), 1980-81, Jan 13 to 
Feb 5, p.254.
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transferred.! 1^
The Secretary of State, in his discretion, may turn the Fund over to the 
designated international organization, if within ten years of the date of the 
coming into force of the Act, an international deep sea bed treaty enters 
into force for the United Kingdom. However, if the international deep sea 
bed treaty does not enter into force within such period (ten years), the 
Secretary of State may order the winding up of the Fund and the payment 
into the Consolidated Fund of any sums standing to its credit.! 16
In conclusion, it can be said that the levies imposed on miners are 
merely for their benefit and for national interests.
3.2. Reservation of Sites
With the exception of the Soviet Edict, which expressly provides for 
site-banking, none of the A c t s  * 17 include provisions for this requirement.
The Soviet Edict specifies that the applicant for permit shall identify 
two plots. One of the two plots shall be used by the enterprise which has 
granted a permit, and the other shall be reserved "for possible exploration 
and exploitation by a future international organization for the sea bed."! 1**
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the French Act does not explicitly
113 British Act, sec. 10 (1).
11^ British Act, sec. 10 (7). The order of winding up the Fund is subject, 
however, to approval by resolution of the Commons House of Parliamnet. Ibid, sec. 
1 0 (8).
117 It has been brought to light that the United States intends to limit the size 
under any one application to 80.000 square kilometers in the exploration phase and 
40.000 square kilometers during commercial exploitation. See VanDyke & Yuen, 
"Common Heritage." V. "Freedom of the High Seas": Which Governs the Seabed?, 
(1982) 19 San Diego L.Rev., p.546.
H 8 Soviet Edict, art. 4.
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state this requirement, it appears that the Act provides for two sites by 
referring to its pro visions.The Act requires that the permit of exploitation 
shall be valid for an area which does not exceed "half of the area of the 
exploration permit if the holder has given proof that the exploitation is
possible."! 19
With regard to the British Act, the issue of this requirement was 
thoroughly debated during the passage of the United Kingdom Bill. One of 
the reasons of not including this requirement in the Bill was the absence of 
such provision from the American and the German Acts. Therefore, 
inclusion of such requirement in the British Act would place United
Kingdom companies at a competitive d i s a d v a n t a g e .  ^
3.3. Production Control
It should be noted that all Acts do not provide for provisions on 
production control.
3.4. Transfer of Technology
By reason of the substantial costs which may be represented by the 
inclusion of such requirement in the legislation, it is not surprising that
none of the Acts provides for this r e q u i r e m e n t .  ^
With regard to the transfer of technology, Article 8 of the Soviet Edict 
provides that, competent agencies of the USSR shall effectuate cooperation 
on the basis of international treaties of the USSR with interested foreign
119 French Act, art. 6.
120 e . D. Brown, supra note 41, pp. 159-60.
121 The British Minister argued that the inclusion of transfer sea bed technology 
arrangement would place United Kingdom companies at a competitive disadvantage in 
respect of companies operating under American or German legislation which do not 
include such burdens. E. D. Brown, supra note 9, pp.II.829-30.
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states. The purpose of such cooperation in the field of technology transfer 
is to render assistance to the foreign states "in the development of 
technology, in the production of equipment, in implementing measures to 
prevent pollution of the environment, the training of the cadre, and other 
questions connected with the exploration and exploitation of mineral 
resources of sea bed areas."
Accordingly, such assistance in the development of technology to 
foreign states is based on a treaty between the USSR and the state 
interested.
By virtue of exclusion of such requirements, transfer of technology, 
reservation of sites and production control, the operators will avoid a very 
considerable and weighty costs in conducting activities in deep sea bed.
3.5. Anti-monopoly and Diligence Requirements
1-Anti-monopoly Requirement
None of the Acts places any limitation upon the number of sites which 
a licensee may possess. It has been argued that the reason of not including 
such provision in the legislation is that such restriction may place miners of 
any state in a disadvantaged situation in comparison with the entities 
operating under other l e g i s l a t i o n .  1^2 However, in respect of the size of the 
area, all legislation containsprovisions on this issue except the British Act.
Commensurate with the Soviet Edict, sea bed plots to which permits 
are issued should not in the total area "exceed reasonable limits, taking into 
account the legal interest of other s ta tes* '^  According to the Italian Act,
122 According to E. D. Brown, this was one of the arguments evoked by the 
British government against the opposition in . Parliament whWKwanted the insertion of 
the anti-monopoly provisions in the British Act. E. D. Brown, supra note 41, p. 162.
123 Soviet Edict, art. 4.
216
the areas of which permits are granted do not "exceed a reasonable area, 
taking the interests of the other states into a c c o u n t .  "124 The French Act 
followed the same stipulation as the Soviet and Italian Acts. Thus, the 
French Act states that the permits issued shall not "exceed a reasonable 
size, taking into account the interests of the other sta te s ."  125
In relation to the German Act, the size of a site should be large enough 
to assure the permit holder to carry out an economic recovery of minerals 
before the expiration of his permit. 126 The American Act specifies that the 
applicant shall "select the size and location of the area of the exploration 
plan or recovery p l a n .  127 Japanese Act asseverated that sizes of areas for 
exploration or recovery shall comply with the "standards provided in
Ministry of International Trade and Industry O r d i n a n c e .  "^8
2- Diligence Requirement
Almost all legislation include requirement to meet diligence standards. 
Accordingly, under the American Act, which is the more detail Act on this 
requirement, each licensee and permittee is required to pursue diligently 
the activities by making periodic reasonable expenditures for exploration, 
and to maintain commercial recovery throughout the period of the
permit. 129
British Act provides that, a license may include terms and conditions 
requiring "any exploration or exploitation of the hard mineral resources 
of the licensed area to be diligently carried o u t . " * 30 ^  American
124 Italian Act, art. 7.
125 French Act, art. 4.
126 German Act, sec. 10 (2).
127 American Act, sec. 103 (a) (2) (D).
128 Japanese Act, art. 12 (2).
129 American Act, sec. 108.
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Act, the German Act requires the licensee to make periodic and reasonable 
investm ents for e x p l o r a t i o n . !  31 Moreover, the Act sets out that 
authorisations to explore and exploit mineral resources may be granted to 
the applicant if the applicant "as a result of his knowledge, experience and 
financial resources as well as his reliability, can guarantee an orderly 
development of mineral resources....1’ 132
The French Act calls upon that the granting of "the title goes together 
with the obligations imposed on the holder, in particular a minimum 
production p r o g r a m . " ^  Furthermore, the exploration license will lay 
down the obligations of the permit holder, especially the minimum 
financial commitment required of him . 134 w ith  regard to the Japanese 
Act, granting permits to applicants will depend on the ability of any 
applicant to perform certain demands. Properly, his financial and 
technological capabilities "shall be sufficient for proper execution of deep 
sea bed mining." Additionally, the rational and smooth development of 
deep sea bed mineral resources "shall be able to be performed
properly. ”^35
According to the Italian Act, applicants for permits "must have the 
technical and financial capacity required for exploration or 
e x p l o i t a t i o n . . . . "  136 Besides, the Act stipulates that the permit is declared 
terminated if the holder, 1) loses the required technical and financial 
capacity, 2) does not fulfill his obligations under the Act or the provisions 
of the permit, 3) or seriously falls behind in the observance of the time
130 British Act, sec. 2 (3) (p).
131 German Act, sec. 10 (3).
132 ibid, sec. 5 (1) 2.
133 French Act, art. 7.
134 Ibid, art. 6.
135 Japanese Act, art. 12 (3), (4).
136 Italian Act, art. 7.
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schedules and conditions set out in the work program .137
With reference to the content of unilateral legislation, one can notice 
that some of the basic provisions on deep sea bed mining included in these 
legislation differ quite strikingly from those of the Convention such as the 
financial terms. While other burdensome requirements are omitted from 
these legislation like transfer of technology and production control.
Section 4. Unilateral Legislation and International Law
Unilateral legislation f o r .  deep sea bed mining, based on the 
principle of "freedom of high seas", has given rise to substantial 
controversy and contentions debate in respect of its compatibility with 
international law.
Developing countries have been claiming that any unilateral legislation 
is violative to international law. The developing countries' opinion is based 
on the irrevocable nature of the various resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly,138 which have codified customary law, especially the 
Declaration of Principles adopted without any negative vote. These 
resolutions declared that the resources of the deep sea bed are the common 
heritage of mankind. The principle of common heritage of mankind has 
been uniformly recognized as the sole principle which regulate and govern 
the deep sea bed and its resources. Therefore, no other alternative regime 
can be legally admitted to regulate, inconsistently with the common 
heritage of mankind, the resources of the deep sea bed.
137 Ibid, art. 11.
138 For example, the Moratorium Resolution, 2574 D (XXIV); Declaration of 
Principles, 2749 (XXV); Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974. 
Mr Biggs asserted that the common heritage principle has been endorsed as a legal 
principle in more than eighteen General Assembly resolutions and two resolutions of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. See G. Biggs, Deep 
Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, (1980) 8 O.D.I.L.A., p.239.
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Before turning to consider the position of the Group of 77 and their 
arguments of refusing any claim from the enacting states that unilateral 
legislation is compatible with international law, this section will briefly 
attempt to examine the legal position of non-parties (third states) to a treaty 
(Law of the Sea Convention) .139
Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,140 
reads: "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state 
without its consent." However, it appears that there is exception to Article 
34. Accordingly, Article 38 indicates that a treaty which is declaratory of 
customary international law may bring about rights and obligations upon 
third states. To put it in another way, where a treaty provision embodies an 
existing customary law ,141 its binding impact is applied not only to the 
parties of the treaty but also to non-parties of the treaty. Article 38 
provides: "Nothing in Articles 34 to 37 precludes a mle set forth in a treaty 
from becoming binding upon a third state as a customary rule of 
international law, recognized as such." On that account, a rule of 
international law may be conventional for some states and customary for 
others.142
139 There are some countries are not parties to the Law of the Sea Convention 
such as, United Kingdom, United States and Federal Republic of Germany.
140 U.N.T.S. No 18, 232, UN. Doc. A.Conf.39.27 (1969), reprinted in (1969) 
8 I.L.M. 679.
141 It has been stated that "customary international law consists o f generally 
recognized limitations on state behavior which are applied by the states of the world 
because they are perceived as binding." See L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, (6th ed.
H. Waldock 1963) p.60.
142 K. Gamble, The Treaty/ Custom Dishotomy: An Overview, (1981) 16 Texas
I.L.J., p.312. Many legal writters have considered the relationship between the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary law. See for example, 
Gamble & Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law o f the Sea: 
Observations, a Framework, and Warning, (1984) 21 San Diego L.Rev., pp.491-511; 
Howard, The Third United Nations on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty/  Custom 
Dishotomy, (1981) 16 Texas I.L.J., p.321; D. d'Amato, An Alternative to the Law of
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The JLC concisely illustrated the relationship between conventional 
international law and customary international law; it stated:
Perhaps the differentiation between conventional international 
law and customary international law ought not to be too rigidly 
insisted upon, however. A principle or rule of customary 
international law may be embodied in a bipartite or multipartite 
agreement so as to have, within the stated limits, conventional 
force for the states parties to the agreement so long as the 
agreement is in force; yet it would continue to be binding as a 
principle or rule of customary international law for other 
states.143
Although the general rule, according to Article 34 of Vienna
Convention on Law of Treaties, treaties do not entail rights and obligations
on non-parties without their consent; the international community
admitted that certain treaties of legislative character are erga omnes. In
other words, the so-called "law-making” treaties that intend to lay down a
set of rights and obligations, e.g., to lay down law ,144 are valid erga
omnes. The kind of such treaties include those creating permanent legal
positive positions which protect the interests of the international
community. For instance, conventions insuring free passage through
international waterways, and the international regime of deep sea bed
mining provisions embodied in the Convention are regarded valid erga
the Sea Convention, (1983) 77 A.J.I.L., p.541; MacRae, Customary international law 
and the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, (1983) 13 Cal.W.I.L.J., p. 181. 
MacRae said that "the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, despite protestations to 
the contrary, has codified with almost unanimous international consent, customary law 
of the sea." Ibid, pp.221-22.
143 I.L.C. Rep. to G.A. in (1950) 2 I.L.C.Yearbook, p.368, UN. Doc. A.CN. 
4.SER. A.Add.l (1950).
144 P. O'Connell, International Law (2nd ed., 1970), p.23. Among the examples 
o f " law-making" treaties cited by O'Connel, there are: the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907, and the Red Cross Conventions. Ibid, p.23.
221
omnes because they reflect the interests of the international community 
and therefore, they are bound not only on the parties but also on the non- 
parties.
The most concrete example of treaty provision which is valid erga 
omnes is Article 2 (6) of the Charter of the United Nations:
"The organization shall ensure that states which are not members of 
the United Nations act in accordance with these principles (described in 
other paragraphs of the same article) so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security."
Article 2 was regarded by Lauterpacht as a mandatory provision 
which "constitutes a claim to regulate the conduct of non-members to the 
extent required for the fulfillment of the object of that article."145
Mr O’Connell, in explaining the significance of the legislative treaty, 
stipulates that:
It is not possible in this dynamic age to await the crystallization 
of customary law, for practice, and the evidence of practice, 
grows only with time. Common problems are therefore 
resolved by resort to multilateral convention, and since in 
matters of marcotics, white-slavery, etc., the minority which 
stands outside the treaty is so small the treaty rules are indeed 
almost general law.146
It is therefore clear that treaty provisions that have legislative 
character can reflect customary international law and thus, entail rights 
and obligations upon third states.
The Group of 77147 claims that unilateral legislation has no validity or
145 L. Oppenheim, International Law-A Treatise, Vol.I (Peace, 8 th ed. by 
Lauterpacht), (1955) p.929.
146 o' Connell, op.cit., p.24.
!47 The name "Group of 77" refers to the original 77 developing countries which 
got together to pursue their interests within UNCTAD and now operates within the 
United Nations system as a whole. They are now 105 countries. See O. Adede, The
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effectiveness in international law, and any rights acquired under such 
legislation would not be internationally recognized and therefore, would 
be considered as illegal. The Group of 77 asserts that the "common 
heritage of mankind" principle has become a binding international rule 
endorsed by many United Nations resolutions.
A firm response was expressed by the Group of Legal Experts in a 
letter dated April 23, 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Group of 77 
on the question of unilateral legislation.14** It has been stated that, the 
Principles of the Declaration form the basis of the international regime of 
the deep sea bed and its resources. Therefore, any unilateral legislation or 
mini-treaty is illegal and violates the Principles of the Declaration. They 
also stipulate that the adoption of unilateral Acts and mini-treaty 
agreements are merely an event without international effect and thus, 
incapable to be invoked vis-a-vis the international community. The Group 
went on to argue that,
The great majority of states would not admit the validity of such 
legislation nor could such legislation constitute valid grounds 
for any juridical claim to explore or exploit the area. 
Furthermore, if such unilateral legislation or mini-treaty should 
be put into operation, the international responsibility of the 
states concerned would be engaged in respect of damage caused 
by such activities incompatible with the Principles applicable in 
the area.149
Moreover, the letter affirmed that the customary principle of the
freedom of the high seas does not apply to the exploitation of the deep sea
bed since the exploitation was beyond the capacity of states at the time
Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority, (1979) 7 
O.D.I.L.A., p.61.
148 UNCLOS El, Off. Rec., VoLXI, pp.80-82.
149 Ibid, p.82.
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when that principle came into being. The letter went on to stipulate that 
even if the customary principle would be applicable on the adoption of the 
Declaration of Principles of 1970.
The strongest reaction of objecting the unilateral legislation was 
formulated by Ambassador Nandan of Fiji, the Chairman of the Group of 
77 150 Mr Nandan contended that the Group of 77 rejected any claim that 
the right to engage in deep sea bed activities was a legal freedom of the 
high s e a s .  He further maintained that the Declaration of Principles was 
binding upon states, and that unilateral exploitation was incompatible with 
those Principles.I52 He also asserted that "unilateral exploitation would be 
a clear violation of international law, which entailed the corresponding 
legal responsibilities."!53
The Group of 77 reiterated its strong opposition by the statement of 
M r De Soto of Peru. On behalf of the Group of 77, Mr De Soto affirmed 
the illegality of all unilateral legislation after being informed that the 
Soviet Union had also enacted an Edict. He said:
To the extent that such unilateral action violated the principle of 
the common heritage of mankind and the principle that there 
should be no expropriation of resources except as provided for 
in the Draft Convention, the Group believed that such legislation 
had no legal effect. The measure adopted by the Soviet Union, 
like the others, did not constitute a source of law. The Group 
would therefore not recognize any claim based upon such 
measures. 154
150 UNCLOS ID, Off. Rec., Vol.IX, pp. 103-04, Statement of the Ambassador 
Nandan of Fiji on Questions Concerning Unilateral Legislation on the Resources of the 
Sea Bed.
151 Ibid, p. 103 (21).
152 ibid, p. 103 (22).
153 ibid, p. 103 (23).
154 UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.XVI, p.130 (53).
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The western countries rejected the statements made by the Chairman 
of the Group of 77 and responded so as to defend the legality of the 
unilateral exploitation.155 The French representative, Mr De Lacharriere, 
contemplated that the argument of the Group of 77 that unilateral 
exploitation of the resources of the deep sea bed was illegal was not valid. 
He argued that:
No government could be bound under international law unless it 
agreed to be so bound in a treaty, and that in no case could a 
government be bound under international law unless it agreed to 
be bound in a treaty, and that in no case could a government be 
bound by a legal rule which others sought to impose on it. 
France had never agreed to any limitations on the freedoms of 
the sea in so far as they related to the exploitation of the sea-bed 
apart from those limitations which it might have accepted by 
treaty or within the framework of the development of 
international customary law. There were no provisions in 
existing international positive law which prohibited the 
reasonable exploitation of the sea-bed on an individual basis.156
De Lacharriere argued that a state is not bound, under international 
law, by a treaty unless it agreed to do so. Since there is no treaty which 
binds the enacting states, unilateral exploitation is internationally lawful. 
He went on to stipulate that there were no international law which 
prohibited such exploitation of deep sea bed. Therefore, the view of De 
Lacharriere could be interpreted as recognizing that the rule to be applied 
in the deep sea bed is what is not prohibited is permitted.
Any exploitation activity occurs under unilateral legislation, then its 
legality would probably be questioned before the ICJ. The President of 
UNCLOS III, Mr Tommy T. Koh declared that he will challenge such
155 UNCLOS HI, Off. Rec., Vol.IX, French statement, p. 106 (43); Belgium, 
p. 107 (53); Federal Republic of Germany, p. 106 (45,46); Italy, p. 107 (51,52); United 
Kingdom, pp. 107-08 (60-61); United States of America, pp. 104-05 (27-29).
156 ibid, p. 106 (43).
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unilateral legislation before the United Nations General Assembly and the 
ICJ. As he put into words:
I will take it upon myself to persuade the United Nations 
General Assembly to adopt a decision asking the International 
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on whether such 
activities under unilateral national legislation are lawful, or are 
they illegal....157
The question of unilateral legislation might be challenged legally 
before the ICJ158 under two possibilities. First, the General Assembly 
might request an advisory opinion on the legality of unilateral legislation 
of the type adopted by the reciprocating states. Second, there is the 
possibility of taking contentious proceedings against one or more of the 
states which have enacted legislation, by one or more members of the 
Group of 77 for depleting the common heritage of mankind illegally.159 
However, since the Court has held in an earlier case that the actio 
popularis is not known to international law, it would be necessary for the 
applicant state or states to demonstrate a legal interest. It seems unlikely 
that the Court could regard the interest of a state or states in preventing 
such a depletion of the common heritage of mankind as constituting a 
sufficient legal interest to found an action.160
157 Quoted in L. Richardson, The U.S. Posture Toward the Law of the Sea 
Convention: Awkward but not Irreparable, (1983) 20 San Digo L.Rev., p.509 at note 
(14). See also S. Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for..., (1982) 60 
For.Aff., p.1017.
158 for  an examination about the possibility of a legal proceedings before the 
ICJ, see R. S. Moss, Insuring Unilaterally Licensed Deep Seabed Mining Operations 
Against Adverse Rulings by the International Court of Justice: An Assessment of the 
Risk, (1984) 14 O.D.I.L.A., pp. 161-91.
159 E. D. Brown, The Consequences of Failure to Agree at UNCLOS El, (1983) 
N.R.F., p.65.
!60 ibid.
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While it is beyond the bounds of possibility to foresee how the ICJ will 
react on such matters, E. Richardson, the former Chairman of the United 
States delegation to UNCLOS III states that the industrialised countries 
would "face the ever-present risk-indeed, the likelihood- that the ICJ will 
eventually declare that any deep sea bed mining activity that does not 
conform to the Convention is illegal."161
Many western countries maintained that until the Convention is 
ratified and entered into force for them, exploitation of deep sea bed is not 
prohibited under existing customary international law on the basis of 
freedom of high seas. In a Memorandum submitted by Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to the Special Standing Committee of the House of 
Commons, it stated:
At the Law of the Sea Conference and elsewhere, HMG have 
made clear their position that deep sea mining and national 
legislation to regulate it are not contrary to existing 
international law. This has been HMG's position over many 
years and it is shared by other industrialized countries. There is 
no rule of international law prohibiting the mining o f the 
resources of the deep sea-bed, and our proposed legislation is 
fully consistent with the status of the deep sea-bed and with the 
rules of international law concerning the freedom of the seas. 
States and their nationals may therefore mine the sea-bed 
provided that they have reasonable regard for the interests of 
other persons exercising their rights on the high seas.162
The representative of the United Kingdom, in supporting the freedom 
of the high seas principle, and the compatibility of the national legislation 
with international law, states:
...with regard to those provisions which seek to make new law,
161 L.Richardson, supra note 157.
162 Pari., Deb., H.C, Standing Committees, Welsh Grand, N.I., S.I.S Special 
STDG., 1st STDG, EEC DOCs, 2nd Reading, Session 1980-81, Vol.VII, p.58.
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the parties to the Convention will assume among themselves a 
new contractual relationship. This will not deprive others of 
existing rights nor, of course, can a conventional regime or 
obligation be imposed on them. Existing rights such as those 
which derive from the freedom of the high seas, as well as 
existing conventional law, will remain.163
Some of the recent commentators argued in favour of the unilateral 
legislation that they are compatible with international law. For example, 
Mr M. Mashayekhi, in his study, concludes that since none of the Acts of 
national legislation assigns exclusive rights to mine the deep sea bed, these 
Acts may be considered to be consistent with international law .164 It has 
been considered that the American Act and unilateral appropriation of 
deep sea bed resources by the United States are neither inconsistent with 
existing international law nor an unreasonable interference with the high 
seas freedoms.165
In supporting the freedom of high seas and unilateral exploitation, T. 
Kronmiller stated that the unilateral appropriation of the resources of the 
deep sea bed is permissible under international law and that deep sea bed 
mining is a freedom of high seas and is consistent with customary 
international law and relevant conventional law. Thus, all states shall 
respect the lawful exercise of exploration and exploitation of the resources 
of the deep sea bed as a freedom of high seas. He further stipulated that,
In international law, there is no reason why this activity may not 
be supported by domestic legislation which does not purport to 
claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over, or ownership of, 
areas of the deep sea bed and subsoil or otherwise to exclude
163 UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.PV.189.
164 M. Mashayekhi, The Present Legal Status of Deep Seabed Mining, (1985) 19 
J.W.T.L., p.249.
165 Wilson, Mining the Deep Seabed: Domestic Regulation, International Law 
and UNCLOS ID, (1982) 18 Tulsa L.J., p.243.
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nationals of non consenting states.166
Having considered the arguments for and against the compatibility of 
unilateral legislation with international law, it is worth referring to one of 
the important characteristics of the Convention, and on which the whole 
negotiations of UNCLOS m  stood up, that is the "package deal."
Accordingly, it has been maintained that the different parts of the 
Convention have different status. The developed countries alleged that Part 
XI is not part of customary international law and therefore, the 
Convention can be divided into different parts. Hence, the developed 
countries included in their legislation the provisions which satisfy their 
interests and exclude those which are burdensome and against their 
benefit . Indeed, some parts of the Convention were taken into account and 
entered into effect by many states, even before the Convention entered into 
force. For example, the 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zone.167
The United States and other developed countries rejected Part XI of 
the Convention as a disadvantageous part, and agreed pleasantly on other 
advantageous parts of the Convention on the basis of customary 
international law, such as innocent passage in territorial waters, transit 
passage in international straits. Nevertheless, the Convention is an 
undivided package, which does not accept to make selection on its parts. 
Ambassador Nandan of Fiji, in the final session of the Conference 
announced that,
... each chapter of the Convention is an integral part of the 
whole. To attempt to rationalize that parts of the Convention are 
simply customary international law, and thereby to separate 
them from others, is to ignore the fact that what was customary
166 T. KronmiUer, The Lawfulness of Deep Seabed Mining, (1980) p.521.
167 Guy de Lacharriere, La Zone Economique Francaise de 200 Milles, (1976) 
A.F.D.I., p.646.
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international law has been clarified or modified and that if such 
provisions were preserved, it was done as a quid pro quo for 
other provisions. Any selective use of the Convention, 
therefore, w ill be not only inappropriate but also 
unacceptable.168
Describing the significant feature of the "package deal", the 
representative of Cameroon, Mr Engo said:
Individual states may not pick and choose to be bound by 
convenient aspects of its provisions. This is particularly true for 
any who may wish to reject one or more of its 17 parts, selecting 
only certain rights established under the rest o f the 
convention....169
As the package is an important quality which has contributed to the 
striking successful completion of the Convention, it has been illustrated 
that,
Its quality as a package is a result of the singular nature of the 
circumstances from which it emerged, which factors included 
the close interrelationship of the many different issues involved, 
the large number of participating states, and the vast number of 
often conflicting interests which frequently cut across the 
traditional lines of negotiation by region....(it) necessitated that 
every individual provision of the text be weighed within the 
context of the whole, producing an intricately balanced text to 
provide a basis for universality.170
With reference to the statements of the Ambassadors Evenson, 
Yankov, Engo and Beesley, Ambassador Igor Kolowski of the Soviet
168 UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.PV.187.
169 UN. Doc. A.Conf.62.PV. 185.
170 B. Zulta, Introduction to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, UN. Publications. Sales No, E. 83. V.5.
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Union agreed that all parts of the Convention represent an indivisible 
package of compromise decisions and all are closely interrelated questions 
of the law of the sea. He added, that the Convention is a package deal and 
any attempts to recognize some of its parts and not recognize other parts 
would be unjustified.171
It has been explained that the Convention's parts are closely 
interrelated and form an integral package. Turning to the statements made 
by states at the signature session in Montego Bay, the President of 
UNCLOS HI, Mr Tommy T. Koh declared:
The second theme which emerged from the statements is that the 
provisions of the Convention are closely interrelated and form 
an integral package. Thus, it is not possible for a state to pick 
what it likes and to disregard what it does not like. It was also 
said that rights and obligations go hand in hand and it is not 
permissible to claim rights under the Convention without being 
willing to shoulder the corresponding obligations.172
He added that,
Although the Convention consists of a series of compromises, 
they form an integral whole. This is why the Convention does 
not provide for reservations. It is therefore not possible for 
states to pick what they like and disregard what they do not like.
In international law, as in domestic law rights duties go hand in 
hand. It is therefore legally impermissible to claim rights under 
the Convention without being willing to assume the correlative 
duties.173
Consequently, Part XI which deals with the international regime
171 Koers & Oxman, The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, (July 13-16, 
1983) L.Sea.Inst. Proc., p.691.
17  ^ Law of the sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN. 
Publications. Sales No, E.83. V.5, [ hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention], XXXIV.
173 Ibid, at XXXVI.
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governing the deep seabed cannot be separated from the other parts of the 
Convention, because all parts form an integral package. On account of the 
active involvement in the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Convention on 
a good faith which allows the common heritage principle to acquire a 
factual legal signification, it is clearly unfortunate to see many of the 
participants countries enacting legislation and arguing that their legislation 
are consistent with the principle of "common heritage of mankind" and 
international law. In fact, these legislation are incompatible with the 
common heritage principle. There is no doubt, that the objective of the 
enacting states is not the exploitation of the deep sea bed resources for the 
benefit of mankind as a whole, but rather for individual benefits.
Since it appears that the Acts lack any concern in respect of the 
interests of mankind, it is therefore that any conduct of exploitation 
activity under such unilateral legislation will be incompatible with the 
Convention and will bring the international responsibility. Up to the time 
of the adoption of the Declaration of Principles, there were no rules 
governing the deep sea bed and its resources. However, after the adoption 
of the Declaration of Principles and the acceptance of the principles, the 
deep sea bed and its resources were declared "common heritage of 
mankind" and become a declaratory rule of customary international law.
It should be noted that the states signatories of the Convention like 
France, Japan, Soviet Union and Italy are bound by Article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, which is considered as declaratory 
of customary international law and as binding on all states. Article 18 
reads:
"A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object 
and purpose of a treaty when:
a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the 
treaty subject to ratification acceptance or approval, until it shall have
232
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty;
b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the 
entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not 
unduly delayed."
Accordingly, it appears that the signatories which enacted unilateral 
legislation and entered into agreements were in violation of the Law of the 
Sea Convention.174
Section 5. Reciprocating States Agreements (RSA)
Developed states moved towards negotiating the possibility of 
concluding agreements under a form of a "mini-treaty" as the best solution 
to co-ordinate their legislation and provide sufficient legal security to 
attract investment capital. The reciprocating states regime facilitate mutual 
recognition of exploration and commercial recovery of areas claims and 
foster similarity in deep sea bed activities.
Under Reciprocating States Agreements, all potential sea bed countries 
will respect each other's claims and preclude their own nationals from 
violating the claims of other recognized states. Hence, under this regime a 
reciprocating state will not grant exploration license or exploitation permit 
that conflicts with licenses and permits granted by another reciprocating 
state.
The regime was seen as an adequate basis to provide the necessary 
mine security, to insure access to the resources of the deep sea bed and 
attract huge investment capital.175 Such Agreements purport to identify
174 For a discussion on Article 18 and its relation with Part XI o f the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, see Gamble & Frankowska, The
Significance of Signature to the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
(1984) 14 O.D.I.L.A., pp. 126-29; and also McDade, The Interim Obligation Between 
Signature and Ratification of a Treaty, (1985) 32 Netherlands I.L.R., pp.25-28.
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and solve the conflicting claims by providing an arrangement for the 
settlement of disputes and thereby provide the security of tenure. To do so, 
such arrangements require the states concerned to regulate their own 
nationals according to their municipal legislation, in order to co-ordinate 
globally the national rules and regulations laid down in the domestic 
legislation for mutual recognition on a reciprocal basis and therefore, 
establish a legal basis for reciprocating states regime.
This section, thus, will attempt to examine the two Reciprocating States 
Agreements.
5.1. The 1982 Agreement
On September 2, 1982, Federal Republic of Germany, United States, 
United Kingdom and France signed an Agreement176 which was 
considered as an important step to enforce the reciprocating states regime.
The Agreement aims to facilitate the identification and resolution of 
conflicts arising from the filing and processing of applications for sea bed 
mining authorisations made by Pre-Enactment Explorers (PEEs)177 on or 
before March 12, 1982, under any domestic legislation in respect of deep 
sea bed operations enacted by any of the parties.178
176 Caron believes that interim arrangements under municipal law regimes will 
remain to some an attractive and even desirable option, since a Law of the Sea Treaty to 
emerge will take years to come into force. D. Caron, supra note 112, p.5.
176 Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic 
Nodules of the Deep Sea-bed Matters, (1982) 21 p.950-62.
177 PEEs is defined as "an entity which was engaged, prior to the earliest date of 
enactment of domestic legislation by any party, in deep sea bed polymetallic nodule 
exploration by substantial surveying activity with respect to the area applied for." The 
Schedule, Part IV, para. 11 (d) of the Agreement.
178 The Agreement, para. 1.
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Parties to the Agreement agreed to consult together "in regard to 
consideration of any arrangement to facilitate mutual recognition of 
au thorisations",179 and also agreed on the possibility to conclude 
agreements "for the mutual recognition of authorisations granted under 
their respective laws in respect of deep sea bed operations."180
With regard to the identification of conflicts, the parties to the 
Agreement shall consult together before granting any authorisation181 or 
entering into any other bilateral or any multilateral arrangement between 
themselves or any arrangement with other states.182 It is therefore, 
stipulated in the Agreement that no party shall issue any authorisation 
prior to January 3,1983.183
Each party shall with all dispatch determine if the Pre-Enactment 
Explorers’s application has complied with the domestic legislation 
requirements, and the area applied for is bounded by a continuous 
boundary, and such area is reasonably compact.184 Furthermore, the 
parties have a collective duty to establish the final list of applications and 
inform each other of any overlapping conflict claims over the same 
area.185
As regards resolution of conflicts, the Agreement include a mechanism 
for resolving disputes over claimed areas of the deep sea bed. Each party 
has the duty to ensure that domestic conflicts are resolved in accordance to 
its domestic legislation requirements.186 Parties are required to assist the 
applicants adequate opportunity in resolving conflicts in a "timely manner
179 Ibid, para. 4 (c).
180 Ibid, para. 5.
181 Ibid, para. 4 (b).
182 Ibid, para. 4 (d).
!83 The Schedule of the Agreement, Part 1, para. 5.
!84 Ibid, para. 3.
ibid, para. 4 (b) (c).
186 Ibid, para. 7.
235
by voluntary procedures."187 If within six months of the entry into force 
of such Agreement between the parties, the applicants involved in the 
conflict have not resolved that conflict, the conflict shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration. 188 Within sixty days after the expiry of a ten days 
cooling-off period, the parties presenting the case of the conflict, shall 
agree in writing "on three arbitrators, or, if they agree to have only one 
arbitrator, on that one arbitrator."189 The appointed arbitrator must not 
be citizen of a party and must be neutral with respect to the subject of the 
dispute, and shall also have international standards and expertise.190 If, 
after a specified time period, these parties cannot agree, the Secretary 
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration will, without delay, 
appoint the arbitrators.191 In making the selection of arbitrators, the 
Secretary General is not confined by any list of arbitrators, and those 
arbitrators appointed shall not be open to challenge.192
With regard to the compatibility of the Agreement with the 
Convention, it should be noted that the Agreement was "without prejudice 
to the decision of the parties with respect to the Law of the Sea 
Convention."193 Moreover, the parties express their desire "to insure that
!87 The Agreement, para. 2.
!88  ibid, part II, para. 9 (2). The Agreement regulate the resolution of 
international conflicts. Accordingly, Paragraph 9 (1) of Part II states that "where there 
is an international conflict, the parties shall use there good offices to assist the 
applicants to resolve the conflict by voluntary procedures." Also Paragraph 5 of the 
Agreement stipulates that "in the event that any of the parties with whom applications 
for authorisations have been made by PEEs on or before March 12,1982 enter into an 
agreement for the mutual recognition of authorizations granted under their respective 
laws in respect of deep seabed operations, the parties concerned shall apply the 
procedures and impose the requirements set out in Part II of the Schedule hereto."
189 ibid, part II, Appendix I, para. 2.
190 Ibid, para. 6.
191 Ibid, para. 4.
!92 ibid, para. 6.
193 The Preambular of the Agreement.
236
adequate areas containing polymetallic nodules remain available for 
operations by other states and entities in conformity with international 
law .”194
Nonetheless, the Agreement looks incompatible with the Convention 
because it envisaged, for example, the granting of mutual recognition of 
authorisations, which completely disagreed with the provisions of the 
Convention, especially Article 137.
5.2. The 1984 Agreement
Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom, Netherlands and the United States took an important step, away 
from the Convention regime regarding the enforcement of the 
reciprocating states regime, by signing on August 3, 1984 an Agreement 
known as the "Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Sea Bed 
Matters."195
The Provisional Understanding is a further step with respect to the 
establishment of a unified legal framework for the deep sea bed mining 
activities to explore deep sea bed and exploit its resources outside the 
regime of the Convention. The Provisional Understanding seeks not only 
to avoid overlaps conflicts, but also to co-ordinate the domestic legislation 
of the parties to it. The Provisional Understanding is subject to 
denunciation on 180 day's notice. Thus, a party may denounce "this 
Agreement by written notice to all other parties,..., such denunciation shall
194 Ibid.
195 In (1984) XXIII I.L.M., pp. 1354-65. The Provisional Understanding was 
concluded with a related Memorandum on the Implementation of the Understanding. 
This Memorandum was signed by the same states except the Netherlands. Ibid, 
p. 1358. Under Paragraph 13 a provision is laid down for additional states to accede to 
the Agreement after its entry into force.
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become effective 180 days from the date of the latest receipt of such 
notice."196 Denunciation is also permitted on the showing of good cause 
related to the implementation of this Agreement. However, such 
denunciation will not "affect the rights and obligations of the parties 
concerned towards other parties to the Agreement."197
The Agreement provides that the parties must refrain from granting 
authorisations to engage in deep sea bed activities for an area which 
overlaps, in whole or part, with another area falling into one or any other 
of the following three categories: (i) an area covered in another application 
filed under the consortia agreements198 referred to above and still under 
consideration by another party; (ii) an area claimed in any other 
application filed in conformity with national law and the Provisional 
Understanding either prior to signature of the Provisional Understanding 
or earlier than the application in question, if still under consideration by 
another party in conformity with the Provisional Understanding.199
It is necessary to turn now to the provisions of the Understanding, 
which co-ordinate and harmonize the domestic legislation.
196 Provisional Understanding, para. 14 (1).
197 Ibid, para. 14 (2).
198 Six of the pioneer consortia entered into Agreements for voluntary conflict 
resolution in 1983. For these Agreements see Paragraph 1 (1) (a) of the Understanding. 
The Agreements are" Final Settlement Agreement" and " Supplementary Settlement 
Agreement." The Final and Supplementary Settlements Agreements are hereinafter 
referred to jointly as "Industry Arbitration Agreements" ( IAA). See M. Hoaghand, 
Conflict Resolution in the Assignment of Area Entitlements for Seabed Mining (Law of 
the Sea. XVI), (June 1984) 21 San Diego L.Rev., p.553 at note (63). The six consortia 
involved in the Agreements are: Association Francaise pour lEtude et la Recherche des 
Nodules (AFERNOD ); Deep Ocean Resources Development Co. ltd (DORD); 
Kennecott Consortium (KCON); Ocean Mining Associates (OMA); Ocean Minerals 
Company (OMCO); Ocean Management Inc. (OMI), or any of them. See ibid, 
Appendix I of the Provisional Understanding, p. 1357.
199 The Agreement, para. 1. This paragraph aims to co-ordinate the domestic 
legislation by attempting to avoid overlaps conflicts on mine sites on which 
authorisations are issued under domestic legislation.
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Initially, measures of eligibility must be regarded in issuing licenses to 
the applicants. Thus, each party shall issue or transfer an authorisation 
only to applicants: a) who are financially and technologically qualified to 
conduct the proposed deep sea bed operations; b) which comply with all 
requirements of the party's national law; and c) whose deep sea bed 
operations will be carried out in accordance with the standards prescribed 
below ."200 What is more, the parties have the duty to consult before the 
issuance or transfer of a license to an applicant who has previously been 
denied an authorisation or had an authorisation revoked for the same area 
by another party, or who has relinquished the same area under an 
authorisation of another party .201
States parties must "seek consistency in application requirements and 
operating standards."202 The standards which the operator shall perform 
are stipulated, in general, in the Memorandum on the Implementation. 
Each party shall take all necessary measures so that deep sea bed operations 
under its control conform with the exercise of the freedom of the high 
seas, by taking reasonable regard to the interests of other states;203 the 
protection of environment;204 the protection of waste;205 safety of life and 
property at sea206 and diligence requirement207
200 Memorandum on the Implementation of the Provisional Understanding, para. 
1 (1). However, before determining the eligibility of the applicant for the issuance of an 
authorisation, each party shall first "with reasonable dispatch, make an initial 
examination of each application to determine whether it complies with requirements for 
minimum content of applications under its national law." Provisional Understanding, 
para. 2.
201 The Memorandum, para. 1 (2).
202 Provisional Understanding, para. 8.
203 Memorandum..., para. 3 (1) (a).
204 Ibid, para. 3(1)  (b), (f).
2°5 Ibid, para. 3 (1) (c).
2°6 Ibid, para. 3 (1) (d).
207 Ibid, para. 3 (1) (e).
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As a means to enforce effectively the standards, each party will 
employ, as appropriate, measures such as "imposing reasonable penalties 
for violation of requirements; placing observers on vessels to monitor 
compliance; suspending, revoking, or modifying authorisations; and 
issuing orders in an emergency to prevent a significant adverse effect on 
the environment or to preserve the safety of life and property at sea."208
With regard to the size of the area, applicants will be granted a 
particular size so as to guarantee that the deep sea bed operations 
authorised "can be conducted within the initial duration of the 
authorization in an efficient, economical and orderly manner with due 
regard for conservation and protection of the environment, taking into 
consideration, as appropriate, the resource data, other relevant physical 
and environmental characteristics and the state of the technology of the 
applicant, as set forth in the plan of operations."209
Provision is made to call upon the parties to m aintain the 
confidentiality of the coordinates of application areas and other 
proprietary or confidential commercial information.210 Each party is 
required to notify the other parties of each application for an authorisation 
which it accepts.211 Further, and collectively, parties are required to 
consult each other, prior to the issuance of any authorisation, and with 
regard to relevant legal provisions and any modification thereof.212
In respect of the system of the dispute settlement, the Understanding 
provides that any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of 
the Agreement shall be settled by appropriate means.213 This provision
2°8 ibid, para. 4.
209 Ibid, para. 2 (1).
210 Provisional Understanding, para. 6(1).
211 Ibid, para. 3.
212 Ibid, para. 5 (a) (c).
21 ^  Ibid, para. 10.
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goes on to stipulate that "the parties to the dispute shall consider the 
possibility of resource to binding arbitration an, if they agree, shall have 
recourse to it."214
According to the provisions of the Understanding, it appears
that they aimed not only to resolve the overlaps conflict, but also to co­
ordinate the way in which parties of the Understanding grant 
authorisations to operate in the deep sea bed. Consequently, the operator 
may feel competent that he has security of tenure on his particular mine 
site with respect to the state parties.
Although Paragraph 15 of the Understanding states that "this 
agreement is without prejudice to, nor does it affect, the positions of the 
parties, or any obligations assumed by any of the parties, in respect of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." The Agreement has 
been seen as creating an alternative regime to the Convention by including 
stipulations and terms permitting exploration and exploitation of the 
mineral resources of the deep sea bed, and this is incompatible with Article 
137 (3) of the Convention.
The Understanding faced a strong criticism from the Group of 77, 
which affirmed that any arrangement outside the Convention regime is 
illegal. Accordingly, it has been stated that The Provisional Understanding 
goes beyond the resolution of conflicts arising from overlapping claims, 
by including provisions regarding exploration and exploitation of the sea 
bed resources outside the Law of the Sea Convention. The Group of 77 
rejects this Provisional Understanding as a basis for creating legal rights 
and regards it as wholly illegal.215
The mini-treaty is a further step towards the creation of a unified and
214 ibid.
215 Statement by the Chairman of the Group of 77 delivered on 13 August 1984, 
LOS.PCN.48, 16 August 1984, p.2, para. 5.
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secure policy for the mining of the sea bed outside the Convention.
Certainly sea bed miners will profit if they conduct deep sea bed 
mining under the reciprocating regime. The regime omit the controversial 
provisions of the Convention such as the substantial financial terms, 
transfer of technology and production limitation control. Because of these 
potential benefits miners will have greater incentive to develop mining 
sites. It has been argued that the regime, which include all potential sea bed 
mining countries, will protect mining investments and provides sufficient 
legal security to attract huge investment capital. Sea bed miners will have 
security of tenure on their mine sites vis-a-vis all potential competitors 
from reciprocating states. However, recognition by a larger group of 
nations is very important to enhance the security of the miners’ rights. If 
the system attract an additional number of states and accede to the mini­
treaty, as Paragraph 13 of the Provisional Understanding invites states to 
do so, miners will enjoy sufficient security to continue investment in the 
deep sea bed.
However, profits gained from mining under this regime should be 
balanced with the costs which might incurred under it.
In the event the regime enters into operation and miners conduct deep 
sea bed mining under it, serious threats of company boycotts, seizure of 
assets, attachment of shipment and legal entanglement may be raised.216
Moreover, security of tenure of the mine site is not absolute. A 
permittee can only be guaranteed security of tenure against nationals from 
the reciprocating states, but he may not enjoy this security if any 
competing claims occur from any miner of a non-reciprocating state and 
therefore, an international conflict may be brought about.
216 Anand, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United States, (1984) 
24 Indian J.I.L., p. 182.
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CONCLUSION
Having examined the legal system of deep sea bed exploitation under 
two different regimes, some conclusions may be drawn.
With regard to the legal status of the deep sea bed and its resources, 
the traditional concepts of res nullius and res communis as well as the 
rule of "what is not prohibited is not permitted" were rejected as legal 
principles to govern the deep sea bed. When the new concept of common 
heritage of mankind emerged as legal principle filling up what was a legal 
vacuum in the deep sea bed, the principle of the freedom of high seas was 
considered as improper and inadequate to govern the Area. Different 
interpretations were given by developed and developing states to the 
concept of common heritage of mankind. Developed states regarded the 
concept as a moral theory and a reflection of political aspirations having 
no legal content. By contrast, developing countries supported the concept 
as a legal principle forming the basis of any future international regime 
for the deep sea bed and its resources.
Until the adoption of the Declaration of Principles confirming that 
the area beyond national jurisdiction and its resources are the common 
heritage of mankind, there was no law applicable to the deep sea bed and 
its resources and no claims were expressed by countries for the 
applicability of other existing regimes or principles.
The vote in favour of the Declaration of Principles means in one way 
or another that the countries supported the common heritage of mankind 
and rejected the traditional concepts as legal status of the deep sea bed.
The principle received support in state practice and acquired the 
necessary opinion juris required for its applicability as customary 
international law. This new principle affirmed that the exclusive right to
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the Area and its resources belong to mankind as a whole and not to any 
individual state or person, natural or juridical.
Since Pardo raised the issue of the concept until the convening of the 
Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1973, 
international community made enormous efforts to achieve an agreed 
international legal regime to regulate deep sea bed mining. Declarations 
of Principles and many other resolutions1 contributed jointly to the 
establishment of the basic principles of the common heritage of mankind 
and confirmed the overwhelming practice of the international community 
as a mle of customary international law.
The adoption of the Declaration of Principles by one hundered eight 
votes to none providing binding guidelines for the elaboration of an 
international regime based on the common heritage of mankind; the good 
faith shown by developed states in actively participating in the 
negotiations of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea; the inclusion 
of the principle in Article 29 of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of states adopted in 1974 by one hundered thirteen votes to none; 
the inclusion of certain aspects of the principle in several unilateral 
legislation such as (the benefits of mankind taking into consideration, 
particularly the interests of developing states, disclaiming any sovereignty 
or sovereign rights...etc), all give evidence to the fact that the common 
heritage of mankind received the necessary state practice and became a 
rule o f customary international law removing the deep sea bed 
exploitation from the legal regime of freedom of high seas to the common 
heritage of mankind principle.
The 1982 Convention established an international regime for the 
deep sea bed whereby resources will be exploited on a common ground
1 Although they are not legislation and have no legal binding effect, they do at 
least impose duties of respect and recognition by virtue of their moral force.
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and not on an individual basis. It grants both the Authority and state 
parties to the Convention and private entities the right to exploit the 
resources of the Area in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention. The system of exploitation generally known as the "parallel 
system" which was agreed to a great extent by developed and developing 
countries, became unacceptable when the Convention was adopted by 
some of the developed countries because it embodied some burdensome 
requirements such as transfer of technology and production limitation 
control. It embodies the possibilities of co-operation between all states 
taking into account the interests of developing states. It creates a strong 
regime of sea bed mining activities under the total control of an 
International Sea-Bed Authority which have broad discretionary powers 
to implement the system of exploitation embodied in the Convention.
While the system of exploitation embodied in the Convention was 
deemed by the majority of states as practical and workable on the one 
hand, it is considered as defective and deficient by some developed states 
on the other. Developed states regard the system of exploitation of the 
Convention as discriminatory and unfair in many aspects.lt included an 
inequality of rights between the Authority’ Enterprise and private entities 
with regard to the right of access to the resources of the Area. For 
example, the system imposes heavy financial terms for applications and 
contracts and substantial payments to the Authority to the detriment of 
developed states industries. However, by including provision in the 
Convention on the review conference, the situation of inequalities of 
rights may be changed if the system is found not practically workable. 
The system of exploitation may well be assessed during the first 
generation of commercial exploitation and the review conference may 
prove effective to insert changes in order to have a workable system
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acceptable to all states.
The International Sea-Bed Authority will regulate and manage deep 
sea bed activities through different organs. The Assembly as a supreme 
organ of the Authority is formal rather than real. Because in practice the 
Council proved its supremacy as a powerful organ on account of the role 
it plays in implementing the system of deep sea bed mining. The 
Enterprise of the Authority enjoys competitive advantages. For instance it 
is guaranteed financial terms and it is exempted from anti-monopoly 
clause. However, the viability of the Enterprise as a commercial organ 
depends to a great extent on the financial and technological contribution 
of state parties to the Convention, especially developed states.
The system of seabed disputes settlement of the Convention seems 
workable because it reflects the aspirations of developing and developed 
countries. The system is so flexible that it does not confer the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber absolute jurisdiction and competence on all kinds of 
disputes. The rules of commercial arbitration can be applicable in case 
any dispute relating to the interpretation and application of contracts 
where the Authority is one of the parties. Moreover, the workability of 
the system appears in the competence of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber to 
mle on the applicability of the decisions of the Authority in special cases.
Unilateral legislation justify their compatibility with the common 
heritage of mankind by including many aspects of the principle such as the 
benefits of mankind taking into account the needs of developing states. 
They also argued that they are not in contrast with the Convention because 
they are designed to be of interim nature to be superseded by the entry 
into force of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, by making 
reference to the provisions of the legislation one can notice that they 
incorporate a different system and therefore, are incompatible with the
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Convention.
The regime incorporated in the unilateral legislation seems very 
attractive and favourable for the private industries to acquire great 
benefits. It excludes the burdensome requirements envisaged in the 
Convention system such as heavy financial terms, production control, anti 
monopoly clause and transfer of technology. Therefore, miners will have 
great opportunity to develop deep sea bed mining and may invest more 
capital. However, benefits gained from mining under this regime should 
be balanced with the costs which might be incurred on an international 
level.
Security of tenure of mine site under this regime is uncertain. A 
permittee may not have security on his mine site in case any competing 
claim is raised from a permittee of another state and therefore, an 
international conflict may occur. This possible situation is stipulated in the 
German Act in Section 5 (1) 3, which provides that licensees will not be 
granted in case there is a danger that the development of deep sea bed 
mining will either "substantially impair the rights of others in their 
exercise of the freedom of the high sea", or "considerably disturb the 
foreign relations of the Federal Republic of Germany."
Relying upon unilateral legislation in carrying out exploitation 
activity, companies would have no real security for their considerable 
amount of capital investment in deep sea bed mining. As the Group of 77 
declared:
It should be stressed that no investor would have guarantee for 
his investments in such activities, for the other states in defense 
of the common heritage of mankind, and no purported 
diplom atic protection would carry any legal w eight 
whatsoever.2
2 UNCLOS m . Off. Rec., VoLXI, p.82.
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Moreover, a serious legal problem may confront the unilateral 
regime on international level. Unilateral exploitation of deep sea bed 
resources may be challenged before the ICJ. The United Nations General 
Assembly may request the ICJ to rule with an advisory opinion on the 
legality of this regime with international law. If the ICJ ruled against 
unilateral legislation, it is likely that the public opinion of the 
international community will be influenced and may create hostility.
The regulation of deep sea bed mining needs an agreed universal 
regime acceptable to all parties of the international community in order to 
establish an effective legal framework for deep sea bed mining. 
Therefore, it is of great importance to achieve a legal compromise so as to 
carry out mining activities in a fair and orderly manner and satisfy all 
interests of all states for the sake of international peace and public order in 
the world ocean. In strict sense, the Convention has not yet achieved the 
universal character, but according to the overwhelming support of the 
international community to the Convention by acquiring one hundered 
fifty nine signatures including some developed countries which possess 
the deep sea bed mining technology (e.g. France, Italy, Netherlands, Japan 
and Soviet Union), it can be said that the Convention has almost achieved 
something close to it. Even though the system of exploitation embodied in 
the Convention, which was accepted as the only compromise between the 
conflicting positions of the developed and developing states and which was 
worked out by developed countries, did not satisfy the interests of a few 
number of states. Efforts should be made to make the system universally 
acceptable to all states either through negotiations especially under the 
auspices of the Preparatory Commission on the International Sea-Bed 
Authority or through the review conference which provides for a review 
of the system in fifteen years after the earliest commercial production
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under the Convention. It is important to preserve the international regime 
of the Convention which was the result of considerable efforts made by 
the international community, in order to achieve an effective regime to 
regulate deep sea bed mining in an orderly manner. Therefore, as Brown 
said:
It would be unrealistic to expect the majority of states to 
abandon the regime painfully constructed in the UN Convention 
and to acquiesce in its replacement by a new order evolved from 
the reciprocating states regime.3
3 E.D. Brown, The Area Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Vol.2, p. 
11.851 (1984).
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